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At that moment that fear is too great, I want you to close your eyes and go to that
Hundred-Acre Wood. And I want you to think, you're stronger than you seem, smarter
than you think, and braver than you believe.
– James Carville, loosely quoting Winnie the Pooh
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ABSTRACT
Are new media technologies stirring up negative partisan feelings in the American
public? Can researchers find ways of using new media tools to reduce affective
polarization? Relying on a series of experiments featuring online newsfeeds and social
media discussions, this dissertation seeks to answer these questions by testing the
influence of partisan news and political discussions in realistic Internet environments.
Two custom news “portals” (2016, 2018) expose participants to actual partisan news
content. Two Facebook discussion experiments (2017, 2019) randomly assign
participants to start real political discussions on their personal social media accounts,
using discussion-initiation strategies designed to reduce partisan animus. Results from
these efforts lead to two conclusions: first, partisan news exposure in online news
environments may not be as polarizing as is often feared; next, social media users are
capable of depolarizing themselves by the ways they begin political discussions. Both
citizens and service providers can take steps to improve our hostile political climate
through low-cost decisions.

x

CHAPTER I.
NEW MEDIA AND THE RISE OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION
Introduction
In an interview with The New Yorker magazine immediately preceding the outcome of the
2016 presidential election, outgoing President Barack Obama had this to say about the perils of
political communication in an age of new media technologies:
An explanation of climate change from a Nobel Prize-winning physicist looks exactly the
same on your Facebook page as the denial of climate change by somebody on the Koch
brothers’ payroll. And the capacity to disseminate misinformation, wild conspiracy
theories, to paint the opposition in wildly negative light without any rebuttal—that has
accelerated in ways that much more sharply polarize the electorate and make it very
difficult to have a common conversation (Remnick, 2016).
This is not the first time American elites have expressed concerns about the influence of mass
media technology in radicalizing public opinion. Some of the earliest work in mass communication
research from the early Twentieth Century decries the dangers of hysterical messaging and
propaganda techniques on a gullible public. In Laswell’s (1927) famous deconstruction of
Wilsonian propaganda techniques, the fear that mass audiences were susceptible to direct and
uniform media influence was a common narrative. Walter Lippmann, perhaps America’s foremost
public intellectual at the time, regularly raised concerns that in the absence of objective journalism
and responsible elite discourse, the public was likely to accept any untruth put in front of them
(Lippmann, 1922). Does our new media environment today pose risks similar to what was feared
a century ago, or are these fears overstated as they were shown to be for older media (Klapper,
1960)? Are we bound to a spiral of fear and loathing, or does the public have the capacity to use
new technological affordances to alleviate political divisions rather than exacerbate them? Each of
these questions motivate the empirical investigations described in what follows.
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Of particular interest for this project is President Obama’s fear about the ability of new
media platforms enabling news makers and members of the public “to paint the opposition in
wildly negative light without any rebuttal.” Whether it is through hostile comments about political
opponents, or continuous reinforcement of pre-formed views from news makers, Obama and
others warn that new media technologies make political antipathy easier to spread and harder to
resist. But is this true? Do new media technologies make Americans dislike their political rivals
more now than in the past? Opinions on the relationship between online media and the extremity
of attitudes of mass politics are wide-ranging. Recent controversies involving Facebook and other
tech giants signal concern about the influence emerging technologies might have over opinions
and attitudes.
Within the research community, the past decade has seen calls for new theoretical and
methodological approaches that better capture the influence of partisan news and social media on
the average American’s political attitudes. These calls motivated a renaissance of new media
research that attempt to keep up with rapid technological changes and user affordances (Iyengar
& Bennett, 2008, 2010; Holbert, Garrett, and Gleason, 2010; Krupnikov & Searles, 2018). As
fruitful as these attempts have been, it remains rare to find experimental research testing new media
effects in real or realistic new media settings. Past work establishes useful constructs either
theoretically, observationally, or under laboratory conditions. The next logical step is to test known
predictions in scenarios that mimic, as closely as possible, the media conditions of the real world.
In this dissertation, I seek to understand how aggregating news portals and social media
political discussions can influence one emerging dimension of mass political division called
affective polarization. My efforts are founded in two common predictions about online political
life: first, that popular claims about the influence of “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers” of
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political news facilitated by news portals increase polarized attitudes (e.g. Sunstein 2001, 2017),
and how engaging in specific modes of political discussion on social media might alleviate partisan
distain from Facebook users, contrary to conventional concerns. The practical hope of this project
is to provide evidence for how fears about the negative effects of user-customized news
environments are likely over-stated, and how different forms of individual expression on social
media, such as the option to behave and talk in specific ways, can be balms for our heated political
situation.
My approach seeks answers by relying on two distinct tools of new media: news portals
and social media discussion features (“statuses” and comments from friends in particular), to
influence political attitudes and talk. Each of these tools capitalizes on a phenomenon unique to
Internet media mechanisms: individual-level customization and user interaction. Unlike previous
media technologies – such as newspapers, radio, or television – new media technologies, like
newsfeeds and social media comment sections, offer levels of personalization and social
connectivity never previously observed. The effects of these innovations on the public’s political
attitudes and behaviors continue to intrigue scholars.
This dissertation contributes to current trends in research by experimentally examining
known effects in political communication literature by relying on innovative study designs. In
particular, the external validity advantages of the investigations reported here include choice rather
than forced exposure, real news content rather than researcher-created news, timely news articles
from actual online sources, and posts to a group of participants’ real Facebook profiles that invite
political discussion. All data collected for each of the four studies examined below seek to
operationalize known partisan news exposure and political discussion constructs using realistic (in
the case of news portals) and real (in the case of Facebook) new media environments.
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Recent events in politics might lead us to believe new media technologies are public
dangers. Scholarly discussions of the political importance of new media are typically framed in
terms of their influence on the health of democratic norms. On the one hand, some argue that the
Internet is essentially ambivalent in its fundamental relationship with democracy (Hindman, 2010;
Tucker et al. 2017), generally reinforcing norms and structures of power that existed prior to the
prominence of the web as a communication resource. Others speculate that the Internet’s capacity
for spreading a diversity of perspectives is foundational to the future of democratic societies,
especially among citizens wishing to hold governments accountable (Diamond, 2010). Others
speculate whether the Internet will lead to the demise of democracy itself (Persily, 2017). Rather
than castigating newsfeeds and comment sections as culprits in the increasing polarization of the
American public, we should focus on efforts to understand how public uses of these technologies
can alleviate, or at least blunt, the force of polarizing trends.
Hindman (2008) provides two key insights for our normative expectations for the Internet:
contrary to early hopes that the emergence of the Internet constituted a radical opportunity for
democratic values to succeed (e.g. Papacharissi, 2002), effects of the web often appear to bolster
or reinforce pre-existing structures of inequality (or reshuffle inequities of social influence into
different hands). Instead, the Internet appears to influence publics in much the same way earlier
innovations were utilized for undesirable or praiseworthy ends. There is no single normative story
that paradigmatically explains the impact of the Internet. The public is stratified in terms of its
knowledge of political facts (Converse, 2000) and not uniformly likely to consume political
content (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013). Identifying the conditions under which technological
change affects different groups, as well as identifying how these tools can be marshalled for the
general welfare, is a challenging but important goal of political communication research.
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Rather than rejecting the core concepts that underly political communication research,
scholars today must adapt methodological techniques and study designs to keep pace with
changing technological affordances and the social disparities that emerge as a result of
technological change. This dissertation does so by investigating previously established theoretical
relationships about partisan news exposure and political discussions within methodological
environments that are more externally valid to where these phenomena take place in the real world.
In a modern media environment, a sizable percentage of the American public is exposed to
information via newsfeeds, whether on social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter, or through
aggregator feeds like Google News that employ heuristics such as headline prominence, source
attributions, and web-page aesthetics to increase user returns to the website (Wu, 2017; Hindman,
2018). As the country increasingly relies on these platforms as their primary sources of political
information (Pew, 2018), it is important for scholars to re-examine many of the predictions and
conclusions about the influence of partisan news and social interactions observed on older media
and investigate them within the context of newer platforms.
Much of the partisan media effects literature focusing on polarization has three key
differences from the methods employed in this dissertation. First, the medium in many past media
effects experiments is often video or newspaper content taken from known partisan television
outlets (Levendusky, 2013; Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013). Second, is rarely treated as the
polarization dependent variable of choice in media effects experiments, or it is demoted to a
secondary outcome in favor of measuring the presence or absence of forms of speech believed to
be consistent with democratic norms such as civility (e.g. Muddiman & Stroud, 2017; Stroud,
Scacco, Muddiman, & Curry, 2014). Past discussion and partisan news exposure related work also
focuses on the issue-based ideology of extremity of constraint (Druckman, Levendusky, &
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McLain, 2018). Lastly, experimental treatments are often delivered in laboratory contexts that
reveal powerful causal effects but may fail to generalize in settings more germane to the way
people are exposed to partisan news and discussion in ordinary life.
The Rise of Affective Polarization
In recent years, political scientists and communication researchers identified an affective
dimension to the politically polarized attitudes of the American public. Because social scientists
operationalize political polarization in a number of different ways, I think it is worthwhile to take
a few moments to discuss measurement strategy and some of the available options in determining
how best to think of polarization, as well as set the stage for the experimental stimuli utilized in
the studies below.
Quite a few dimensions of polarization have been targeted over the last decade or so (see
reviews, Prior, 2013; Lelkes, 2016; Boxell, Gentzkow, & Shapiro, 2017). There are long-lasting
debates about the nature and scale of political polarization in the American public. Many different
dimensions of political polarization receive attention in political communication, including the
extent to which Americans express antipathy for political opponents. The paradigmatic approach
to polarization research has been to focus on issue-positions, candidate evaluations, and the
strength of self-identification with party labels.
Those who try to describe and account for the phenomenon of political polarization often
draw their battle lines on the policy preferences of Americans. Abramowitz & Saunders (2008)
and Abramowitz (2010) have investigated the consistency of policy positions over time. They
measured “ideological” polarization using ANES time-series data to determine whether the
public’s issue preferences had become more bimodal, or organized into two distinguishable poles,
over time. Ideological consistency takes a battery of policy topics and asks respondents to identify
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whether they take a conservative (=1), moderate (=0), or liberal (-1) stance toward each issue. The
scores are then summed, providing a fifteen-point scale (-7 to 7) with high scores meaning strongly
conservative and low scores strongly liberal.
Critics of this form of issue-based convergence note that while people may be more apt to
organize policy preferences according to the agendas of their preferred party, most members of the
public do not hold to those policy views with more conviction or extremity now than in the past
(Fiorina., Abrams, & Pope, 2005, 2008). Thinking of political polarization as a set of structured
policy positions emerged before the new millennium. The approach comes from early work in
public opinion research found in Converse (1964) and Campbell et al. (1960) who attempted to
find what they called “constraint,” or the degree to which our policy preferences track together in
a correlated way. However, results from those early investigations, as well as attempts to replicate
their investigations of ideological constraint, find that most Americans do not actually hold
consistent and ideologically structured policy preferences over time (Zaller, 1992; Kinder &
Kalmoe, 2017). In fact, misperceptions about the positions and coalitional compassion of the two
parties is so rampant that one recent study (Ahler & Sood, 2018) found that correcting some of
these basic misperceptions led to decreases in the amount of partisan antipathy people were willing
to express.
Most Americans are ideologically “innocent.” Kinder & Kalmoe (2017), in revisiting
Converse’s claims from 1964, confirm that very few Americans can accurately identify liberal and
conservative policy positions, or identify the two parties in ideological terms, or self-assess their
own policy preferences in terms of liberal or conservative values. This does not mean people are
stupid, as both Converse (2000) and Key (1966) feared the narrative might become. The core
problem with optimism about the rationality of the American public comes not from low rationality
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per se, but a host of psychological and heuristic tendencies that make the public vulnerable to
misinformation (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) and prone to motivated reasoning as a defense
mechanism against uncomfortable political disagreement (Taber & Lodge, 2006, 2013).
An alternative measure of political polarization that frees scholars from the mire of
ideology (though not without its own conceptual challenges) the importance of party identity in
shaping social attitudes toward political opponents. As debate raged over whether ideological and
issue-based polarization is occurring in the mass public at all, Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes (2012)
developed a construct founded in social identity theory (Tajfel, 1970) called affective polarization.
Their landmark study wielded several measures of affective attitudes toward out-partisans,
including, most notably for this project, differences in feeling thermometer scores for participant’s
feelings toward their in- and out-party taken from the American National Election Survey (1960 –
2010). Famously, Iyengar et al. (2012) conclude that “both Republicans and Democrats
increasingly dislike, even loathe, their opponents” (pg. 1).
Iyengar and colleagues determined that partisans have increasingly come to dislike the
other side over time using three separate measurement strategies. The first measure uses feeling
thermometers to measure the amount of negative affect a participant expresses toward the opposing
party, which they show to have increased significantly. Iyengar et al’s (2012) second measure
involves asking respondents how they would feel if a close family member married a member of
the opposing party. This second measure is often considered a measure of social distance rather
than polarization and has recently been interpreted as an indicator of distaste for politics in general
rather than a sign of partisan distain (Klar, Krupnikov, & Ryan, 2018). Finally, they assess trait
attribution of political candidates by analyzing responses to questions that asked participants to
stereotype Republicans and Democrats by ranking the degree to which specific adjectives describe
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those groups. For example, since 1980 the ANES has asked participants whether they would rate
people groups, including the Republican and Democratic parties, as intelligent or moral (Lelkes,
2016).
While conceiving of public attitudes in a way that de-emphasizes policy positions is
consistent with long history of arguments about how the public does not hold fully informed and
structured political beliefs (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992), the value of Iyengar et al.’s (2012)
contribution comes in the rendering of political divisions in terms of how individuals feel toward
political opponents. People do not need to be profoundly divided by their policy preferences to be
affectively polarized (Iyengar, et al. 2012; Mason, 2015). According to this finding, people do not
need to become more polarized in terms of their issue-preferences, but in how they feel toward
people they disagree with and perceive to be members of antagonistic groups. Among the various
kinds of polarization offered by the research community, Boxwell, Gentzkow, & Shapiro (2017)
present evidence that partisan affective polarization is by far the most prominent construct of
polarization identified in public opinion surveys. Although it seems apparent that many partisans
are willing to overstate their feelings of antipathy toward partisan opponents (Abramowitz &
Webster, 2015), it remains clear that affective polarization has increased over time and continues
to be a highly salient means by which Americans evaluate their political opponents.
What are the causes of Affective Polarization?
When Iyengar et al. (2012) proposed affective polarization as a new dimension of political
attitudes that might divide the American public, they cited social identity theory as the bedrock
behind why ordinary people might become deeply intrenched in seeing themselves as members of
a political party. According to the foundations of social identity theory, people think of themselves
as representatives of certain traits linking them to a group (Tajfel, 1978). There are several reasons
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why party might become a powerful identity. From the earliest examinations of partisanship,
research in political science placed the origins of political identity in community (ca). Political
identity is likely to become entrenched because it is acquired at an early age (Sears, 1975). This
early socialization within our communities is then amplified by the electoral politics of American
political campaigns. Media coverage, as well as the campaign infrastructures of both major
political parties the United States, are always preparing for the next election (Lee, 2016; Kreiss,
2016). Campaigns intentionally develop messages that attempt to activate emotions like anger or
fear that are activated when we feel our group is under threat (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015).
One potential challenge to the social identity connection is that partisans are more likely to
dislike their opponents than they are to like members of their own party. The increase in affective
polarization observed by Iyengar et al.’s analysis of the ANES timeseries since 1960 is not driven
by increased feelings or warmth toward one’s own party, but greater feelings of animus toward the
other side. This phenomenon, dubbed “negative partisanship” by Abramowitz and Webster (2015)
may be amplified by social pressures associated with the characteristics of group membership on
would predict under the assumptions of social identity theory. Mason (2016) has argued that
increases in the sorting of many identities under the common framework of partisanship leads
highly-sorted partisans to more easily experience the negative emotions believed to be
foundational to partisan distain, such as anger or fear.
Both news portals and social media comment sections may be environments where
exacerbations of affective polarization are plausible. Survey investigations into the relationship
between news information exposure and affective polarization note that increased exposure to proattitudinal information leads to increased affective polarization, while counter-attitudinal exposure
may have little or no influence (Garrett, Dvir Gvirsman, Johnson, Tsfati, Neo, & Dal, 2014).
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Consistent with offline results showing that threatening partisan messages induce anger (Huddy et
al, 2015), especially among well-sorted partisans (Mason, 2016, 2018), Suhay et al. (2018) show
in a compelling experiment that exposure to hostile partisan messages in the comment sections of
news websites leads to increased affective polarization. Despite the fact that many news sites are
doing away with public comment sections, it is not difficult to infer that exposure to similarly
hostile messages in other online comment environments lead to similar effects.
Measuring Affective Polarization
Traditionally, affect is measured by a host of self-report measures intended to gauge an
individual’s affective orientation toward an exterior object, whether it’s an individual, institution,
or group (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen 1988; Russell, Barrett, & Feldman, 1999; Watson, Betella,
Verschure, & Paul, 2016). While feeling thermometers are standard measures in many political
communication studies, Iyengar et al. (2012) also estimate affective polarization using ANES
items asking respondents how they would feel if a loved one (e.g. a son or daughter) married a
member of the opposing party. This measure is commonly interpreted as a measure of social
distance rather than affective polarization, and it is debatable whether the two constructs are
actually measuring the same phenomenon (Klar, Krupnikov, & Ryan, 2018). As mentioned earlier,
trait attributions of partisans, including elites and ordinary voters, are also sometimes treated as
indicators of affective polarization (Levendusky, 2018; Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016a; Iyengar
et al., 2012).
This dissertation focuses on feeling thermometer differences. Stroud (2010) measured
affective polarization (although under a different name) by calculating the absolute value
difference between scale ratings for two objects, such as the Republican and Democratic parties.
This measure will be utilized extensively in my dissertation as the primary calculation for affective

- 11 -

polarization dependent variables. In her analysis of candidate and party favorability during the
2004 presidential election, Stroud finds that time-series survey responses reveal a temporal
relationship between partisan news exposure and polarization where increases in self-reported use
of conservative or liberal news precedes increases in the scale gap in favorability toward George
W. Bush vs. John Kerry. This, along with laboratory evidence that stronger partisans increase in
affective polarization after viewing partisan news (Levendusky, 2013) leads to a reasonable
expectation that affective polarization should increase from partisan news exposure in a news
portal, especially among individuals claiming strong association with one of the two dominant
political parties.
For my purposes and following Stroud’s lead, an affective polarization gap is calculated
by finding the average absolute value difference between feelings toward two objects commonly
understood to oppose one another on a unidimensional partisan plane. For my purposes, dependent
variables will be constructed to measure differences in feeling thermometer gaps toward several
target objects of interest Increases in the gap score indicate greater divergence between feelings
toward political parties, party elites, news organizations, individuals who disagree with a
participant’s views on policy topics, and ordinary Republican and Democratic voters, yielding a
possible range of 0 (no polarization) to 100 (completely polarized). For example:
DV1CongressAffect = |x| = MthermPartyConA – MthermPartyConB
DV2PartisanAffect = |x| = MthermPartyA – MthermPartyB
This approach allows us to identify the size of affective differences between feelings
toward both parties.

As the gap score increases in value, we can conclude that affective

polarization toward Republicans or Democrats is higher. In the context of how this phenomenon
has emerged historically, Figure 1.1 displays ANES results for the affective polarization gap for
partisan differences between 1980-2016. Figure 1.1 demonstrates how the gap in public feelings
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toward both parties over time increases as we approach 2016, as well as the average partisan
feeling gap for both parties, which is the same measure as out primary dependent variable.
Past approaches to the study of affective polarization are handicapped by the ANES feeling
thermometer items that ask respondents to indicate their degree of coldness or warmth toward the
Democratic and Republican parties. Longitudinal data describing the public’s thermometer gap
ratings of other major partisan groups or individuals is not available. However, there is emerging
evidence that the public evaluates different partisan actors differently (Druckman & Levendusky,
forthcoming). Beyond speculating about the public’s different schemas, even less experimental
research examines partisan news or social media treatment effects in influencing affective
polarization toward a range of partisan groups, persons, and organizations.
Figure 1.1. Affective polarization toward both political parties increases over
time.
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Source: ANES timeseries data: 1980-2016
Note: polarization decrease for Republicans between 2012 and 2016 results from
diminished positive affect from self-identified Republicans toward their own
party (M[2012] = 66; M[2016] = 60).
The feeling gap is the absolute value difference between attitudes toward two distinct
objects. It is insightful to critique social-distance measures as having more to do with a distaste for
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politics in general and not true animus toward political opponents (Klar et al., 2018). The feeling
gap overcomes this limitation by comparing feelings toward an in-group and out-group
simultaneously, not only assessing how one might feel if forced to interact with a strong outpartisan, let alone a self-reported measure of feelings toward only one side of the political divide.
It is also important to note that previous measures of affective polarization, including feeling
thermometer scores, are known to have increased in recent decades (Iyengar et al., 2018; Lelkes,
2016; Iyengar, et al. 2012). Reconceptualizing affective polarization as a distaste for encountering
opposing partisans helpfully re-frames the language of this social-distance dimension of
polarization, but still invites explanation from scholars as to why responses to these measures have
increased over time.
The thermometer gap measure of affective polarization does have a key limitation worth
mentioning. If someone has a general distaste for strong partisans on both sides, it wouldn’t be
legitimate to describe that person as being affectively polarized along a partisan dimension. They
might feel strongly cold toward Republicans and Democrats simultaneously and would therefore
report a low thermometer gap. Figure 1.1 also reports that what appears to be a slight decrease in
affective polarization for the average scores between both parties is explained by a reducing in
positive thermometer ratings of the Republican party by self-identified Republicans. The hope of
my Facebook discussion experiments is to induce reductions in affective polarization by using the
social affordances uniquely offered by social media, though additional investigation is required to
fully explicate the consequences of measuring affective divisions in terms of the thermometer gap
as opposed to other strategies.
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Why Should We Care About Affective Polarization?
The consequences of increased affective polarization may extend to corners of social and
cultural life that we might not expect at face value. In a 2018 review of the origins and
consequences of affective polarization from Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra, and
Westwood, the authors describe many of the potentially negative social and political consequences
of increased affective polarization in the mass public. For example, increases in the social distance
expressed by survey respondents between Republican and Democratic voters suggests that people
are increasingly prone to avoid contact with those who might disagree with their politics (Carlson
& Settle, 2016). Partisans tend to evaluate the physical attractiveness of out-partisans differently
from in-partisans, punishing the beauty of people we think prefer political candidates who oppose
the ones we prefer (Nicolson, et al. 2016). Chopik and Motyl (2016) investigate how the influence
of living areas where out-partisans constitute the majority of the population leads people to feel
like it is difficult to form new friendships. Many partisans report a desire to move away from these
incongruent areas to places more aligned with the party preference (Gimple & Hui, 2015). As
partisan biases continue to shape our outlook on fellow citizens, scholars should address ways of
countering the increasing salience of political divides within the context of existing technological
and cultural affordances.
Positive Outcomes of Social Media Use
Despite the polarizing effects observed when folks are forced to see attitude reinforcing
content or experience political disagreement, there are good reasons to predict that different
dimensions of polarization can be improved under the right conditions. Many possible mechanisms
play in a role in shaping post-discussion attitudes. First, our lived experience of agreement and
disagreement has powerful effects on how we evaluate the other side (Mutz, 2006). If different
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kinds of political discussions can be induced by framing the values of that discussion at its starting
point, scholars may find that attitudes emerging from those discussions vary according to how they
began. Second, the combined force of our personal identity and social interactions may deeply
shape our responses to different modes of speech. Using the example of Facebook, ordinary users
are bombarded with a complex array of social influences, news items, community impressions,
and position-taking cues that signal the political orientations of Facebook friends. In combination,
these factors in any newsfeed might lead to increased political politization, as is compellingly
shown by Settle (2018), but may also provide users with a stage to demonstrate depolarizing
behaviors.
There is also evidence that overall social media usage (not just political use) has an easing
effect on political tensions. Since the majority of social media users are not primarily online for
political purposes (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), studies that raise fears about negative partisan
message exposure risk overstating the relative importance of politics in online social contexts.
Furthermore, Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro, 2017 note that the demographic groups most likely
to have increasingly polarized over the last twenty years are the groups least likely to be regular
users of social media (i.e. increased age and lower levels of education). Increased social media
usage is also correlated with believing oneself to be open-minded toward opinion change
(Barnidge et al. 2017) and, as noted earlier, social media users are more likely to be exposed to
ideological diversity compared to non-users (Bakshy et al, 2015; Barberá, 2015, Fletcher and
Nielsen, 2017). Fears about selective exposure and increased partisan differences online do not
appear to be radically different from partisan exposure that depends on other forms of media. While
strong partisans seek out and are emboldened by partisan media content on television
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(Levendusky, 2013), a majority of audiences tune out from politics when given the choice
(Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013).
People can also use social media to encourage positive political and social change. Munger
(2017), for example, showed that individuals posting derogatory comments on Twitter could be
socially pressured to be more considerate (by members of their in-group), and Messing and
Westwood (2014) provide evidence that people will privilege friendly endorsements of online
content from people they know ahead of source credibility, even over-riding partisan biases. In
other words, there is potential to wield the social pressures uniquely available on social media to
encourage positive social and political behaviors. One goal of this dissertation is to identify ways
of encouraging citizens to engage in positive and constructive discussions and behaviors in the
presence of others. This is a separate goal from trying to shift the policy beliefs of everyone who
sees or participates in the discussions, but to nudge the mindsets of participants toward a peaceful
direction. For my purposes, these dynamics could be moderated by previous evidence showing
that the more politically sorted individuals are, the more emotionally reactive they tend to be when
exposed to partisan hostility (Mason, 2018). Mason also shows that this is especially true for
people whose identities converge along multiple social (i.e. religion, race, party identification,
ideological self-placement) and issue-based identities.
Deliberation Online and Its Limitations
What are potential solutions of the political antipathy observed by current qualtitative and
qualitative studies? Previous investigations into the persuasive effects of online information
exposure and media participation paint a grim picture for the prospects of depolarization. Some
observers articulate fears that in an environment of media choice and the potential for widespread
selective exposure to agreeable views, the internet creates a haven for like-minded individuals by
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creating information bubbles that permit them believe whatever they wish without being exposed
to counter-balancing information (e.g. Sunstein, 2001, 2009, 2017). While these fears appear to be
unfounded in the case of heavy social media users (Bakshy et al, 2015; Barberá, 2015, Fletcher &
Nielsen, 2017), a common solution offered by commentators and researchers has been to
encourage exposure to cross-cutting information, or facts and beliefs that challenge our own
perspectives (Mutz, 2002, 2006).
Scholars interested in deliberative democratic theory routinely consider the importance of
cross-cutting exposure to the moderation of political divides (Mutz, 2006). Mutz presents a
consequential trade-off: while exposure to differences in political opinion does tend to cool-off
political disagreements, the Americans most likely to engage in this kind of exposure (i.e.
deliberators), are also less likely to participate in politics. Hopes among democratic theorists that
participation lies at the heart of a well-functionign democracy are dashed since spaces of
deliberative exchange (Habermas, 1989) depress the passions of partisans who are likely to remain
participatory. So while deliberation appears to have a depolarizing effect, participation in the
political process suffers. Scholars should continue to seek ways of encouraging voters to
participate in politics in ways that do not worsen sectarian differences.
This strategy is often employed in terms of opposing argument exposure and
comprehension (e.g. Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997; Price & Cappella, 2002; Price, Cappella, and Nir,
2002). Argument exposure is frequently used in persuasion studies. Chaiken (1980), in
distinguishing between heuristic and systematic evaluations, determined that experimental
participants possessing high levels of interest and a relatively high information cache about a given
topic are more likely to think systematically when exposed to structured arguments, while lowinterest individuals are likely to rely on short-cuts (e.g. a speaker’s likeability), suggesting that
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persons with high and low levels of political interest will react differently when confronted with
cross-cutting arguments. Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) attempt to show how forced exposure to
arguments critical of one’s issue beliefs are persuasive, at least in the short term, by assessing
people’s self-assessment on an agreement scale before and after exposure to contrary arguments.
Similar approaches are conducted in online contexts. In the early 2000s, Price and Cappella
conducted a large-scale online deliberative experiment where citizens met in regular sessions
during the 2000 presidential campaign to discuss the election and leading issues of the contest.
These meetings were hosted in online chatrooms with moderators overseeing manicured
discussions. Outcomes of this process were gauged by an innovative measure, argument repertoire
(AR), that assesses participants’ awareness of arguments for and against their own beliefs. While
positive results were modest and largely conditioned on participation levels, the studies suggested
that certain forms of online discussion and argument exposure might foster understanding.
Personal accounts of experiences relevant to certain policy disputes may also reduce
affective polarization by framing political divides in humanizing rather than contentious terms. In
her critique of the limitations of deliberation as the key normative ideal of democratic discussion,
Sanders (1997) proposes that “appeals to deliberation […] have often been fraught with
connotations of rationality, reserve, cautiousness, quietude, community, selflessness, and
universalism, connotations which in fact probably undermine deliberation’s democratic claims”
(pg. 348). According to Sanders, in defining the entry-level conditions of deliberation in this way,
theorists unintentionally established prerequisites for participating in the deliberative process that
unequally favor some citizens more than others. After all, if citizens tend to be politically
uninformed, motivated by identarian attachments to process information in a biased way, and
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typically fail to maintain well-structured political belief systems, which citizens can participate in
deliberation?
To alleviate some of these limitations, Sanders recommends that political theorists extend
the scope of democratic discourse to include operationalizations of testimony, or the idea “telling
one’s particular story” in the context of a political discussion may be equally successful in
prompting democratic norms as traditional conceptions of deliberative discourse. My second
Facebook discussion study described in Chapter V attempts to compare the influence of inviting
personal stories against a traditional rendering of deliberative invitations for reasoned speech.
Another option emerges from a comination of literatures investigating the importance of
social identites in the evaluation of political beliefs. As Mason has recently argued (2014, 2018),
politically relevant sorting is more than just the correlation between ideological issue constraint
and partisanship. Political antipathy is exacerbated by the number of self-identies that converge
within any individuals self-understanding. For example, to the extent that one political party
represents multiple identities (e.g. white, Christian, Republican, pro-gun), the strength of one’s
partisanship is positively related to the overlap of these potential identities. In order to combat this
identity-based sorting, Levendusky (2018) conducted an experiment in which participants were
exposed to news content that framed political disputes by cueing a shared American identity for
the readers. This stimulus is intended to dislodge identites that are characterized by division (e.g.
party id) and increase the prominence of shared identities in a person’s subconscious evaluations
of oppositional persons or information.
Summary of What’s to Come
Two news portal experiments investigate partisan news source headline exposure on
affective polarization. Using real news articles presented in a scrollable newsfeed, both portal
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experiments introduce artificially high levels of partisan news to participants. The first portal,
conducted in the early Summer of 2016, extracted articles from the Google News collection of
timely stories from Fox News and MSNBC and randomly assigned participants to increased
exposure from one of those sources or neither. This allows for a realistic test of both pro- and
counter-attitudinal news source exposure to partisans with varying degrees of attachment to their
preferred party. Two years later, a second portal randomly assigned participants with a known
party preference to see an experimentally higher dosage of real articles extracted from the
homepages of a group of sources with a reputation or partisan slant supportive of the subject’s
party preference. The articles appeared within the same newsfeed as other real news articles
collected from Google News. The 2018 approach allows for a more powerful treatment of partisan
news exposure relying on user-customization, a practice which many news portal designers may
have a financial incentive to institute, possess the technology to deploy, and also forms the basis
of many popularized critiques of the modern news delivery ecosystem.
Next, two Facebook discussion experiments are conducted to identify ways of using
specific discussion initiation strategies to reduce the affective polarization of participants.
Participants in both studies are asked to post pre-written discussion prompts to their real Facebook
profiles inviting their actual connections to engage in a conversation about a policy topic. Each
discussion prompt includes language framing the intentions or recommended procedure of the
conversation. In a 2017 pilot study, participants were asked to post discussion prompts that asked
interlocutors to either withhold their personal position on the topic and collaborate on a solution
(called “deliberation”), or to reveal their position at the onset of the discussion and then continue
to find a solution (referred to as “debate”). A 2019 experiment expanded on this approach by
replacing the “debate” prompt with two new prompts specifically designed to target and reduce
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affective polarization. One prompt invited participants or their Facebook “friends” to share a
personal story of how the policy topic affected them personally (called “testimony”), while another
asked discussants to put aside partisan differences and focus on the importance of the issue topic
for all Americans (called “shared American identity”). Both versions of the experiment also
include treatments involving requests for the presentation of evidence in the discussions. As we
shall see, the interaction between the prompt discussion frames and requests for evidence play an
intriguing role in the possibility of using social media to reduce affective polarization.
Both the news portal and Facebook discussion experiments test pre-existing theoretical
relationships between partisan news exposure and political discussion on levels of affective
polarization. I present no original model of new media effects on polarization in this dissertation.
Instead, the goal is to examine the merits of previous contributions to the study of partisan media
effects using methods that are specifically designed to mimic the conditions of online political
engagement in the real world, while preserving the advantages uniquely available to experimental
methods.
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CHAPTER II.
PARTISAN NEWS EXPOSURE AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION
Keeping Up with Technological Change
Why study partisan news exposure in modern news delivery environments? Since the
earliest experiments in media effects, scholars have dealt with the methodological challenge of
ensuring that message exposure in laboratory contexts matches how people consume media
messages in normal life. Most of this research focused on how media messages are successful in
shaping the ways consumers think about specific topics, the different levels of importance assigned
to those topics, and the extent to which people use those insights to evaluate political elites (e.g.
McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). Recently media effects investigations have
been combined with polarization research in public opinion to assess the media’s capacity to
influence psychological and social variations of polarization.
Within the last ten years, political communication scholars devoted tremendous interest in
the importance of a rapid expansion in the number or available news channels, outlets, and
information sources present in the contemporary media environment. Some scholars report that
the proliferation of choice in partisan news availability leads Americans to consume news that
converts them into more extreme versions of themselves; others argue that signals of increased
extremism are products of a path-dependency created by an environment of choice. Under this
view, partisans appear more partisan because they select into favorable news, not because partisan
news sources are converting the politically lukewarm into radicals.
The first major development in this trend toward greater choice was the introduction of
cable television. In his book Post Broadcast Democracy, Markus Prior (2007) investigated how a
television environment with a large diversity of content allowed national audiences to sort
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themselves according to their consumption preferences. Politically, he argues that the American
public divided into “news-junkie” and “entertainment-seeker” camps. The former group was
comprised largely of politically motivated individuals who tend to be partisans with higher rates
of political engagement and civic knowledge. Entertainment seekers emerge in a choice
environment by taking advantage of the potential to “tune out” from political news completely.
Likewise, people prone to seek out political news can select into watching the 24-hour cable news
networks, each likely incubating the pre-existing views of the audience in one way or another.
Before the rise of cable television, rates of incidental exposure to basic political information were
high among the public because nightly broadcast news shows were, in many cases, the only
program airing during many primetime time-slots. As the number of choices increased, a shared
sense of the important political narratives disappeared.
Concurrent with this research is the emergence of a wide body of scholarship debating the
existence and causes of political polarization in the American public (e.g. Abramowitz &
Saunders, 1998, 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope 2005, Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2006;
Hetherington, 2009). An important component of this debate includes the influence of partisan
media outlets and the potential for partisan news to cause or exacerbate polarization. After all, as
the number of available news sources has increased, partisans of many orientations are better
supplied with niche sources that intentionally cater to their preferred views (Stroud, 2011). Among
individuals who do choose to consume partisan news, Levendusky (2013) argues that partisan
networks have the potential to exacerbate political differences, particularly among individuals for
whom partisanship plays a prominent role in their personal identity. More knowledgeable partisans
tend to consume news at higher rates (Prior, 2007), display motivated biases in their evaluation of
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opposing political views (Taber & Lodge, 2006), and react to oppositional information and
discussion by counter-arguing rather than moderating their views (Mutz, 2002, 2015).
Are the polarizing effects of a high-choice political news environments as powerful as
some fear? To answer this, Arceneaux & Johnson (2013) conduct a series of experiments in which
participants are asked to watch television, including partisan news shows, much like previous
television effects studies. But unlike forced exposure studies that provide no choice in the
experimental stimuli (e.g. Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), Arceneaux and Johnson simulate a more
realistic television viewing environment by providing some participants with a remote allowing
them to choose which programs they watch during the experimental session. This introduction of
active audience choice is vital, they argue, in understanding the range of possible exposure effects
from television. Results showed that when people were given the choice, most chose to avoid
political programming and settle on an entertainment show. Consistent with Prior’s analysis,
Arceneaux and Johnson agree that the proportion of the American public regularly viewing
partisan news is small. While partisans may seek out reinforcing views in ways that deepen their
party attachment and inform their issue positions (Levendusky, 2013), the majority of Americans
tune out from political news when given the option.
The emergence of news aggregating platforms on the Internet forces scholars to re-assess
the nature of partisan news influence. Arceneaux and Johnson’s findings for the implications of a
choice environment in cable television emphasize that the affordances of media technology may
powerfully structure the ways members of the public consume or avoid politically charged content.
After all, it is not even clear that the public has a firm grasp of how news delivery works today. A
recent qualitative study (Toff & Nielsen, 2018) suggests that this new internet-based mediated
distribution of news is poorly understood by most people because much of the American public
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grew up in an environment of direct distribution. Newspapers, TV, or radio are all direct access
mediums: we pick up a copy of the NYT, turn on Fox News, or turn the radio dial without receiving
those services through any one master distributor. When trying to describe how modern news
works, Toff & Nielsen note that interviewees often speak in “folk” understandings (e.g. “it just
comes from the air”; “it’s all out there”). In an environment where greater than half the American
public gets news from social media sites (Pew, 2016), this lack of public understanding is certainly
a concern. It may be inappropriate to continue interpreting large sections of the news audience as
“seekers” since much of the content delivered to them is customized by the news provider. An
important step in bridging this gap is for political communication scholars to measure the effects
of partisan media exposure on platforms that simulate the delivery mechanisms in the real market.
A Time of Crisis? Echo Chambers & Filter Bubbles
Although the relationship between selective exposure and affective polarization is
frequently studied, members of the public may see increased exposure to news content supportive
of their preferred political party without consciously looking for it. This is because designers of
news delivery platforms now possess the technological means and financial incentives to
personalize news offerings according to known user preferences. For example, Li and colleagues
(2019) recently demonstrated that returns from Google News search queries will trend toward
politically congruent content as the number of searches and clicks on like-minded news increases.
What are the consequences of this top-down personalization of news, and how might scholars
better address the nature of partisan news exposure in the age of personalization?
One theorized consequence of user-customized user environments is that individuals and
groups could cocoon themselves within bubbles of ideological self-reinforcement, avoiding
exposure to contradictory opinions and news and forming conclusions based solely on voices
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reinforcing and amplifying the beliefs they already espouse. Fears about these so-called “echo
chambers” and “filter bubbles” created by algorithmic personalization of news may be overstated
(Dubois & Blank, 2018; Zuiderveen Borgesuis, Trilling, Möller, Bodó, De Vreese, Helberger,
2016), and this dissertation will shed some light as to why.
V.O. Key first introduced the term “Echo Chambers” in a political research context to
describe the influence of elite opinion on the range of available perspectives adopted by the public
(1966). With the success of the Michigan School perspective from the likes of Campbell et al.
(1960) and Converse (1964) in showing that most of the voting public held largely unstructured
policy views and remained attached to their preferred political parties even in the absence of
ideology, some scholars feared that ordinary citizens were portrayed as ignorant victims of a
system far beyond their potential to understand. Key (as well as Converse) feared that the public
would be wrongly labeled as narrow and irrational. In contrast to the Michigan School’s paradigm
that emphasized psychological attachment to parties, Key noted that members of the public may
live in an “echo chamber” environment wherein public attitudes and choices only reflect the quality
of elite options available to them. Fishkin (1995) likens this imagery to Plato’s famous “Allegory
of the Cave” in book VII of Republic: it could be the case that the range of views expressed by the
public are merely shadows on the wall, projected by elites and unrepresentative of true public
sentiment. If the perspectives and messaging of politicians were more rational, so Key argued,
maybe public attitudes would be as well.
Pariser (2011), who first applied the term “filter bubble” to the new media environment,
worried about the effects of personalized news on the diversity of content exposure and subsequent
effects for democratic discourse. This fear has been repeatedly articulated by Harvard Law
professor Cass Sunstein (2002, 2009, 2017) within the context of the United States. According to
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his interpretation, reduced exposure to differing perspectives stunts the development of
democratically minded citizens, preventing them from cultivating a basis of shared experience that
is required for mutual understanding. At the same time Vīķe-Freiberga and colleagues (2013)
warned the European Commission that an ideologically tailored news environment might “create
more insulated communities as isolated subsets within the overall public sphere [that] undoubtedly
have a potentially negative impact on democracy” (pg. 27).
Critics of customized news platforms also worry that these technologies remove
gatekeeping power from journalists and news-makers by transitioning it over to the delivery
platforms themselves, as well as their makers (Zuiderveen Borgesius, et al. 2016; Vīķe-Freiberga,
et al. 2013). The structure of news production and publication becomes dominated by the designers
of search engines, apps, and social networking sites who have powerful financial incentives to
convert readers into regular users (Hindman, 2018; Wu 2017).
Zuiderveen Borgesius and colleagues (2016) also mention, though are not persuaded it is
true, that personalized news aggregating environments may lead to increased social sorting, or the
ability of users to profile and classify populations of others according to criteria established by
reductionistic agendas of media technologies and their designers (Turow, 2011). This concern is
supported in recent investigations of Facebook’s newsfeed by Settle (2018), who convincingly
shows that heavy users of Facebook have high degrees of confidence in their ability to accurately
identify the political orientations of their Facebook friends compared to non-users. She also finds
that this confidence is associated with severe over-estimations of the extremity of views held by
opposing partisans, a phenomenon that is observed both online and off (Ahler & Sood, 2018).
Additionally, within the past decade, scholars have observed that as much as 10% of search results
provided by Google Search are links sorted and presented by the personalization algorithm
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(Hannak, Sapiezynski, Molavi Kakhki, Krishnamurthy, Lazer, Mislove, & Wilson, 2013).
Consensus on the influence of news aggregators in shaping polarized attitudes continues to elude
scholars.
Not that big of a problem?
Despite these fears, there is a surprising absence of experimental tests of these predictions
in new media environments that simulate the way news is delivered in real life. Observational
evidence complicates the sweeping claims made by some advocates of the echo chambers
hypothesis. The same individuals most likely to choose personalized news services are also those
most likely to seek out general interest news resources (Beam & Kosicki, 2014), suggesting that
pre-existing levels of news interest predict the use of aggregators. These same high-news users are
more likely to encounter counter-attitudinal messages compared to folks reporting lower rates of
news consumption (Beam, 2014). Flaxman, Goel, & Rao (2014) observed both effects: web-search
behavior according to browsing histories suggested that cross-cutting exposure and issue-based
distance polarization increased in tandem.
Additionally, although research into choice environments has flourished in recent years
and forms a powerful interpretive lens for understanding the interrelationship between audience
preferences and technological affordance, online news ownership structures and production values
are increasingly being absorbed by large technology companies like Google, Apple, Facebook,
Yahoo!, and Amazon (Galloway, 2016). Selective exposure to news sources consistent with one’s
preferred party may in part be exacerbated by the technological affordances of outlet choices
(Stroud, 2011), yet a limited number of large technology companies are consolidating online
services unto themselves (Galloway, 2016; Hindman, 2018), leaving online news consumers with
an ever-diminishing number of online news owners and providers.
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Effects of Exposure to Partisan News
Past research establishes that partisans do prefer to select and read news from outlets
supportive of their preferred party, yet scholars also observe that such selective exposure has
limited effects on changes in political beliefs. The number of ideologically-driven news sources
has increased dramatically with the rise of cable television and internet choice affordances (Stroud,
2011), paving a way for partisans to behaviorally seek news that shows an affinity for their own
party, and avoid rival news sources if they so desire (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). People self-reporting
strong attachments to either the Republican or Democratic parties who also consume partisan news
with some frequency also tend to become more entrenched in their party attachments (Levendusky,
2013), and they tend to resist information that contradicts the narratives of their preferred party’s
messaging and success (Taber & Lodge, 2006). More recently, surveys of the general public have
found that partisan aligned media outlets also receive high levels of trust from the most partisan
segments of the general public (Gallup, 2018).
Perhaps surprisingly, partisans seeking out affirming political news do not need to digest
messages in full in order for polarizing effects to occur. Cues that provide readers with short-cuts
to assess the legitimacy of news are at least as influential in shaping issue salience and cognitive
effects as the actual content of those news articles (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). Other elements
besides article content, such as the framing of political headlines around “horse race” coverage
instead of policy agendas, can shape knowledge gaps among members of the public (Patterson,
1980) and structure audience expectations about what they will find in articles published by
sources with a known political reputation. A person’s pre-existing levels of political interest and
knowledge serve as the best predictors of information recall after exposure to news content has
occurred (Price & Zaller, 1993), suggesting that persons who are more actively engaged with
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politics may also respond to news content with greater interest. An audience member’s
partisanship is also known to moderate other media effects phenomena like agenda setting and
priming, depending on whether messages appear supportive of or inconsistent with the person’s
party preference (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, 2010; McLeod et al., 1974). News that is endorsed by
social connections tends to be taken as more powerful indicator of credibility than the source
affiliation alone (Messing & Westwood, 2015; Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015).
Beyond the influence of reinforcing exposure to counter-attitudinal information does not
lead to automatic depolarization. For decades, political science and communication scholars have
observed that people resist counter-attitudinal information (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979) and
process it in biased ways that tend to reinforce their pre-existing political views (Taber & Lodge;
2006; 2013).
Taber & Lodge (2006) famously conduct a series of experiments, using policy issues like
affirmative action and gun laws, to show that prior beliefs have a substantial influence in shaping
our evaluation of new information. When individuals are presented with information that is
consistent with prior beliefs, they tend to accept it without much debate, suggesting a confirmation
bias toward political information that appears agreeable. The converse is also true: when presented
with cross-cutting information, people tend to reject the implications or conclusions of counterattitudinal exposure and counter-argue according to the affective impressions previously stored in
memory that safeguard their beliefs (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Taber & Lodge, 2006).
This phenomenon of motivated skepticism is consistent with expectations about the role of
psychological mechanisms in influencing information exposure. In The Rationalizing Voter
(2013), Taber and Lodge continue their analysis and note that when people are confronted with
new information, a duel-process of cognitive and affective mechanisms activate that filter new
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information into storage. In particular, new information is stamped with an affective, or emotional,
tag depending on the new information’s degree of consonance with prior attitudes (called “hot
cognition” in Lodge & Taber, 2005). It has recently been argued that personality attributes such as
a need for cognition and a need for affect can powerfully shape the likelihood that people will
reflect on new information rather than rely on instinctual responses (Arceneaux & Vander Whelen,
2018). When individuals are asked to recall their view on new information (like in the case of a
survey response), Taber and Lodge find that people will struggle to provide substantive details and
specific concepts that one might hope from a perfectly rational decision-maker. Instead,
evaluations yield positions that favor pre-existing beliefs, and especially those articulated from
trusted sources. Information that cuts against these affective attachments is not only rejected
propositionally but may also elicit emotionally charged reactions.
Partisan news exposure may incite affective responses because media coverage of political
differences, and especially heated exchanges between high-profile politicians and political pundits,
can exacerbate perceptions of how pervasive polarization is within the public (Levendusky, 2013;
Levendusky & Malhotra, 2015). Experimentally, Druckman and colleagues (2013) show that when
individuals see reports framed to emphasize elite differences on policy, members of the public
seeing such frames are more likely to polarize compared to those who did not.
One mechanism believed to be at play in the processing and consumption of partisan media
is the degree to which people both identify with one side of the political spectrum and also
accurately articulate the policy agendas of the preferred party. Partisan sorting has increased over
time (Levendusky, 2009) and also reduces the likelihood of encountering conflicting political
identities and ideas (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). This reduction leads people to believe opposing
partisans are more extreme than they truly are (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016b). A decline in these
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encounters may lead to daily living conditions under which most people rarely have any
interpersonal interactions with Americans holding different views from themselves. A decrease in
cross-cutting identities may lead to increased hostility toward political opponents without changing
the issue-positions or self-identification of media users much at all (Mason, 2018). Given the
absence of cross-cutting interpersonal interactions, people may increasingly depend on a news
environment that has a financial incentive to produce news content that leads consumers to believe
partisan opponents are more dangerous than they really are.
Relevant to Affective Polarization?
From a selective exposure perspective, the relationship between seeking politically
congruent news and affective polarization is well-documented. Observationally, there is
considerable correlational support for predicting that exposure to politically friendly news content
leads to increases in negative emotional evaluations of partisan opponents (Stroud, 2010;
Levendusky; 2013; Garrett et al., 2014).
Different partisan and ideological cues, whether they are produced by media outlets,
political elites, or messages authored by ordinary citizens, signal identity differences that may lead
to political animus. Baugher (2017) uses time-series analysis to show that high levels of issue
extremity and constraint are both associated with high levels of affective polarization. News that
emphasizes these differences is experimentally known to increase the public’s perceptions of
ideological extremity from political opponents (Levendusky, 2013). Experiments manipulating the
extremity of policy positions for fictitious political candidates also increase affective polarization
(Webster & Abramowitz, 2017; Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016). Partisan news that emphasizes
extremity from political elites might convince consumers in the public to adopt more extreme
views themselves (Levendusky, 2013). These elite cues are important for affective polarization
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since affectively polarized attitudes appear to be targeted more directly at elites rather than other
members of the public (Druckman & Levendusky, 2019, forthcoming). Even access to broadband
internet itself may be associated with increases in affective polarization (Lelkes, Sood, Iyengar,
2017).
Specific predictions for the effects of partisan news exposure detailed in the news portal
experiments in this dissertation are inspired by the observational findings of Stroud (2010), Garrett
et al. (2014), and the experimental approaches laid out by Iyengar & Hahn (2009) and Levendusky
(2013). Stroud (2010) uses time-series survey analysis and finds that selective exposure precedes
increases in gaps of scale-ratings of candidate favorability, concluding that self-reported increases
in selective exposure to partisan news precedes increases in favorability gaps in the evaluation of
political elites. Garrett and colleagues (2014) draw inspiration from Slater (2007) and KnoblochWesterwick (2012) to justify a multi-survey analysis concluding that “greater selective exposure
to attitude-consistent messages has been shown to activate the political self-concept. Accordingly,
exposure should activate emotions toward both the in- and out-party” (pg.311). Garret (2009) and
Garrett & Stroud (2014) note that while self-identified partisans do prefer pro-attitudinal news,
they do not necessarily avoid counter-attitudinal news. To that end, Garrett et al.’s analysis of
secondary data from the United States and Israel showed that exposure to pro-attitudinal news
increased negative affect toward out-partisans, while attitude inconsistent news had modest
calming effects on negative affect.
Hahn & Iyengar (2009) use a multi-day online experiment that tracked the news
consumption behavior of Republicans and Democrats, showing that conservative leaning
participants generally preferred Fox News while liberal-leaning participants disproportionately
sought out MSNBS news. In the laboratory, forced-exposure to partisan news content in single-
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shot viewing of televised news from Fox News and MSNBC increased negative affect toward
partisan opponents (Levendusky, 2013). This finding makes sense in light of what scholars know
about the incendiary nature of partisan television and the messaging strategies of pundits on Fox
News and MSNBC.
Much of the news produced by partisan outlets is couched in passionately negative speech,
and this mode of speech is known to stoke emotions within audience members that are associated
with affective polarization (Mason, 2016; Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015). A rhetorical tactic often
used by pundits is to neutralize the legitimacy of out-partisans by instigating anger and fear
(Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
After sustained exposure to these negative messages, reinforcement of identity-based political
divides over time may further entrench polarized attitudes. Knobloch-Westerwick, 2012 and
Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2011 offer additional experimental evidence that many partisans
prefer messages that reinforce their own views and will eschew news that violates this message
reinforcement. Message reinforcement seeking may be conditioned by America’s two-party
electoral system as opposed to multi-party systems abroad (Trilling, Van Klingeren, & Tsfati,
2016).
Portal Methods and Partisan News Cues
Can the effects of partisan news on affective polarization be replicated in online news portal
environments? For three consecutive years, the Manship School’s Political Communication
Research Group (PCRG) designed and tested innovative online news portals that replicate realworld news aggregating environments. Experimental treatments in each version of the two portals
analyzed in this dissertation (2016 and 2018) delivered real news content to study participants over
a period of seven days (2016) or twelve days (2018). Participants in both experiments were free to
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choose which stories they read and were asked to rely on the portal as their primary news source
during each investigation period. Throughout the duration of these studies, researchers
unobtrusively collected user behaviors in the portal such as headline impressions, clicks, and total
time spent browsing the portal. Each portal was accompanied by pre- and-post-test survey
instruments assessing a range of political and media related outcomes.
In general, news portals are websites designed to aggregate content from multiple
independent news sources and present the collected content in an ordered way, also sometimes
referred to as “digital intermediaries” (Kleis Nielsen & Ganter, 2018). News portals are typically
designed and operated by companies whose goal is to engage as many people as possible by
tailoring user experiences to make returns to the site more likely, sometimes called “stickiness”
(Hindman, 2018). Motivated primarily by profits, platform designers are increasingly successful
in using algorithmic personalization techniques to customize the order of content available on the
portal newsfeeds sorted by known user preferences.
Despite the emerging popularity of news portals in the real-world, scholars have produced
scant experimental work investigating their effects. Observational studies have shed light on how
news portals relying on personalized filters might increase overall news exposure (Beam &
Kocicki, 2014), including incidental exposure for audience members who do not ordinarily seek
political news (Kobayashi & Inamasu, 2015; Kobayashi, Hoshino, & Suzuki, 2017). Recent
successes using the PCRG portals to demonstrate experimental effects include establishing that
the prevalence of crime news influences evaluations of the U.S. president (Kalmoe, Pingree,
Watson, Sui, Darr, & Searles, 2018), how effects of fact-checking and opinion editorials defending
journalism improve several dimensions of media trust (Pingree, et al. 2018), and how varying the
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number of headlines covering Trump administration scandals increases negative evaluations from
in-group partisans (Darr, et al. forthcoming).
A news portal tool for media effects experimentation offers scholars the opportunity to
investigate previously established relationships, like partisan news exposure and affective
polarization, using an information delivery mechanism that corresponds to personalized news
websites commonly used by the general public. News portals offer novel media effects
experimentation that allows for a rare combination of repeated exposure to online news stimuli
without the forced exposure to message or video content that is often employed in laboratory
experiments. They also allow researchers to retain the well-established experimental benefits of
using random assignment to rule out reverse causality and third-variable influences (see e.g.
Iyengar & Kinder, 1987).
Portal methods offer familiar validity trade-offs previously considered in field
experiments: namely, increased validity over claims of generalizability using experimental
treatments, at the cost of reduced experimental control over the delivery of the study treatments
(e.g. Greene & Gerber, 2002). The portal allows researchers to utilize multiple, dynamic forms of
online content exposure using real-time news stories that simulate a news consumption
environment. At the cost of full experimental control over the content of the news seen by
participants, the portals gain the advantage of capturing a realistic exposure environment by using
only live news content within a scrollable newsfeed. Since simultaneous exposure to pro- and
counter-attitudinal political news is common online (Holbert et al., 2012) portal environments are
well-suited for providing experimental news treatments that allow researchers to control content
imbalances without losing the incidental exposure to diverse content that is commonly provided
by real-world news portals.
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While the method behind each portal design is relatively novel for media effects
experimentation, the portal’s inherent limitations and strengths are already familiar to social
science scholars in the form of field experiments. Although the portals are not actual field
experiments, per se, they do share similar strengths and limitations in terms of internal and external
validity. In particular, these strengths and limitations are already familiar to experimental methods:
According to Druckman et al. (2011), field experiments are limited by the degree of control
researchers have in “what experimental stimuli subjects observe” (pg. 9). Other challenges include
difficulty in guaranteeing that participants follow instructions, or that the immediate effects of
exposure to the stimulus can be measured at the time of the study. Green and Gerber (2002)
contend that researchers may hope for “downstream benefits” of more long-term experimental
exposures when conducting research outside the laboratory, or in in single-shot exposure settings.
Understanding long-term effects of a controlled news portal as an experimental setting require
further testing to appreciate all the concerns that may relate to the validity of the method.
The news portal designs employed here design expose subjects to news stories that are
coded to fit tailored experimental manipulations by selecting real content made available through
a custom PHP script that automatically retrieved articles off Google News RSS feeds, as well as
the homepages of specific websites that produce conceptually relevant content. When combined
with previously established user preferences, experimental portals are able to simulate the same
personalized news delivery environments that are commonly used in the public space and typically
popular among users (Kalyanaraman & Sundar, 2006).
Partisan Source Cues: Advantages of Portal Methods
This dissertation’s focus on affective polarization is an attempt to re-evaluate previous
partisan media effects investigations within the context of a technological affordance that
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aggregates many news sources in a single platform. Content exposure in the news portals may take
the form of article headline and source cues alone or include the written a video content of articles
the participants click on. The names of primary sources and article headlines are both well-known
cues to news consumers on platforms such as Google News (Sundar, Knobloch-Westerwick, &
Hastall, 2006). Experiments seeking to understand the influence of source and headline cues in
online news environments consistently find that identity-signaling cues, such as university
affiliations for undergraduate samples (Go, Jung, & Wu, 2014), influence judgements about
credibility and trustworthiness. Likewise, exposure to partisan news content in the form of written
news can trigger the already polarized attitudes of partisans (Levendusky, 2013).
Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain how cueing influences a range of
audience perception outcomes. Cognitive accessibility models have been offered to hypothesize
that reliance on source cues allows people arrange issue importance (Iyengar, 1990; Price &
Tewksbury, 1997) and make credibility judgements without going through the cognitively
demanding process of reading articles, whether fully or in part (Reinhard & Sporer (2010). Others
offer dual-process models that distinguish between heuristic and systematic modes of processing
messages and information (Chaiken, 1980) where individuals rely on news cues to assess topic
importance (Pingree & Stoycheff, 2013).
Regardless of the underlying psychological processes occurring at the point of exposure,
most news consumption explanations find that individuals, and especially partisans, rely on news
source reputations to make judgements (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Sundar, Knobloch-Westerwick,
& Hastall, 2007). In the context of political news, strong partisans are thought to be especially
responsive to identity-signaling source cues (Mondak, 1993) from both in-group and out-group
message senders, and especially from political elites. In fact, partisans may be even more reactive
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to out-party sources in determining which value positions to adopt of oppose that they are to ingroup sources (Goren, Federico, & Kittilson, 2009).
This leads to a reasonable expectation that news portals might provide cue-laden
environments that activate partisan identity and may result in the triggering of previously stored
affectively charged associations and memories (Lodge & Taber, 2005). It is important to note that
strong reactions can be triggered by even vague mentions of some concept related to partisanship
(“Hot Cognition”), meaning that the affectively charged associations activated by exposure to
partisan information might occur from exposure to something as mundane as the name of a known
partisan news source. Figure 2.1 below displays how Portal 2016 might appear to any randomly
assigned participant.
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Figure 2.1. Portal 2016 Screenshot
The scrollable feed includes article headlines, images associated with the article, a topline
for the story, and a source attribution. Each source is featured somewhat discretely in comparison
to other attributes of the portal, suggesting that any observed effects from source exposure are not
due to unrealistic forced exposure to partisan source stimuli.
Portal 2018 advances to include formatting features designed to test for the effects of
different cues based on page architecture and user promotion of important stories. Figure 2.2 shows
a screenshot of Portal 2018. Changes to the Google RSS in 2018 prevented the collection of article
toplines, leaving article headlines, photos, and source attributions as the remaining attributes
available for participants to observe while scrolling.
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Figure 2.2. Portal 2018 Screenshot
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CHAPTER III.
DOES PARTISAN NEWS EXPOSURE AFFECTIVELY POLARIZE? TWO
NEWS PORTAL EXPERIMENTS
Portal 2016 Study Design & Methods
A convenience sample was recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk marketplace to
participate in a multi-day news portal study. Initial recruitment for the study pre-test (N = 1,395)
concluded by instructing participants to use the news portal for a period of seven days as their
primary source of news. Researchers shut down access to the portal at the end of the seventh day.
After the study period, participants were asked to complete a post-test survey (N = 1,051) within
36-hours after the portal’s closure and were offered an additional bonus in compensation for
completing a follow-up survey up to five days after finishing the post-test.
Regarding Mechanical Turk sample quality, the validity of “turker” samples in
experimental research is believed to be superior to other convenience samples, particularly
university samples of college students (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), and especially
useful for online behavioral studies (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013). The psychological
profiles of conservatives and liberals on Mechanical Turk are also considered to be comparable to
members of the general public (Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015), suggesting that
investigations of political differences using the marketplace have relatively strong external
validity.
Real articles from both Fox News (N = 707) and MSNBC (N = 132) were gathered from
Google News using RSS queries set to find stories from both sources. The comparative imbalance
between the number of available articles from each source was unexpected and may contribute to
the findings for affective polarization reported below, especially after acknowledging that the total
number of articles available to the portal was 12899. Predictions from the 2016 news portal assume
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that articles published by Fox News and MSNBC are, in fact, perceived to be supportive of the
parties they ostensibly represent. It is not verified in my analysis whether the content of specific
articles actually represent a partisan agenda. In fact, there is preliminary evidence suggesting that
a large proportion of the online content produced by Fox News and MSNBC contains relatively
low levels of partisan slanted content, and primarily focuses on general news topics. A revised
method of partisan news exposure for Portal 2018 overcomes this limitation by injecting multiple
partisan sources from both sides of the partisan spectrum (described in detail below).
Two other experimental factors completed the overall design of Portal 2016, though neither
of these is considered in this study. Half of the portal users were randomly assigned to see an
overall increase in “problem” stories coded by a separate group of Mechanical Turk workers tasked
with identifying stories that are “clearly about some specific problem facing the United States.”

Table 3.1. Portal 2016 Sample Affective Polarization by Party Preference (1-10 scale).
Republicans (n = 314)
M
SD

Democrats (n = 674)
M
SD

Combined (n = 988)
M
SD

Congress Gap

2.40

2.42

3.52

2.61

3.16

2.60

All Partisans Gap

3.24

2.69

4.21

2.75

3.91

2.76

Trump Vs. Clinton

4.50

3.21

4.75

2.95

4.66

3.04

Note: mean quantities are the polarization gap for all participants self-identifying as partisans.
Independents and those refusing to self-identify are not included.

The hypotheses and results below draw inspiration from the conclusions reached by several
previous investigations, including Iyangar & Hahn (2009), Stroud (2010), Levendusky (2013), and
Garrett et al. (2014). Stroud and Garrett et al. provide compelling observational support for
predicting that exposure to partisan news that is both pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal can
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lead to increases in affective polarization. I test this prediction experimentally by focusing on three
scale gaps as affective polarization outcomes. In all three questionnaires, participants were asked
to rate how the felt about some object on a scale of 1 – 10, with high values indicating “warm”
feelings and low values indicating “cold” feelings. Table 3.1 shows the 2016 sample’s feeling scale
gaps sorted by party preference toward Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress (M =
3.16, SD = 2.60), the Republican and Democratic parties (M = 3.91, SD = 2.76), and the gap for
the 2016 presidential nominees from each party, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton (M = 4.66,
SD = 3.04). I use these to test for the following predictions:
Levendusky’s (2013) experiments using television clips from Fox News and MSNBC
showing that relatively extreme partisans become even more extreme when exposed to proattitudinal content, and from Taber and Lodge’s (2005, 2006, 2013) exploration how motivated
reasoning and “hot cognition” lead individuals to become more polarized after exposure to
counter-attitudinal news. Levendusky demonstrated that exposure to friendly partisan media
messaging can increase affective polarization, particularly among partisans strongly identifying
with their party. Based on this finding from a forced-exposure experiment, I test the same
predictions in a news portal context using the following hypotheses:
H1. Pro-attitudinal news will increase affective polarization toward a) the political parties
b) members of the U.S. Congress and c) 2016 presidential nominees (scale gap) compared
to counter-attitudinal news and the control condition.
H2. Counter-attitudinal news will increase affective polarization toward the a) political
parties b) members of the U.S. Congress and c) 2016 presidential nominees (scale gap)
compared to pro-attitudinal news and the control condition.
H3. The effects predicted in H1 will be stronger for strong partisans than for weak
partisans.
H4. The effects predicted in H2 will be stronger for strong partisans than for weak
partisans.
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Results
Hypothesis 1 for the analysis of Portal 2016 predicted that exposure to an increased volume
pro-attitudinal news sources would increase affective polarization toward a) the Republican and
Democratic parties, b) Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress, and c) Donald Trump
and Hillary Clinton. Hypothesis 2 looks for the same effect from counter-attitudinal news,
predicting that exposure to counter-attitudinal news will also increase affective polarization for
each outcome. Hypotheses 3 and 4 incorporate the influence of a participant’s strength of
partisanship by predicting that pro-attitudinal news will increase affective polarization more
powerfully for stronger partisans (H3), as will counter-attitudinal news will increase affective
polarization more powerfully for stronger partisans (H4).
Treatment Effects
To test for the effects of the treatment’s influx of Fox News and MSNBC stories into the
portal, I first generated a mean-scale that combines the three affective polarization gap outcomes
into a single dependent variable (M = 3.91, SD = 2.37, α = .80). This is necessary since the public’s
differentiation between different partisan constructs, such as parties, elites, or candidates remains
unclear from the extant affective polarization literature. Although each measure is correlated to
one another (Parties and Congress: r = .802, p < .001; Parties and Candidates: r = .509, p < .001;
Congress and Candidates: r = .428, p < .001), it is unknown whether each outcome will respond
uniformly in reaction to the partisan news treatments.
A factorial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted using the combined average
responses to the three affective polarization outcomes as a dependent variable. A covariate for
each participant’s pre-test levels of affective polarization is also included in to distinguish any

- 46 -

treatment effects from the degree of polarization each participant carried with them prior to using
the portal. Dummy variables for pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal news exposure were
computed from the original partisan news exposure factor in order to isolate the influence of each
form of exposure from one another, as well as from the control condition. To account for partisan
strength, a two-level factor was created using each participant’s pre-test responses to a 7-point
survey item asking how strongly they identified with either the Republican or Democratic party.
Scores ranging between “5” and “7” on the pre-test scale were coded as “strong” partisans, and the
remainder of responses on the scale were coded as “weak.” Most Americans who identify as
Independents or non-partisans on survey measures of party identity actually exhibit some degree
of preference for one political party or the other, either in terms of voting behavior or attitudinal
assessments (Sides & Vavreck, 2014; Petrocik, 2009; Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, & Wesley,
1992). Because of this, my analyses produced below operationalize partisanship in terms of party
preference rather than identity. The other experimental factors (problem stories and local news)
were also included in the models but did not reveal statistically significant effects.
Results from the model reveal no statistically significant effects of partisan news exposure
in the news portal. Contrary to expectations in hypothesis one, pro-attitudinal news did not increase
levels of affective polarization, F(1,992) = 0.15, p = .351 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .000. Hypothesis
two, which predicted that counter-attitudinal news exposure would increase affective polarization,
was also not supported by the analysis, F(1,992) = 0.49, p = .242 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .001.
Finally, partisan strength does not seem to influence affective polarization responses for
participants, regardless of pro- or counter-attitudinal news exposure. Hypothesis three predicted
that stronger partisans would increase affective polarization compared to weak partisans after
random assignment to a newsfeed showing pro-attitudinal news. The analysis shows a statistically
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insignificant relationship between pro-attitudinal news and partisan strength on affective
polarization, F(1,992) = 0.22, p = .320 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .000.
Next, three separate factorial analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted treating
each affective polarization outcome as a dependent variable in each model. Results of these
analyses are summarized in Table 3.2 (Appendix). Model one relies on a dependent variable
calculated by taking the absolute value difference between feelings toward Republicans and
Democrats in the U.S. Congress, resulting in a single score for the feeling “gap” between a
participant’s feelings toward one party or the other. Model one makes use of the full factorial
design by including pro- and counter-attitudinal news treatment dummies, as well as a two-level
factor for partisan strength taken from the participants’ pre-test answer to a question asking how
strongly they identify with either the Republican or Democratic party, and a two-level factor for a
participants party preference from the pre-test.
Models two and three replace the calculated Congress feeling gap with feeling scales for
the Republican and Democratic parties and scales for feelings toward Donald Trump and Hillary
Clinton, the two candidates nominated by either party for the presidency in 2016. Both models
also include the full factorial design and the two partisan strength and party preference variables.
Republicans and Democrats in Congress
Model One presents results from the analysis testing H1a and H2a, which predicted that
increased exposure to headlines from a partisan news sources aligned with one’s preferred party
would increase feeling scale gap responses for Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress,
while exposure to counter-attitudinal news would also increase affective polarization. The
analysis does not support either hypothesis. Individuals assigned to see pro-attitudinal news (Fox
News for Republicans; MSNBC for Democrats) did not report higher levels of affective
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polarization compared to participants in other conditions, F(1,981) = 0.06, p = .404 (one-tailed),
partial η2 = .000. Participants seeing pro-attitudinal news from sources supportive of their
preferred party were not significantly more likely to change in their affective polarization (M =
3.1, SE = .13) compared to participants seeing counter-attitudinal news (M = 3.1, SE = .13),
F(1,981) = 0.01, p = .456 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .000.
Model One also tested to see whether a participant’s pre-test indication of partisan
strength interacted with the treatment to increase affective polarization for pro-attitudinal news
and counter attitudinal news, predicted in H3a, and increase from counter-attitudinal news as
predicted in H4a. Results from this analysis show null treatment effects for the relationship
between pro-attitudinal news and partisan strength on affective polarization toward members of
the U.S. Congress, F(1,981) = 0.20, p = .165 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .000. H4a predicted that
strong partisans exposed to counter-attitudinal news would increase in affective polarization
around members of the U.S. Congress more than weak partisans assigned to the same condition.
Results from the analysis in Model One undermine this prediction, showing that there is no
statistically significant relationship between partisan strength and counter-attitudinal news
exposure on affectively polarized attitudes toward Republicans and Democrats in the U.S.
Congress.
The Republican and The Democratic Parties
Similar results are found for the feeling scale differences toward the Republican and
Democratic parties. Model Two reports results for H1b and H2b, which predicted that participants
assigned to see news from like-minded sources would increase in their affective polarization
toward the two major political parties when shown pro-attitudinal content (H1b), and also increase
when shown counter-attitudinal content (H2b). Consistent with the findings for Congress, the
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analysis does not support either prediction. Participants seeing pro-attitudinal news were not more
or less affectively polarized toward the Republican and Democratic parties, F(1,981) = 0.04, p =
.476, partial η2 = .000, contradicting the prediction made in H2a. Likewise, H2b predicted that
participants assigned to see counter-attitudinal news would also increase in partisan affective
polarization. The analysis does not support this prediction either, F(1,981) = 0.14, p = .356, partial
η2 = .000.
H3b and H4b predicted that the interaction between the partisan news exposure and a
participant’s self-reported partisan strength would increase affective polarization for strong
partisans seeing both pro-attitudinal (H3b) and counter-attitudinal (H4b) news content compared
to weak partisans. The relationship between pro-attitudinal news and partisan strength in
predicting increased affective polarization around the parties was not statistically significant,
F(1,981) = 1.70, p = .096 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .002. There is no support for the expectation
that strong partisans will respond differently than weaker partisans to pro-attitudinal partisan
news exposure in the portal, a finding that does not support H3b. Next, I find similar null results
for the influence of counter-attitudinal news and partisan strength, F(1,981) = 2.25, p = .067
(one-tailed), partial η2 = .003. Therefore, H4b is not supported by the analysis.
2016 Presidential Candidates
For the final affective polarization outcome, a feeling gap toward Hillary Clinton and
Donald Trump, hypotheses H1c and H2c predicted that exposure to news from pro-attitudinal
sourced articles would increase affective polarization (H1c), while exposure to counter-attitudinal
news would increase affective polarization (H2c) toward the candidates. Compared to the other
two outcomes for the 2016 Portal, feeling gap responses toward the 2016 presidential candidates
between strong and weak partisans were virtually identical. While the size of the affective
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polarization gap between strong and weak partisans toward members of Congress (M = 3.2, SD =
2.6) and the two political parties (M = 3.9, SD = 2.8) are similar, the gap toward Donald Trump
and Hillary Clinton is comparatively higher (M = 4.7, SD = 3.0). This difference within a nonrepresentative sample is consistent with what one might predict knowing that the emotions driving
affective polarization, such as anger or fear, are activated by the advertising and messaging
activities of presidential campaigns (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015; Mason, 2018; Brader, 2005).
However, it may also explain why the Trump vs. Clinton feeling gap is also the outcome showing
the smallest pre-treatment differences between strong and weak partisans. During a contentious
Presidential campaign, people may be primed to strongly like their party’s preferred candidate and
dislike the opposing party’s candidate with an intensity exceeding that of feelings towards parties
or other political elites.
Despite greater affective polarization toward the candidates overall, results from the
ANCOVA in Model Three using the feeling gap between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton as a
dependent variable do not support the predicted increase affective polarization. Consistent with
the null findings for feeling-scale gaps toward members of Congress and the two political parties,
the pro-attitudinal news exposure treatment did not significantly increase affective polarization
between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump F(1,978) = 0.76, p = .190 (one-tailed), partial η2 =
.001. Likewise, participants randomly assigned to see counter-attitudinal news did not increase in
candidate affective polarization compared participants assigned to other conditions, F(1,978) =
0.62, p = .216 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .001.
The same null results were also observed for predictions made in H3c and H4c that
predicted stronger partisans would be more polarized than weaker partisans in the presence of
either pro- or counter-attitudinal news. The interaction between self-reported partisan strength
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and the pro-attitudinal news exposure treatment for the Trump vs. Clinton dependent variable
was statistically insignificant, F(1,978) = 0.16, p = .344 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .000. The same
null effect was observed for the relationship between partisan strength and counter-attitudinal
news exposure, F(1,978) = 1.78, p = .092 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .002. Based on these findings,
both H3c and H4c are not supported by the analysis.
Portal 2018 Methods & Study Design
Results from the 2016 portal show that introducing a single-source experimental treatment
of partisan news did not influence affective polarization for the political parties, Republicans and
Democrats in the U.S. Congress, or the 2016 presidential candidates. This null finding is observed
for both pro- and counter-attitudinal news exposure, and it did not vary according to the strength
of attachment participants had toward the Republican or Democratic parties. It is possible that the
single-source partisan news treatment from the 2016 portal was simply too weak of a stimulus to
influence polarization attitudes. Additionally, because the effects of counter-attitudinal news
exposure on affective polarization were inconclusive in the 2016 study and in the extant literature,
the operationalization of personalized partisan news exposure on the 2018 portal study doublesdown on increasing the magnitude of exposure to pro-attitudinal news using a stronger treatment.
A convenience sample of 1391 persons was collected from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
marketplace who were paid to use an updated version of the purpose-build custom news portal for
a period of 12-days. Participants were compensated $1 for taking a pre-test survey, and then
between $1 and $3 for using the portal as their primary source of news during the data collection
period. Participants with higher rates of portal usage were eligible for the $3 compensation
maximum. The study concluded by finishing with a post-test survey assessing a range of affective
polarization outcomes. A final sample of N = 1247 persons completed the study and responded to
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feeling thermometer measures assessing participants’ affective rating of several objects, including
the two political parties, Fox News and MSNBC, and feelings toward people who disagree with
the participant’s views on several policy topics. Researchers monitored the portal 24-hours a day
from two continents, guaranteeing that the feed was monitored at all times during the data
collection process.
Like the 2016 Portal, the 2018 version automatically populated the newsfeed 24-hours a
day with real news stories extracted from Google News at the top of each hour. This study also
included a much larger experimental design. The analysis below relies on a two-level factor for
partisan personalization taken from a larger fully factorial design that included treatments for factchecking, defense of journalism, the presence of an “up-vote” button, and three factors
manipulating content presented in a sidebar. Screenshots of both the 2016 and 2018 portals are
shown above in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, as well as in the Appendix. Partisan news was collected
separately using custom PHP script sending queries to the home pages of news websites with a
known partisan slant, as well as the Google News RSS.
Partisan Personalization Treatment
The experimental treatment for partisan news exposure in the 2018 Portal consisted of
stories extracted from the homepages of partisan news outlets with a known partisan slant. These
stories were then injected into the portal feeds of participants randomly assigned to see news
supportive of their preferred party.
On a pre-screen page at the beginning of the study requesting the consent to participate
from prospective workers, subjects were also asked to indicate whether or not they had any
preference whatsoever for either the Republican of Democratic parties. Once participants revealed
whether they preferred the Democratic or Republican party, they were randomly assigned to
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newsfeeds displaying a mixture of real headlines from both partisan and non-partisan sources. For
Democrats, the personalized news condition included a total of 756 news stories from MSNBC,
Slate Magazine, Huffington Post, and Mother Jones. Participants preferring the Republican Party
were assigned to feeds including a total 671 news stories from Fox News, Breitbart News, and
Town Hall. This collection of partisan sources is validated by the network analysis of Benkler,
Yochai, Faris, and Roberts (2018), who demonstrate that audiences for each of the outlets listed in
the partisan news treatment have sorted themselves into clear partisan-leaning camps during the
2016 presidential cycle.
Table 3.2. Portal 2018 Sample Affective Polarization by Party Preference (1 – 100
thermometer gap).
Republicans (n = 418) Democrats (n = 829) Combined (n = 1247)
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
The Political Parties
Gap

40.6

31.2

53.8

28.4

48.7

29.9

Issue Disagreement
Thermometer

38.4

18.0

29.5

16.0

32.5

17.2

Fox News Vs.
MSNBC
Gap

33.5

31.4

41.8

27.5

39.0

29.1

Note: mean quantities represent the responses of participants with a self-identified party
preference. Independents are not included.

Predictions for the partisan news treatment in the 2018 portal are consistent with the proattitudinal predictions used in the analysis of Portal 2016 that relied on observational and
experimental findings from Stroud (2010), Garrett et al. (2014), Iyengar and Hahn, and
Levendusky, (2013). Portal 2018 adds two different affective polarization outcomes from 2016
that focus on polarization brought on by disagreement about important issues in the United States
and feeling differences toward Fox News and MSNBC (M = 39.0, SD = 29.1). Feeling
thermometers for members of the U.S. Congress were not included. Because 2018 was not a
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presidential election year, a feeling thermometer for Hillary Clinton was dropped from the items
measured. The 2018 does analysis include a feeling thermometer gap for the Republican and
Democratic parties (M = 48.7, SD = 29.9), which is the standard comparison of objects relied on
in past studies of affective polarization (e.g. Iyengar, et al. 2012).
H1. Pro-attitudinal news will increase affective polarization toward a) the political parties
and b) Fox News vs. MSNBC.
H2. Pro-attitudinal news will increase affective polarization toward a) the political parties
b) Fox News vs. MSNBC “strong” partisans rather than “weak” partisans.
The issue disagreement outcome is calculated by taking the mean of thermometer responses to
four different issue-based thermometers focusing on disagreement. Participants were asked in the
pre-and post-test surveys how they feel toward people who disagree with them about important
issue topics featured prominently in the news in May of 2018. Specific issues measured included
Black Lives Matter (M = 30.5, SD = 22.9), Guns (M = 28.1, SD = 21.9), Education (M = 35.8, SD
= 20.6), and the Mueller Investigation (M = 35.7, SD = 21.4). I then computed the mean of these
items in order to create a single aggregated affective polarization outcome for participant feelings
toward people who disagree with them about salient issues, referred to henceforth as the “issue
disagreement” outcome (M = 32.5, SD = 17.2, α = .798).
The purpose of conceptualizing affective polarization around personal issue disagreements
if two-fold. First, and as stated previously, most of the extant literature in mass polarization
research focuses on the issue-based extremity and constraint reported by members of the public.
People may consider policy disagreement with others to be conceptually different from their
evaluation of political parties, elites, or news organizations. This may be particularly relevant since
issue disagreements might not signal the same unidimensional differences that are observed for
the other partisan constructs (Green, 1988; Craig, Martinez, & Cain, 1999). Because the issue
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disagreement measures in this analysis are created by calculating the mean feeling thermometer
scores for feelings about people who disagree with participants across multiple issues, the
hypotheses rendered below predict that the issue disagreement thermometer mean will decrease in
the partisan news exposure condition, indicating that participants increasingly dislike those who
disagree with them about important issues after exposure to pro-attitudinal partisan news, and
especially among strong rather than weak partisans.
H3. Pro-attitudinal news will decrease warm feelings toward people who disagree with
participants about policy views.
H4. Pro-attitudinal news will decrease warm feelings toward people who disagree with the
participants about policy views for “strong” partisans more than “weak” partisans.
Results
To test for the effects of multi-source pro-attitudinal news exposure on affective
polarization outlined in H1 through H4, three analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted
using pre-treatment measures for each outcome as covariates. Each model includes a two-level
factor for the partisan personalization treatment that randomly assigned half of participants with a
known party preference to see an artificially higher dosage of news stories from politically
congruent sources. Additionally, a two-level factor accounting for partisan strength (strong vs.
weak) based on responses to the pre-treatment survey is included to assess the influence of partisan
strength in interacting with the partisan news treatment. Consistent with Portal 2016, the partisan
strength factor was created using each participant’s pre-test responses to a 7-point survey item
asking how strongly they identified with either the Republican or Democratic party. Scores ranging
between “5” and “7” on the pre-test scale were coded as “strong” partisans, and the remainder of
responses on the scale were coded as “weak.” The remaining experimental conditions were also

- 56 -

included for each model but did not reveal significant main effects (a full experimental design is
included in the Appendix). Results for each analysis are summarized in Table 3.4 (Appendix).
Treatment Effects
2018 Portal results from the analyses predicting increased affective polarization are
consistent with the null findings observed in the 2016 Portal, despite a stronger pro-attitudinal
partisan news treatment. The multi-source partisan news treatment for participants with a known
party preference revealed statistically insignificant differences for multiple measures of affective
polarization. Exposure to increased pro-attitudinal did not noticeably influence any of the affective
polarization outcomes.
The Republican and Democratic Parties (feeling gap)
Beginning with the one outcome shared by both the 2016 and 2018 portal experiments,
H1a predicted that the thermometer gap for the Republican and Democratic parties would increase
for participants assigned to the pro-attitudinal partisan news exposure condition. Results from the
analysis do not support this prediction, F(1,1242) = 0.35, p = .278 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .000.
Despite increased exposure to multiple sources known to be supportive of each participant’s party
preference, persons assigned to see pro-attitudinal news were no more likely to change in affective
polarization (M = 48.9, SE = .64) than those not seeing any artificially inflated amount of partisan
news (M = 48.4, SE = .63). H2a predicted that stronger partisans would also increase in affective
polarization between the two parties compared to weaker partisans. The model also shows that this
prediction is not supported F(1,1242) = 2.08, p = .150, partial η2 = .002. The partisan news
treatment did not activate polarized attitudes for strong partisans (M = 52.5, SE = .84) compared
to strong partisans who did not receive the treatment (M = 51.7, SE = .86). Participants indicating
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lower levels of partisan strength also did not significantly differ in the treatment condition (M =
44.2, SE = 1.0) compared to the control (M = 46.1, SE = 1.0).
Fox News vs. MSNBC (feeling gap)
Next, H1b predicted that participants assigned to the partisan news treatment would
increase in the affective difference in responses to Fox News vs. MSNBC. Results from Model 2
show a statistically insignificant main effect for the treatment toward the two paradigmatic partisan
news organizations, F(1,1242) = 0.04, p = .420 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .000. Participants assigned
to see news from sources aligned with their preferred party (M = 39.7, SE = .67) did not vary in
their thermometer gaps compared to participants in the control condition (M = 39.5, SE = .69).
H2b then predicted that differences in partisan strength would interact with the partisan news
treatment for strong partisans compared to weak partisans. The analysis also did not support this
prediction, F(1,1242) = 0.13, p = .722, partial η2 = .000. Strong partisans seeing an influx of proattitudinal news (M = 41.7, SE = .89) were not more likely to increase in affective polarization
toward Fox News and MSNBC compared to strong partisans in the control condition (M = 41.1,
SE = .90). Weak partisans in the partisan news exposure condition (M = 37.8, SE = 1.0) did not
significantly differ from weak partisans who did not see the treatment (M = 37.9, SE = 1.1).
Issue Disagreement (thermometer)
Finally, H3 predicted that the average feeling thermometer score would decrease (become
“colder”) for participants assigned to see pro-attitudinal news sources. The combined measures for
affective attitudes toward those who disagree with the participant’s policy positions revealed null
effects. Participants assigned to see an increase in stories from party congruent news sources (M
= 33.8, SE = .57) were not more affectively polarized around issue disagreement compared to
participants in the non-congruent condition (M = 33.0, SE = .56), F(1,1242) = 1.08, p = .30, partial
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η2 = .001. The effect of the partisan news exposure treatment was remained statistically
insignificant when comparing effects on strong and weak partisans, undermining the prediction in
H4, F(1,1242) = 1.85, p = .174, partial η2 = .002. Strong partisans in the partisan news treatment
(M = 31.1, SD = .73) reported only slightly lower feelings toward people with whom they disagree
compared to weak partisans also assigned to the treatment (M = 34.9, SE = .86).
Discussion
Partisan news exposure in two different news portal environments did not make subjects
more affectively polarized. This finding is consistent across two different treatment strategies and
four different political constructs toward which members of the public may be affectively
polarized. The two different treatment strategies offer a comparatively robust test of partisan media
effects in a news portal environment, particularly regarding the strength of source cues and
headlines produced by sources with a known partisan slant. The emphasis on source cues is perhaps
clearer from the Portal 2016 results. In Portal 2016, many of the partisan treatment articles injected
into the newsfeeds were, perhaps surprisingly, largely non-partisan in their content. The majority
of stories from Fox News and MSNBC focused on topics normally considered to be mainstream
news topics (e.g. entertainment, sports, novelty stories). Since the articles selected for the study
were extracted from the Google News RSS, we can be reasonably confident that news appearing
from these sources in 2016 portal is at least somewhat representative of the news content Google
ordinarily presents from those two sources.
The Portal 2018 treatment was designed to overcome this limitation by extracting articles
from the homepages of multiple partisan news sources. This strategy should produce higher
volumes of explicitly partisan content since homepages are typically designed to capture attention
in much the same way that front pages of traditional newspapers do (Hamilton, 2004). Listing
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content on the homepage that is likely to attract attention is precisely what constitutes the platform
“stickiness” described by Hindman (2018) in his diagnosis of the economic landscape of online
news. Furthermore, implementing a multi-source treatment strategy preserves the advantages of
source cue reliance on shaping partisan attitudes while also overcoming the possibility that
individual users may view specific sources associated with unequal levels of trust.
Despite adjusting the partisan news treatment strategy between the 2016 and 2018 portals,
no effects were observed for affective polarization. This finding held up irrespective of a
participant’s self-described level of partisan strength. Republicans and Democrats claiming to
associate strongly with their preferred party were no more or less likely to affectively polarize
toward the Republican and Democratic parties compared to those who hold their partisanship less
stridently. The same null results were observed for a thermometer gaps toward elites, whether it
was Republican and Democratic members of the U.S. Congress or the 2016 presidential candidates
(2016), media organizations (2018), and traditional feeling thermometer scores toward people who
held opposing policy views (2018).
These results are surprising given past evidence that partisan news exposure leads to
greater affective polarization, particularly among strongly identifying supporters of either party.
When users of both news portals were exposed to articles published by news sources known to
be supportive of one party or other, their levels of affective polarization remained unchanged
from the pre- to post-test. This finding contradicts claims about the magnitude of effects we
might expect from the “filter bubble” hypothesis (Parsier, 2011), but is instead consistent with
other findings that suggest the media diets of Republicans and Democrats are more similar than
is often assumed (Weeks, Ksiazek, & Holbert, 2016). More importantly, these findings are also
consistent with what scholars might expect to observe from consumers in a high-choice
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environment. Participants may increase in polarized attitudes following forced exposure to
partisan news, but not in response to the same content delivered in a realistic choice-driven
context. An increased dosage of partisan news source exposure for users with a known partisan
preference in Portal 2018 mimics user-customization of tailored news content on a high-choice
platform, and yet fails to produce changes in affective polarization despite an exposure period of
twelve days.
How is the absence of increased polarization possible given the wealth of evidence that
exposure to partisan news, especially among strong partisans, leads to higher affective
polarization? Several explanations are possible: first, the history of empirical investigations into
the power of media effects consistently cycles through over- and under-estimations of the media’s
ability to dictate public opinion. As I described earlier, before Lazarsfeld (1940) and Klapper’s
(1960) diagnoses of the strength of media effects, it was common among political elites to decry
the persuasive effects of media messages in shaping public opinion through direct and uniform
influences on public opinion. Since then, political communication scholars have called for novel
approaches that empirically evaluate the conditions under which political messages and news
influence public opinion and, more recently, to understand how news contributes to the
indisputable rise in affective polarization. Approaches like the one analyzed here suggest a return
to a more limited-effects understanding of partisan news exposure.
Another alternative is that the strategy for content delivery utilized in the Portal
experiments is too dissimilar from other new media environments that increase polarized attitudes,
such as social media, and therefore will not produce the expected effects. Unlike news portals,
social media platforms feature the possibility of news sharing that includes social endorsements.
As noted earlier, previous investigations into the influence of social cues and news credibility finds
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that recommended content from our friend network tends to override previously held perceptions
of source credibility (Turcotte, et al. 2015), even for counter-attitudinal news (Messing &
Westwood, 2015). Settle (2018) has recently shown that among the complex interrelationships
between social and news cues that may occur on Facebook, utilization of the newsfeed is associated
with increases in perceived polarization. Regular Facebook users are far more likely to confidently
sort their friend network along partisan lines and perceive them to be extremists. Unlike Facebook
or other social media platforms, news aggregating portals lack the context of sociality that might
frame responses to news. Although increases in affective polarization do not appear to result from
the experimental methods employed here, there still exists a large diversity of news delivery
potential online that is not explored here.
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CHAPTER IV.
POLITICAL TALK IN A POLARIZED AMERICA
The news portal experiments presented in Chapter III revealed that affective polarization
is not as vulnerable to increases from news exposure as is sometimes feared. Is it possible that
affective polarization can be manipulated in the opposite direction? The experiments described in
the forthcoming chapters attempt to achieve such a reduction in affective polarization by
experimentally assigning Facebook users to post different discussion prompts as “statuses” to their
real Facebook profiles. The goal of each prompt is to dampen the salience of partisan divides by
re-shuffling other concepts ahead of the partisan attachments that drive negative partisan affect.
The 2017 pilot study compares deliberation and debate style discussions against one another. The
2019 discussion study randomly assigns discussion prompts framed to induce three constructs:
deliberation, personal testimony, and a shared sense of national identity. Both experiments also
test for the effects of requesting the best evidence relevant to the discussion topic.
The studies described below propose three discussion strategies that aim to reduce
affective polarization. These strategies are 1) to encourage a deliberative approach to the sharing
of competing perspectives, 2) initiating a discussion by inviting personal testimonies or stories
about a policy topic 3) and to prime the importance of a shared American national identity as a
means of demoting the salience of party identity. I will outline a brief theoretical defense of these
strategic frames and the targeted dimensions of polarization in this chapter. It is important to note
that face-value presumptions about the influence of discussion strategies on specific
conceptualizations of polarization are grounded in past research utilizing methodologies different
from my own. Actual effects of each discussion strategy may influence individual objects of
affective polarization (i.e. the Republican and Democratic parties, Republicans and Democrats in
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the U.S. Congress, and ordinary voters for with the Republican or Democratic parties) in
unexpected ways.
Reducing Political Divides Online is a Daunting Challenge
Online political discussions have been a topic of political communication research since at
least the late-1990s when scholars began to speculate about the potential for Internet platforms to
facilitate political conversations and influence policy-oriented thinking within the web-active
public (Coleman, 1999; Papacharissi, 2002; Bradley & Froomkin, 2004). The ways people talk
about politics online may influence political polarization, or at least the degree to which they
themselves are polarized. While a good amount of work currently exists demonstrating how
polarization might increase because of exposure to negative partisan messages and online
information exposure there is potential to use social media platforms such as Facebook to
depolarize political tensions irrespective of whether these sites are, at present or in the past,
exacerbating partisan divides. Attempts to induce depolarization have been successful in some
experimental studies using messages or information exposure stimuli. I advance this concept by
examining whether Facebook users are capable of depolarizing themselves through expressions of
depolarization in the form of invitations to talk about politics on Facebook.
This means starting discussions in ways that specifically target and undermine the
foundations of negative partisan affect. Participants in both studies are randomly assigned prewritten discussion prompts that they post to their real Facebook accounts. Each treatment prompt
includes language designed to reduce the affective polarization of participants, and a control
prompt simply asks for comment on a particular political topic without such language.
The insights gleaned from the two portal experiments are valuable from the perspective of
news consumption, yet a second and often neglected dimension of online political life consists in
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the ways members of the public engage in discussions or observe others talking about politics.
Unlike past media innovations, social media platforms like Facebook are uniquely characterized
by their capacity to facilitate user participation (boyd, 2002; Stoycheff, et al. 2017), including the
ability to talk with people in one’s own network on any number of political topics. Investigating
this discussion component is an equally important dimension of online social life as news exposure
and is fertile ground for experimental methods.
Facebook is currently the leading platform among U.S. adults in terms of usage and
posted content (Pew, 2016). According to Pew Research Center, 49% of Americans report
posting about politics on Facebook, and 45% of them use Facebook as a regular source for
political news (Pew, 2017). As the online media landscape has shifted toward a smaller number
of key players in the social networking space (Galloway, 2016), the decline of blogs and chat
forums as the spaces of democratic discussion has induced renewed interest in the effects of
online behavior and political expression on social media (Bode, Vraga, & Borah, 2014; Barberá,
Jost, & Tucker, 2015; Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2016).
Since Facebook is used by a much larger percentage of the population compared to Twitter
and other social media platforms (Pew, 2018), and since Facebook tends to be overwhelmingly
more represented in social media studies in communication journals (Boydstun et al. 2017), there
is a stronger theoretical basis for predicting generalizable findings there compared to platforms
used by more narrowly defined segments of the population. On Facebook, users associate with a
complex combination of strong and weak social ties (Granovetter, 1973), including family, friends,
and co-workers. Despite recent controversies, the platform remains fertile ground for discussion
experimentation that allow users to interact with people they personally know from many domains,
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which is a setting quite different from past online discussion experiments that test effects of
discussions among strangers (e.g. Price, Capella, & Nir, 2000, 2002).
Are social media polarizing us?
Social media platforms like Facebook are accused of exacerbating polarization primarily
through information exposure in the news feed rather than discussions or comments. As the use of
social media sites by the general public has increased dramatically over the past decade (Pew,
20181), the strength of ideological polarization (according to the measure offered Abramowitz &
Saunders, 2008) increases correspondingly. Others have persuasively shown how social media
users are more likely to be exposed to ideological diversity (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015;
Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017), so much so that such diverse exposure may lead to reduced overall
polarization (Barberá, 2015). Among the demographic groups most likely to have polarized over
the past decade, Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017) conclude it is among the groups least likely
to regularly use social media. Increases in age and lower levels of education are linked to greater
overall political polarization, yet social media platforms like Facebook remain disproportionately
used by the young and educated (Pew, 2018).
While political uses for Facebook are prominent, not all members of the public are equally
likely to engage in political discussion. Pew reports that 34% of Facebook users claim to have
posted a status expressing their personal political views. This insight is consistent across
observations of the public discussion behavior offline (Jacobs et al. 2007; Verba et al. 1999) as
well as online (Davis 2005; Jang et al. 2014). Few people who use social media, both in terms of
discussion and other modes of participation, cite politics as their primary motivation for logging
on (Wojcieszak. & Mutz, 2009). For scholars to investigate discussion effects on platforms like

1
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Facebook, it should be noted that the target population may be different from members of the
general public. At a minimum, they are more likely than their peers to engage in discussions.
We should also recall that significant forms of political behavior and communication occur
offline. Qualitative approaches to understanding networks in private forums where important
political and social concerns are ironed out in settings away from the public eye (Cramer, 2016;
Van Duyn, 2018) and remind us of participation gaps relevant to social media discourse. While
much of political communication and discussion occurs in online environments like Facebook,
scholars should be careful not to overrepresent the magnitude of any one platform in shaping
polarization or other outcomes of interest.
Impediments to cross-cutting discourse
A hope of investigations into online opinion formation and exchange has been that
exposure to cross-cutting information might alleviate polarized views, yet psychological evidence
suggests that a host of impediments limit our capacity to dampen strong partisan attitudes that
could lead people to dislike their fellow citizens. As I’ve repeated many times, though it bears
repeating given its potential significance, strong partisans are the most likely to consume partisan
media (Levendusky, 2013) that reinforces their views. They are also more likely to engage in
politically motivated reasoning that uncritically accepts pro-attitudinal arguments and unfairly
dismisses opposing views (Taber & Lodge, 2006).
A popular rubric for encouraging an appreciation of opposing views is deliberation,
although in online discussion spaces, deliberation is only likely to occur in discussions where
politics is unlikely to be the primary motivation for participation (Hindman, 2008; Wojcieszak &
Mutz, 2009). Most people do not use social media primarily for political reasons, yet a great deal
of scholarly emphasis on social media platforms is concerned with their influence on public
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opinion and expression. Since a typical Facebook user’s friendship network us more likely to be
composed of familiar individuals rather than strangers, it seems improbable that politics serves as
a core reason for the majority of a normal user’s time on Facebook.
Previous online deliberation efforts demonstrate that improving knowledge of competing
perspectives or substantially altering issue positions is unlikely except under highly tailored
conditions (see e.g. Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2000, 2002). Exposure to differing perspectives has
occasionally been shown to influence attitudinal outcomes sought by deliberative theorists, such
as increased social acceptance of political differences (Mutz, 2006). While Facebook policy
discussions may not convert participants from one side of a policy dispute to its opposite, engaging
in distinct forms of political talk designed to improve the quality of the discussion may reduce the
salience of partisan identity differences, or promote other modes of speech that alleviate partisan
divisions. Participants expressing an intention for quality discourse and experiencing “better”
policy discussions might lower the intensity of their partisan distain.
Mechanisms for Reducing Affective Polarization
Political communication scholars have made many attempts to use interpersonal
discussions as a means of reducing political divides, increasing acceptance of opposing views, and
seeking consensus on important policy differences. Historically, these attempts are met with mixed
success. Many of the same psychological, social, and cultural drivers of biased information
processing relevant to news exposure also determine how people react to political talk. There are
also added factors unique to interpersonal communications that may influence the effects of
political discussion. It is not clear whether personal interactions will lead to decreases in affective
polarization that are necessarily desirable normatively.
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1. Inter-group Contact
Early election studies from Columbia University proposed that interpersonal
communication, rather than media influence, held the most powerful influence over political
attitudes and behaviors (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). Even before the rise of social
media platforms, scholars argued that mass media influence and interpersonal communication
might facilitate discussion of political affairs within the public (Chaffee, 1982), and especially
during political campaigns. Relying on insights for social psychology, some political
communication scholars predict that interactions with members of other groups (face-to-face or in
the form of mediated messages) may reduce political animus and increase acceptance of perceived
foes (Allport, Clark, & Pettigrew, 1954; Mutz, 2002; 2006; Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, & Christ,
2011) However, experimental results about the depolarizing effects of interpersonal contact are
mixed, and structural features of online discussions may inhibit what positive effects do exist.
Studies in inter-group contact theory have previously focused on efforts to relive racial
tension by undermining the power of racial stereotypes. However, as political attachments
increasingly subsume social identity factors including race (and other sociological attachments),
the mechanisms within inter-group contact theory that predict positive attitudinal changes may
also apply to the increasingly sorted political identities of the electorate. Are there ways of relying
on inter-group contact that lead to depolarization?
One of the core challenges that probably worsens polarization online are differences in how
people engage with others via screens rather than in face-to-face contexts. In social settings, faceto-face encounters are socially complex, requiring us to intuitively navigate a variety of norms and
expectations (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004). In the case of online text-based interactions,
however, reduced availability of potentially humanizing nonverbal cues may exacerbate conflict.
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Two recent studies shed valuable insight on these differences. Barnidge (2017) analyzes panelsurvey data to establish that increased social media use predicts perceptions of greater political
disagreement compared to face-to-face discussion. Or rather, when asked to think about people
with whom they disagree, respondents indicated that the disagreements were more serious online
than off. Schroeder et al.’s (2017) series of psychological experiments found that perceptions of
social and personal discord increased as interactions moved from face-to-face, to video screens,
text, and then to anonymous text. They describe the absence of bodily and vocal cues as a kind a
dehumanization of the speech communication exchange. The less humanized interactions became,
the more likely participants were to attribute nefarious motivations to their interlocutors. Since the
quality of information engagement appears to decrease on mobile devices compared to desktops
(Dunaway, Searles, Sui, & Paul, 2018), the public’s transition to smaller screens may lead to
reduced potential for social media platforms, as apps, to facilitate quality discussions compared to
the same platforms accessed via stationary desktops or laptops.
Group dynamics of political discussion and disagreement may also limit the capacity for
inter-group contact effects. For example, it has been noted that members of the public who are
arguably most in need of interactions with political opponents may also be those least likely to go
looking for it (Murray & Stroud, 2019). Even when contact with political opponents occurs,
disagreement in discussion networks does not necessarily lead to changes in attitude strength
(Robison, Leeper, and Druckman, 2018). Contrary to inter-group contact optimism and past
findings from Mutz (2006) that would predict greater tolerance for opposing views, Druckman and
colleagues (2019) find that people assigned to heterogenous discussion groups were more
polarized about issues than those assigned to talk in like-minded groups.
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2. Social Modeling
Another mechanism that might underly the effects of online discussions comes from
Bandura’s social learning and cognitive theories (Bandura & Walters, 1977; Bandura 2001) called
“modeling,” or the “vicarious acquisition of knowledge” gained by observing the behavior of
others (Bahn, 2001, pg. 11). Newer studies of online comment sections frequently find that the
presence of forum moderators in Facebook news articles or outlet pages who police the civility of
discussions were able to reduce the presence of uncivil comments and increase deliberative
indicators like evidence and comments relevant to the topic at hand (Stroud, Scacco, Muddiman,
& Curry, 2014). While Stroud and colleagues do not interpret the effects of comment section
moderators as a form of modeling, the influence of observed behavior from an exemplar may prove
influential in online behavior. Modeling in the form of written behavior, exemplified in this
dissertation by the treatment discussion prompts used in the Facebook discussion studies, may
motivate participants to promote the style of discussion suggested in the prompts.
3. Expression Effects
Political expression on Facebook can be broadly defined as occurring “when a person
makes public come aspect of their political identity or political views” (Settle, 2018, pg. 52).
Facebook makes expression possible through an enormous range of features that include public
statements to the newsfeed, “reacting” to political content through likes or other the expression
of at least five other responses (“Love,” “Haha,” “Wow,” “Sad,” and “Angry”), disclosing
identifying information to one’s profile, and pictures that cue political meaning.
Theorists have argued that self-perceptions may be influenced by the ways messages are
expressed by their senders (Pingree, 2007) in both online and offline contexts (Shah, 2016). The
act of posting a statement (like an invitation to talk about policy) may activate a mechanism that
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compels participants to speak and behave in ways that are consistent with the message content of
the original expression. Once a Facebook user has publicly made a statement containing political
expression, a multitude of mediating and moderating factors may influence how the act of
sending that message may shape the sender’s attitudes, including apprehensions about audience
response, the ego-driven need to save face, a catharsis of releasing previously undisclosed
sentiments, and identity or other social commitments that may (consciously or unconsciously)
bias the sender’s understanding of the message’s meaning. Expression effects have been shown
to increase political participation in cases where people express political intentions online (Shah,
Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005), or alter self-perceived personal traits and beliefs after
experimental manipulations of statement expression (Bem, 1967) Under this rendering of
expression effects, people may interpret their own beliefs and personal traits in terms of past
expressions they themselves have made. If this is the case, we may observe that posting public
discussion prompts that contain different expressions of political openness may revert back and
influence the political attitudes of the participants.
Does Evidence Matter?
Another dimension of online policy discussion that may affect perceptions of discussants
is the extent to which relevant reasons or evidence included in the discussion prompts. Providing
sources to correct misperceptions or strengthen arguments is a research subject in a variety of
domains (Vraga & Bode, 2017; Margolin, Hannak, & Weber, 2017). In the 2017 and 2019
discussion experiments, I incorporate this element into the experimental designs by including
explicit requests for interlocutors to provide the “best reasons” or “best evidence” (2017) in
support of some side of the argument. After concluding that the “best reasons” request in the pilot
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study did not reveal any significant results, the 2019 experiment only included a “best evidence”
treatment.
The importance of political disucssion online may depend on the content of those
discussions just as much as the frames that set guidelines for how the discussion will proceed. To
that end, we also include explicit requests for participants to include either the “best reasons” or
“best evidence” for some side of the policy dispute. Consistent with past assessments of democratic
discussion quality (Kim, et al. 1999; Moy & Gastil, 2006), we hope the inclusion of substance in
some disucssions will interact with the deliberation and debate prompt to improve the discourse.
Participants may interpret differences in the precise meaning of the words “reasons” and
“evidence,” although such differences are hard to predict. Because there is conceptual ambiguity
behind requests for substance in previous online experimental research, and because evidence for
its effects vary (Dryzek & Braithwaite, 2000; Valenzuela, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011), I include
the requests separately as a three-level factor (including a baseline with no request for either
evidence or reasons) to account for a possible diversity of interaction effects.
The discussion of news portals already noted that partisan motivated reasoning colors the
ways in which people process new information (Taber & Lodge, 2006; 2013), yet common wisdom
also maintains that the inclusion of evidence is important for quality discourse. Part of the
challenge in deciding on the efficacy of evidence lies in agreeing on what sorts of things actually
constitute evidence. Perloff (2003), for example, claims that messages including evidence are more
persuasive than messages presenting no evidence at all, although the relative differences between
forms of evidence, such as story narratives or numerical statistics, remains unclear (Zebregs, et al.,
2015).
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Wojcieszak and Kim (2016) conduct an experiment designed to contrast the importance of
evidence in the forms of narrative testimonies and numbers, finding mixed results for message
acceptance and self-perceived attitude change. They derive their operationalization of numberbased evidence from Church & Willbanks (1986), who define such evidence as “empirically
quantified descriptions of events, persons, places, or other phenomena (pg. 108). A common view
among persuasion scholars appears to be that numerical data presented as evidence tends to be
perceived as objective and verifiable compared to narrative forms of evidence that rely on firstand third-person messaging Greene & Brinn (2003).
On the other hand, context seems to matter quite a bit in determining which kinds of
evidence matter. Counter-attitudinal messages may be more persuasive when they are framed in
terms of personal narratives (e.g. excessive alcohol consumption, Slater & Rouner, 1996).
Testimonial accounts of personal experience that cut-against an audience member’s pre-formed
beliefs may be harder to discount or contradict (Chung & Slater, 2013).
Since previous accounts of the importance of evidence in political discussions offer mixed
results and not traditionally focused on affective polarization as an outcome, it is not clear how to
predict the direction of effects evidence may have on its own or interacting with other elements of
the discussions.
Deliberation and Resolving Political Disagreement
Democratic theorists have argued that deliberative policy discussions are key to improving
the decision-making of citizens in a democratic society (Habermas 1998; Delli Carpini, Cook, &
Jacobs 2004). While investigations into the feasibility and real-world practice of deliberation have
encompassed a variety of domains (Lupia, 2002; List, Luskin, Fishkin, & McLean 2012), questions
about the role of deliberation on the Internet persist, let alone its possible inherent limitations
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(Sanders, 1997). Scholars from a diverse array of fields are interested in the so-called deliberative
process, particularly with regard to politics and the quality of messages ordinary citizens or
members of the media are able to send and receive. As Sanders notes, “Deliberation is a request
for a certain kind of talk: rational, contained, and oriented to a shared problem” (pg. 370). Both
normative and empirical studies have defined the concept of deliberation in a variety of ways,
whether as a “pooling of reasoning powers” (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2006) or as a platform
conducive for “hearing all sides” of an argument (Fearson, 2008). Almost by definition, the
deliberative process includes at least two sides of some controversy.
Scholars interested in deliberative democratic theory routinely consider the importance of
cross-cutting exposure to the moderation of political divides (Mutz, 2006). Mutz presents a
consequential trade-off of interpersonal political disucssion: while exposure to differences in
political opinion does tend to cool-off political disagreements, the Americans most likely to engage
in this kind of interaction are also less likely to participate in democratic civic behaviors like
voting. So while deliberation appears to have a depolarizing effect in terms of tolerance for the
propositions of partisan opponents, participation in the political process overall suffers among the
citizens most open to tolerance. Scholars should continue to seek ways of encouraging voters to
participate in politics in ways that do not worsen sectarian differences.
For at least two decades, media scholars have debated the potential of online discussion
spaces to foster quality deliberation (e.g. Papacharissi, 2002), or to damage democratic aspirations
for quality discourse by cultivating environments of minimal exposure to opposing points of views
(Sunstein, 2001, 2009, 2017; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), or democratize the flow of information
in ways that can either undermine or improve public representation of maligned groups (Hindman,
2008; Papacharissi, 2015). While it is generally accepted that people spend more time and effort
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trying to disconfirm opposing views than re-confirming like-minded ones (Edwards & Smith,
1996), scholarly attempts to validate measures of exposure to opposing opinions are well
established (Cappella, Price, & Nir, 2002; Mutz, 2002, 2006) and find mixed success in offline
contexts.
Past approaches to the effects of deliberation, as opposed to alternative forms of political
talk, are typically measured in terms of decision-making “intelligence” (Cook & Jacobs, 1998;
Fishkin & Luskin, 2005; Cappella, Zhang, & Price, 2017), or the preceived quality of arguments
and opinions rendered in a deliberative setting (Price, Cappella, Nir, 2002; Mutz, 2006; Kim &
Cappella, 2010). I soften those expectations by examining the outcomes of less-formalized
deliberative discussions, or policy-based talk that are not moderated by experts or measured in
terms of substantial agreement or compromise. Instead, the focus of this investigation is whether
or not the framing of policy discussions has any effect on a participant’s feelings toward those who
may disagee with their own position, similar in spirit to Mutz’s (2006) investigatation of tolerance
for political opponents as a consequence of having a deliberative experience. The outcomes
examined here are attitudinal and not targeting a specific kind of discourse.
Deliberation as Shared Reasoning; Debate as Competitive Reasoning
Drawing on Pingree (2007), the 2017 pilot study described below seeks to overcome some
of the challenges of past deliberation research by trying to induce a distinction between shared and
competitive reasoning, referred to here as the difference between deliberation and debate. To
encourage discussions that lead participants to work cooperatively in considering a policy topic,
deliberation is operationalized as a request for interlocutors to withhold their own opinions on a
policy topic while requesting that their fellow commenters do the same. By contrast, a debate style
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discussion is operationalized by requesting that commenters reveal their own positions on the topic
first, and then proceed to try identifying the best solution.
A limitation of many deliberative investigations is the extent to which researchers are able
to facilitate a process among participants that distinguishes between discussions that are an
exchange of pre-existing opinions as opposed to a process of shared opinion discovery. A variety
of cognitive and social biases, including motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, or other forms of
ego reinforcement, make it difficult for individuals to evaluate arguments with an openness to
opinion change, suggesting for scholars that the success of investigations into online deliberation
that participant characteristics may have greater importance than differences between platforms
(Wright & Street, 2007). For the sake of practical differences in how the discussion setting might
distinguish between deliberation and debate, some evidence suggests that individuals process
different time-orders of opinion and reason expression in ways deliberative scholars might
operationalize (Pingree, 2007). Critically, accountability experiments in psychology (for a review
see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) have found that expressing opinions prior to reasons activates some
of the defensive reasoning processes mentioned above, while the opposite order can lead to more
open-minded processing (Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock et al., 1989).
Stroud and colleagues (Stroud, Scacco, Muddiman, and Curry, 2014) experimentally
showed that news organizations can encourage deliberative norms in the comment sections of
online news outlets by experimentally introducing the presence of individuals, such as journalists,
who can referee the civility and behavior of commenters. My studies attempt to introduce a kind
of discussion quality monitoring from the participants themselves, as opposed to designated
discussion moderators or administrators.
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Testimony as a Counter-balance to Deliberation
Sanders (1997) argues that a limitation of deliberative theories (as they are often conceived)
is that they frequently fail to account for known disparities of participation inherent from inequities
in society. “The material prerequisites for deliberation are unequally distributed” along many
social and cultural lines, including gender, race, and class (pg. 349). Deliberative theories often
downplay the weight of pluralistic perspectives in favor of creating an idealized space for
maximum rational exchange, seeking a kind of “ideal speech situation” that discounts many social
and cultural factors in order to manufacture a space for secular reasoning (Habermas, 1962, 1992).
Sanders suggests that an alternative mode of political discussion that overcomes some of
the limitations of typical formulations of deliberation is to include and highlight personal stories
relevant to the topic at hand. Rather than expecting citizens to engage in highly rational exchanges
of propositions and facts in order to improve conciliatory attitudes, there is potential for narratives
to achieve the same outcomes desired by deliberative theorists. Many studies comparing numerical
versus narrative forms of evidence focus on disputes over non-controversial topics (Wojcieszak &
Kim, 2016) such as the benefits of relaxation spaces in corporate offices (Hoeken & Hustinx,
2009). Consistent with findings that females may enjoy some trait-reinforced advantages in
consensus-building contexts, deliberative theorists have argued that particular personal
characteristics such as expressions of empathy might offer advantages in pursuing successful
deliberative efforts (Morrell, 2010). In other media contexts, narratives framed episodically around
personal stories in television dramas (Mutz & Nir, 2010) and films (Igartua, 2010) influence the
political opinions of viewers to become more accepting to the views expressed by key characters
in the plot, at least temporarily, depending on whether audience members were asked to empathize
with those characters.

- 78 -

One classic case of a problematic disparity in deliberation settings is gender. Two major
considerations appear relevant to the relationship between gender and participation in deliberative
settings: 1) contextual or institutional constraints and 2) how perceived stereotypical gender roles
may hinder female participation. Looking into the deliberative setting itself (as opposed to
lingering post-discussion effects) Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014) conduct a thorough
investigation of female experiences in deliberative settings and find that effectiveness is
conditioned significantly on levels of representation (i.e. degrees of minority or majority status)
and the specified goals of the deliberative setting itself. For example, deliberative bodies that
require unanimous agreement but consist of a minority of females are a context especially difficult
for female citizens to pursue agendas or persuade male colleagues to agree with them. In cases
where the established goal is to seek majority-based decisions, female participants are much more
adept in facilitating this goal compared to their male counter-parts. This interaction between
descriptive representation and “institutional” norms of the deliberative experience suggests that,
in most cases, female participants are at a participatory disadvantage, especially online. This
conclusion is consistent with fears that the relationship between descriptive and substantive
representation in decision-making groups is dynamic and can be influenced by a variety of
complex factors not always readily available in online platforms (Mansbridge, 1999).
Critics of deliberative approaches to group problem-solving have also argued that the
deliberative setting takes on masculine bias in a variety of ways (Mendelberg, Karpowitz, &
Oliphant 2014). For example, stereotypic assumptions regarding female social roles can lead to a
constructed perception that female voices are less authoritative compared to males (Eagly &
Johnson, 1990). Female participants in discussion-based forums are frequently undermined by
stereotypic attributions of traits (e.g. gentility, warmth, compassion) or beliefs associated with their
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gender (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993). Furthermore, the ebbs and flows of discussions themselves
can delegitimize female voices. Interruptions from male interlocutors, for example, have been
shown to affect female deliberative participants significantly, leading them to withdraw from the
process by refraining from asserting their beliefs or counter-arguments (Anderson & Leaper,
1998). Additional experimental evidence suggests that females in decision-making games exhibit
lower levels of altruism when required to take on assertive, and arguably more masculine, roles in
deliberative settings (Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro, & Barcelo 2016).
The 2019 Facebook study described below tests whether testimony operationalized as
requests for “personal stories” will cut against or reinforce requests for the “best evidence” on a
chosen policy topic. In another recent experiment, Ragowski & Sutherland (2016) compared
polarization outcomes for participants who were asked to provide their attitudes toward
incumbent U.S. Senators. The researchers exposed some participants to the names, records, and
party identification of the Senators, while other participants received additional information
about the personal stories and backgrounds of the legislators. Results showed that seeing the
personal background information reduced affective polarization toward the Senators compared to
individuals in the comparison condition. While not truly an experiment about testimony,
Ragowski & Sutherland’s manipulation may have encouraged participants to consider political
opponents from a non-political vantage point and evaluate them in more socially complex terms.
My goal in including a testimony prompt is to encourage empathy that leads participants to think
of their own political opponents in ways that are more charitable, and that invites political
opponents to disagree safely.
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Shared National Identity: Reducing the Salience of Party Identity
Another option emerges from a comination of literatures investigating the importance of
social identites in the evaluation of political beliefs. As Mason has recently argued (2014, 2018),
politically relevant sorting is more than just the correlation between ideological issue constraint
and partisanship. Political antipathy is exacerbated by the number of self-identies that converge
within any individual’s self-understanding, making people feel as though much is at risk when
their side of the political frakas is attacked. For example, to the extent that one political party
represents multiple identities (e.g. white, Christian, Republican, pro-gun), the strength of one’s
partisanship is positively related to the overlap of these potential identities. When negative
messages that target any one of these identities are processed, people increasingly react as though
all of them are under threat. For the most sorted partisans, negative messages about their preferred
candidates and party can quickly elicit the strongest emotions (Mason, 2018), building resentments
that overlap multiple political, social, and personal commitments simultaneously.
In order to combat this identity-based sorting by finding a pathway to reducing affective
polarization, Levendusky (2018) conducted an experiment in which participants were exposed to
news content that framed political disputes by cueing a shared American identity for the readers.
This stimulus is intended to dislodge identites that are characterized by division (e.g. party identity)
and increase the prominence of shared identities in a person’s subconscious evaluations of
oppositional persons or information. Levendusky’s novel approach yielded encouraging effects,
but were observed after participants were exposed to a powerful experimental treatment. Subjects
were asked to read a fictitious news article highlighting positive aspects of the United States and
the American people, and then to write a paragraph “explaining what people like best about
America and why they are proud to identify as American” (pg. 4). Rarely will ordinary people

- 81 -

encounter such a powerful exercise during a normal session of new media participation, whether
it is through information exposire on a news portal or several minutes on Facebook. Still, there is
promise for commonly held identities to overcome the salience of divided ones. In the 2019
Facebook discussion study, I operationalize Levendusky’s insight in one of the discussion
treatment prompts by inviting participants to put aside partisan divisions and solve the disucssion
topic as fellow Americans.
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CHAPTER V.
CAN FACEBOOK DISCUSSIONS REDUCE AFFECTIVE
POLARIZATION?
The remainder of empirical analyses in this dissertation focus on identifying ways to
decrease affective polarization by having Facebook users post political discussion prompts to their
real Facebook profiles. Two experiments described below offer promising but highly conditional
evidence that depolarization is possible. In particular, the act of posting invitations designed to
target affective polarization tend to reduce affective divides in comparison to treatment or control
conditions that are likely to mimic the contentiousness of political discussions observed outside of
a research context. The act of requesting evidence or asking for evidence in combination with a
“debate” style discussion prompt, seems to increase polarization compared to the treatment
conditions designed to reduce the divide. Findings from a 2017 pilot study and 2019 follow-up
study offer different routes to the same conclusion: people can depolarize themselves merely by
posting invitations for certain kinds of political talk. This effect is observed for three different
feeling gap outcomes, though the findings are inconsistent.
As much as the results presented below are encouraging for the prospects of reducing
affective polarization, these experiments may be even more valuable in what scholars can learn
about methodologically sound approaches to online discussion. The strengths, limitations, and
specific hurdles for data collection in these studies are elaborated on at the end of the chapter.
Managing these experiments revealed challenges in participant compliance. While the methods
employed for these studies were novel, they cannot disentangle the specific causal mechanisms
that lead to depolarization, which may account for some inconsistent results across treatments and
outcomes. Nonetheless, any evidence of achieving depolarizing effects on the much derided
Facebook.com should be of interest to scholars.
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There may be relevant differences between other deliberative contexts and discussions on
Facebook that will influence findings. Previous attempts to investigate deliberation on the internet
were published before social networking sites (SNS, e.g. Facebook) emerged as prominent
locations for political discussions and information exposure. One key example may be the
difference between settings for deliberative public opinion “polls” that identify issue importance
or problem solutions (Farrar, Fishkin, Green, List, Luskin, & Paluck, 2010) as opposed to online
discussion platforms. Early indications from a recent study are cynical about Facebook as a
platform for quality deliberation (Esau, Friess, & Eilders, 2017), however the units of analysis in
that case are public Facebook comments in news article forums. In the studies presented here,
interlocutors are engaging in discussions with Facebook “friends,” or with other individuals who
are not screened out by the user’s privacy settings. This approach inherently increases the
likelihood that participants will talk to individuals with whom they are at least somewhat
personally familiar.
Facebook Discussion Study 2017 Methods & Study Design
A pilot study was conducted in May of 2017 to assess the difference between deliberation
and debate styled political discussions on Facebook. Participants obtained from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MT) sampling service (N = 578) were asked to post pre-written prompts
supplied by the researchers to their real Facebook profiles as “statuses” inviting their Facebook
“friends” to talk about a policy topic, and then to facilitate a policy discussion according to the
instructions provided in the prompt. After hosting the discussion for a period of 24-hours,
participants were required make the posts “public” by changing their personal profile settings to
allow the researchers to capture the discussion transcript. Using a custom-designed scraping
program, participants entered their profile information after finishing the discussions, at which
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time the transcripts were automatically collected and anonymized by the program. Upon
submitting the discussion text, participants then proceeded to a post-test survey instrument that
included feeling thermometer measures for attitudes toward the Republican and Democratic
parties, and members of the U.S. Congress. Compensation for participating in the study required
that the exact prompt provided by the researchers be posted to the participants actual Facebook
profile.
This sample, like many extracted from online services, deviates from population
parameters presumed to exist based on the U.S. Census. The experiment includes a greater
proportion of female (62.6%) as opposed to male (35.5%) individuals, a majority of whom are
Caucasian (78.9%), well-educated (88% report have a high school diploma or greater), with a
mean age of 37 years old (SD = 11.4).
By fielding a Facebook discussion experiment, this investigation tests for effects of
deliberative and debate oriented policy discussions on feelings toward partisans in congress and in
the public. The experiment consisted of three key manipulations to the discussion prompts:
discussion approach (deliberation vs. debate), discussion substance (best reasons or best evidence
for a position, plus a baseline), and to discuss one of two policy topics (immigration or healthcare),
yielding a 2 (debate/deliberation) X 2 (immigration/healthcare) X 3 (best reasons, best evidence,
baseline) experimental design (12 total groups).
The first prompt manipulation was to invoke the difference between deliberation vs. debate
oriented political discussions The difference between deliberation and debate is operationalized in
each prompt by explicitly asking participants and their interlocutors to either 1) withhold their
point of view on the policy in order to find a “best” solution (i.e. a deliberative posture) or 2) begin
the discussion by clearly stating which side of the issue they are on so they may defend their point
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of view (i.e. a debate posture). As Pingree (2007) has previously argued, the posture of messages
sent by participants in discussion settings may affect a variety of attitudinal outcomes important
to democratic decision-making of the message-sender. Thus, I expect that merely posting the
discussion prompts as Facebook statuses may trigger posturing mechanisms wherein participants
are more likely to adhere to the spirit of the prompts motivated by a defense of self-expression.
A second three-level factor asked participants to supply either 1) the best “evidence” for
each side of the dispute, 2) the best “reasons” for each side, and finally 3) a baseline condition
omitting requests for evidence or reasons. This manipulation is included in addition to
debate/deliberation to assess the effects of presentations of evidence or reasons on a participant’s
post-study “argument repertoire” (Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002) or evaluations of “the relevant
reasons that one has for one’s own opinions and the relevant reasons that others with opposite
opinions might have” (pg. 73). Although I do not investigate perceived argument legitimacy in
this analysis, the inclusion of explicit calls for evidence or reasons in the policy discussions may
influence an interlocutor’s affective assessment of political objects, such as parties or elites,
believed to represent a competing perspective. Below are two example prompts that include
variations of each manipulation (Denoted in italics. Full list of prompts listed in the Appendix).
Deliberative discussion of healthcare emphasizing evidence. I'm in a research study on
how people talk about political issues online. Please help me by sharing your thoughts on
health care. I'd like to hear from all sides. Let's all try to talk like we haven't made up our
minds yet, and just figure this issue out together. What is the best evidence for each side?
Debate discussion of immigration emphasizing reasons. I'm in a research study on how
people talk about political issues online. Please help me by sharing your thoughts on
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immigration. I'd like to hear from all sides. Let's all each start by making it clear what side
we're on. What are the best reasons for each side?
Immigration and healthcare are selected as discussion policy topics primarily for two
reasons. First, in May/June of 2017 when the study and survey were in the field, both issues were
highly salient in news coverage and online discourse. President Trump’s “immigration ban”
policies and the Republican healthcare proposal (AHCA) had both been prominent issues in the
weeks leading up to the study. Second, the selected issues are substantively broad enough that
large segments of the public might at least hold some minimum level of pre-existing attitudes
regarding them, even if well-structured opinions were not present. Both policy topics received
highly contentious news coverage in the weeks leading up to when the experiment occurred. In
designing the study, it was speculated that this approach was preferable to prompting discussions
around any specific piece of legislation to avoid topics so narrowly constrained that participants
would have little to say about them.
An important deviation of this study’s deliberation instructions that separates this
experiment from other deliberation studies is the absence of seeking actual compromise or policy
solutions. In the case of deliberation experiments involving group discussions (Barabás, 2004) or
deliberative polls (Farrar et al. 2010) where individuals participate in jury-like forums that seek a
single decision outcome, the treatment prompts are intended to induce a deliberative discussion
that influences the degree of affective polarization exhibited by participants toward members of
the U.S. Congress and the Republican and Democratic parties.
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Measures
Dependent Variables
Similar to outcomes examined in the two news portal experiments, affective polarization
gap measures were calculated for two dependent variables: feeling thermometer gaps toward the
Republican and Democratic parties and Democratic and Republican representatives in the U.S.
Congress. The affective polarization of this study’s Mechanical Turk sample differs slightly from
the population parameters provided by the ANES in 2016 (see Figure 1.1, Chapter 1). While
2016 measures of the polarization gap toward the Republican and Democratic parties max out at
approximately 40-points in the nationally representative ANES sample, the MTurk sample used
in this study is slightly more polarized overall. Table 5.1 shows the mean affective polarization
gap for both dependent variables in the “combined” column. Results here show the gap toward
members of congress (M = 41.7, SD = 31.9) and partisans in general (M = 48.1, SD = 33.0).

Table 5.1. Facebook 2017 Sample Affective Polarization by Party
Republicans (n = 198)
M
SD

Democrats (n = 371)
M
SD

Combined (n = 569)
M
SD

Congress Gap

37.8

32.4

43.8

31.5

41.7

31.9

All Partisans Gap

41.7

33.1

51.5

32.5

48.1

33.0

Note: mean quantities are the polarization gap for all participants self-identifying as partisans.
Independents and those refusing to self-identify are not included.

Given this difference in polarization, there are two ways in which our stimuli might
induce different effects our sample compared to the general population. Given that stronger
partisanship is associated with stronger negative feelings toward opponents (Abramowitz &
Webster, 2016) and increases in partisan reasoning (Taber & Lodge, 2006, 2013), we may
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observe greater resistance to instructions intended to avoid partisan conflict. On the other hand, a
greater range in polarization gaps leaves more room for moderation. If self-expression effects
occur at all, we may find there is more room for change among Turkers compared to other
partisans.
Control for Legitimate Discussion
Before participants could proceed to the post-test survey to complete the requirements of
the task, each participant was asked to submit a transcript of the discussion by logging in to a
Facebook App purpose-built for this study which collected and anonymized the text of the
discussion. To verify that the retrieved discussions were legitimate and to distinguish them from
cases where the study prompt was posted and did not receive any response, a dichotomous
variable was created by manually coding for the presence of absence of discussion in the
transcripts. After coding, the number of valid transcripts is calculated to be N = 396, with the
remaining N = 182 transcripts either reporting no response to the discussion prompt, or responses
that appeared illegitimate.
Discussion 2017 Hypotheses
H1. Deliberation prompts will decrease affective polarization compared to debate
prompts for a) the political parties and b) members of the U.S. Congress.
H2. Evidence prompts will decrease affective polarization for a) the political parties and
b) members of the U.S. Congress.
RQ1. Will effects in H1 vary depending on requests for a) best evidence, b) best reasons,
c) or the control condition?
Treatment Effects
Average Affective Polarization (Political Parties & U.S. Congress)
To investigate effects of the different discussion prompts on affective polarization, I
conduct three analyses of variance (ANOVA) for each of the three outcomes: 1) the combined

- 89 -

average of both thermometer gap variables, 2) the political parties thermometer gap, and 3) the
U.S. congress thermometer gap, totaling in nine models. Because it is unclear from extant
literature whether or not ordinary Americans differentiate their attitudes between political parties
and political elites along measures of affective polarization, I calculate the mean of the political
parties and U.S. Congress thermometer gaps in the same manner used for the two news portal
experiments. Because the two variables are highly correlated (r = .845, p < .001), I first examine
the predictions in H1, H2, as well as the interaction of RQ1 using the average of the two
thermometer gap outcomes (M = 45.7, SD = 31.1).
I test the prediction in H1a,b by conducting an analysis of variance using the full
factorial design, 2 (deliberation vs. debate) X 3 (best evidence, best reasons, control) X 2
(immigration vs. healthcare). Hypotheses H1a and H1b predicted that deliberative prompts
would decrease affective polarization compared to debate framed prompts. Based on the analysis
using the averaged thermometer gap scores for feelings toward both members of the U.S.
congress and the political parties, this prediction is not supported. Participants receiving a
deliberation prompt were not significantly different from those receiving a debate prompt,
F(1,551) = 0.77, p = .191 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .001.
Next, to disentangle any main effects of the best evidence request compared to the best
reasons or the control condition, I conducted two additional analyses of variance which each
include a dummy variable comparing best evidence to either best reasons (model two) or the
control condition (model three) respectively. Model two for the 2017 Facebook experiment uses
a best evidence vs. best reasons dummy variable, with the control condition as a missing group.
H2 predicted that requests for the inclusion of the best evidence would decrease participant
affective polarization compared to requests for the best reasons. Contrary to expectations, there
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appears to be no statistically significant difference, F(1,381) = 0.09, p = .381 (one-tailed), partial
η2 = .000. Model three replaces the evidence vs. reasons dummy with a dummy variable
comparing the effects of best evidence requests against the control condition, while excluding
best reasons. Again, contrary to the prediction anticipated in H2, requests for best evidence did
not influence affective polarization compared to the control condition, F(1,374) = 1.38, p = .121
(one-tailed), partial η2 = .004.
Are there any interaction effects between the deliberation and debate prompts with
requests for either best evidence, best reasons, or the control condition? The research question
asked whether effects predicted in H1 might interact with the influence of effects in H2. Each of
the models reported above included interaction terms between the two-level deliberation vs.
debate factor with the dummy variables (either best evidence vs. best reasons or best evidence
vs. the control). When interacting the deliberation vs. debate factor with the best evidence vs.
best reasons dummy, a statistically significant difference is uncovered, F(1,381) = 6.51, p = .011,
partial η2 = .017. Using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni post hoc comparisons, pairwise
differences between participants assigned to the best evidence condition differ in affective
polarization depending on whether they were assigned to deliberation or debate prompts (p =
.010), while the differences for participants in the best reasons condition were not significant.
Figure 5.1 shows that participants in the best evidence condition assigned to deliberative prompts
(M = 36.7, SE = 3.1) were less affectively polarized than participants in the evidence condition
assigned to debate prompts (M = 48.1, SE = 3.2).
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Figure 5.1. Facebook 2017 Average Affective Polarization: Evidence vs. Reasons

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward the
Republican and Democratic parties.
Model Summary: F(1,381) = 6.51, p = .011, partial η2 = .017
Is the same effect observed when the the deliberation vs debate factor interacts with the
dummy variable for best evidence vs. the control condition? Results from this interaction are
shown to be statistically insignificant, F(1,374) = 2.36, p = .125, partial η2 = .006. Although the
interaction effect is not significant, Figure 5.# (Appendix) notes that the same reduction in
affective polarization that was observed between deliberation and debate prompts when
interacting with the best evidence vs. best reasons dummy is also observed for the dummy
comparing best evidence to the control condition. The average feeling thermometer gap outcome
combining feelings toward the political parties and members of Congress decreases for
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participants assigned to prompts that include both deliberative language and requests to share the
best evidence.
Republican and Democratic parties
Hypotheses H1a predicted a main effect of the deliberation vs. debate prompts for levels
of affective polarization toward the Republican and Democratic parties. I anticipated that
deliberative discussions will decrease the size of the thermometer gap comparing Republicans
and Democrats compared to debate discussions. H2a predicted that the “best evidence,” prompt
would decrease affective polarization compared to the “best reasons,” and baseline prompt
manipulations. To test the prediction in H1a, the full 2 (deliberation vs. debate) X 2 (immigration
or healthcare) X 3 (“best reasons,” “best evidence,” and baseline) experimental design is used in
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for main effects of either deliberation or debate framed
posts on affective polarization toward the two political parties. The model also included a
dichotomous control factor indicating whether or not a verified discussion was seen in the
transcripts This analysis found no significant main effect for deliberation in the predicted
direction, F(1,551) = 0.25, p = .308 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .000, undermining the prediction
that deliberative prompts would decrease affective polarization toward the political parties
compared to debate prompts.
H2a predicted that prompts including requests for the best evidence would reduce
affective polarization for the Republican and Democratic parties compared to prompts requesting
the best reasons or the control condition. Replicating the analytical strategy employed for the
combined thermometer gap outcome, I conducted two analyses of variance replacing the threelevel discussion substance factor with two dummy variables for either evidence vs. reasons or
evidence vs. the control condition. The first of these models uses a dummy comparing the
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influence of the best evidence prompts against requests for the best reasons. Results from this
analysis do not support the prediction in H2a, F(1,381) = 0.28, p = .299 (one-tailed), partial η2 =
.001. The second model compared the effects of best evidence prompts against participants
assigned to a control condition. Again, there appears to be no main effect for the influence of
evidence compared to the control condition, F(1,374) = 1.19, p = .139 (one-tailed), partial η2 =
.003.
The research question then asked whether the interaction between the deliberation vs.
debate factor and the discussion substance treatments would influence participant affective
polarization. Results from the earlier analysis using the combined thermometer gaps as an
outcome determined that there was a significant interaction when comparing deliberation vs.
debate with the best evidence vs. best reasons dummy variable. Replacing the combined
thermometer gap with the gap for feelings toward the Republican and Democratic parties reveals
a similarly statistically significant relationship, F(1,381) = 4.91, p = .027, partial η2 = .013. Using
Holm’s sequential Bonferroni post hoc comparisons, we see that participants assigned to
deliberation prompts in combination with requests for the best evidence (M = 38.9, SE = 3.3)
were less affective polarized compared to participants assigned to debate prompts requesting
evidence (M = 49.6, SE = 3.4), p = .022. Participants Figure 5.2 shows the significant
interaction.
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Figure 5.2. Facebook 2017 Political Parties Feeling Gap: Evidence vs. Reasons

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward the
Republican and Democratic parties.
Model Summary: F(1,381) = 4.91, p = .027, partial η2 = .013
Next, the interaction between the deliberation vs. debate factor and the dummy varaible
comparing requests for the best evidence and the control condition was not statistically
significant, F(1,374) = 3.21, p = .074, partial η2 = .009. Both this insignificance, as well as the
direction of change between deliberation and debate prompts in the presence of evidence
(Appendix), are similar findings to what was observed for the combined thermometer gap
outcome above.
Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress
The approach for testing hypotheses H1b and H2b predicting main effects of the
experimental treatments on the thermometer gap toward members of the U.S. Congress is
identical to the analysis used to investigate predictions for the political parties and the combined
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thermometer gap. For the prediction in H1b, that deliberation discussions would decrease the
congress feeling gap compared to debate, another factorial analysis of variance was conducted
using the original design, 2 (deliberation vs. debate) X 2 (immigration or healthcare) X 3 (best
reasons, best evidence, and baseline), and a valid discussion control with the congress
polarization gap as the dependent variable. Consistent with the lack of support observed for H1a,
the model reveals no significant main effect for the deliberation vs. debate manipulations for the
partisan feeling gap, F(1,542) = 1.49, p = .112 (one-tailed) , partial η2 = .003, failing to support
the predicted polarization in H1b.
Relying on two models including the dummy variables comparing best evidence against
best reasons, and then best evidence against the control condition, two more analyses of variance
investigated the influence of the prompt substance treatment on affective polarization toward
Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress. H2b predicted that the presence of requests for
the best evidence in the Facebook discussion prompt would depolarize participants compared to
the other conditions. A factorial analysis of variance including the best evidence vs. best reasons
dummy shows a statistically insignificant influence of evidence compared to reasons, F(1,381) =
0.02, p = .481 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .000. The next model using a best evidence vs. control
condition dummy also reveals a statistically insignificant influence of the best evidence
compared to the control condition, F(1,374) = 1.34, p = .124 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .004.
Finally, in keeping with the interaction models utilized for the combined affective
polarization gap outcome and the political parties gap outcome, interaction effects between
deliberation vs. debate prompts and the two best evidence dummies were conducted to address
the research question. The first interaction compares the combination of the deliberation vs.
debate factor with the dummy variable comparing prompts requesting the best evidence and the
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best reasons, revealing a statistically significant relationship, F(1,381) = 7.24, p = .007, partial η2
= .019. Holm’s sequential Bonferroni post hoc comparisons clarify that participants assigned to
post a deliberative prompt containing requests for the best evidence (M = 32.7, SE = 3.1) were
less affectively polarized than those posting a debate prompt requesting evidence (M = 44.8, SE
= 3.2), p = .007.

Figure 5.3. Facebook 2017 Congress Feeling Gap: Evidence vs. Reasons

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward the
Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress.
Model Summary: F(1,381) = 7.24, p = .007, partial η2 = .019
In a pattern consistent with the findings for the averaged thermometer gap and parties
thermometer gap, the model comparing the interaction between deliberation and debate prompts
with requests for the best evidence against the baseline condition revealed statistically
insignificant results, F(1,374) = 1.30, p = .255, partial η2 = .004.
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Each of the significant interactions above suggests that including requests for the best
evidence in the discussion prompts may have both polarizing or depolarizing effects depending
on whether that request is expressed in a deliberative or debate-driven way. Main effects for the
difference between deliberation and debate were not statistically significant, suggesting that the
comparison is not so distinct that participants reported notable differences. Similarly, the
influence of requests for the best evidence or reasons were not statistically significant on their
own. It is only when requests for the best evidence are paired with deliberation or debate that
differences in affective polarization emerge. When participants posted a prompt asking their
friends to identify what side of the issue topic they held, and provide the best evidence,
participants reported increased levels of affective polarization toward the political parties,
members of the U.S. Congress, as well as the average between the two. Participants assigned to
the combination of deliberation and best evidence requests showed a statistically significant
decrease in affective polarization.
Unexpectedly, the interaction effects reported above emerge only for the relationship
between deliberation vs. debate and best evidence vs. best reasons, but not for the evidence
comparison to the control condition. Although the direction of mean differences is the same for
models including both the evidence vs. reasons or evidence vs. baseline dummy variables, in
which debate prompts with evidence increase polarization compared to deliberation prompts
with evidence (see figures in Appendix), the difference was less notable compared to participants
posting prompts that did not feature either request.
Facebook Discussion Study 2019
Inspired by the findings of the 2017 pilot study, a second Facebook discussion study was
designed using discussion treatment prompts specifically tailored to influence the underlying
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mechanisms associated with affective polarization. As described above, the salience of partisan
identity is thought to be a cornerstone in how people evaluate political opponents. However,
based on results from the two news portal experiments, as well as the 2017 Facebook discussion
experiment, there is some evidence that affective polarization is not as easily increased as is
sometimes feared, and may also be vulnerable to decreases under the right conditions.
Results from the 2017 Facebook study revealed that when people begin a Facebook
discussion about policy by posting a status inviting friends to talk, those same users might
depolarize themselves when they express the importance of both deliberation and evidence. The
2019 Facebook discussion study has two goals: first, to replicate the earlier interaction between
deliberation and evidence on affective polarization toward the political parties and members of
the U.S. Congress. Second, to investigate whether two new discussion prompts, called
Testimony and Shared National Identity, are able to overpower the salience of partisan identity
in influencing levels of affective polarization. Of course, this approach assumes that partisan
identity is always primarily salient for individuals participating in a political discussion and
needs to be demoted for depolarization to occur. Because the public seems to be increasingly
folding a range of social identities into their partisanship (Mason, 2018), it is reasonable to
assume that people engaging in political conversation are processing the experience in terms of
this sorted socio-political collapse of identity. The goal here is to reshuffle the importance of this
partisan identity by priming the importance of personal experiences (Testimony) or a national
identity shared by supporters of both political parties (National Identity).
Methods & Study Design
After completing a pre-test containing measures for Facebook political use,
demographics, and feeling thermometers of interest, participants recruited from Amazon’s
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Mechanical Turk (final N = 491) were randomly assigned to post pre-written discussion prompts
to their personal Facebook profiles that invited their network to have a policy discussion focused
on an issue topic selected by the participant from a list of topics supplied by the researcher. After
posting the status on Facebook and, hopefully, engaging in a political discussion over a period of
at least 4-hours and no longer than 10-hours, participants then took a post-test survey measuring
a variety of political discussion outcomes, including items on political attitudes (particularly
affective and perceived polarization), attitudes about the discussion experience, and the same
demographic information inquired about in the pre-test. After the discussion period, but before
proceeding to the post-test, participants were asked to copy-and-paste the text of their
discussions into a text-block provided on the treatment page of the survey (a screenshot of
Treatment page is included in the Appendix) and provide a screenshot of the discussion to verify
compliance with the study instructions.
A completion rate based on the number of participants who finished the pre-test (N =
1518) compared to the number of participants who both completed the post-test and submitted a
discussion transcript (N = 491) is calculated to be 32.3%. Among those who completed the
study, two groups received slightly different prompt versions. 35.5% (N = 129) of participants
were randomly assigned to post prompts nearly identical to those utilized in the 2017 study, with
the addition of two new prompts. In the midst of logistical difficulties with Amazon and the Turk
marketplace, slightly altered versions of the prompts were constructed to improve response rates
and study recruitment. The result of the changes can be seen below.

- 100 -

Table 5.4. Non-Experimental Variation in Prompt Wording

Original Prompt Versions

Updated Prompt Versions

Deliberation: I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. Please help me by sharing your
thoughts on ______________. I'd like to hear
from all sides. Let's all try to talk like we
haven't made up our minds yet, and just figure
this issue out together. What is the best
evidence for each side?

Deliberation: What should be done about
_____________? I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. Let's all try to talk like we haven't
made up our minds yet, and just figure this
issue out together. What is the best evidence
for each side?

Testimony: I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. I’d like to hear from all sides. Please
help me by sharing your thoughts on ____.
Does anyone have a personal about how this
issue affected you? What is the best evidence
for each side?

Testimony: What should be done about
_____________? I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. Does anyone have a personal about
how this issue affected you? What is the best
evidence for each side?

Shared American Identity: I’m in a research
study on finding better ways of talking about
politics online. Please help me by sharing
your thoughts on _________________. I’d
like to hear from all sides. Let’s try to forget
about Republicans and Democrats for now
and just figure this issue out together as
Americans. What is the best evidence for each
side?

Shared American Identity: What should be
done about _____________? I’m in a
research study on finding better ways of
talking about politics online. Let’s try to
forget about Republicans and Democrats for
now and just figure this issue out together as
Americans. What is the best evidence for each
side?

Baseline: I’m in a research study on finding
better ways of talking about politics online.
Please help me by sharing your thoughts on
______________. I’d like to hear from all
sides. What is the best evidence for each side?

Baseline: What should be done about
_____________? I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. What is the best evidence for each
side?

After a period of data collection hurdles, the prompt language was changed slightly to
encourage higher rates of participation. Posts were rephrased to begin with a question about the
chosen issue topic rather than a declarative statement about being in a research study. Problems
in collecting data during the first two days of the study (described in the Appendix) afforded an
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opportunity to change the wording of each discussion prompt to make them more invitational.
For each analysis reported below, a two-level factor for the discussion wording was included as a
control for any effects associated with the change.
Dependent Variables
Two affective polarization outcomes that the 2019 study shares with previous
experiments contained in this dissertation are thermometer gaps for the Republican and
Democratic parties (M = 40.0, SD = 33.1) and Republican and Democratic members of the U.S.
Congress (M = 36.2, SD = 32.2). A third and new measure of affective polarization focuses on
participant attitudes toward ordinary voters of either the Republican or Democratic parties. In
both the pre- and post-test surveys, participants were asked to rate “people who vote for [political
party]” on a feeling thermometer scale ranging from 0-100. Post-test responses are calculated
using the same method described in Chapter One to create a thermometer gap measure (M =
31.8, SD = 31.2) similar to those used in previous analyses.
To be consistent with the analytical approach of analyses leading up to this point, a
variable was created that combines each of the three thermometer gap outcomes into a single
dependent variable (α = .946). Unsurprisingly, each of these variables is highly correlated to one
another (Parties and Congress: r = 899, p < 001; Parties and Voters: r = .835, p < .001; Congress
and Voters: r = .831, p <.001). This results in a combined thermometer gap variable for the
Facebook 2019 discussion study combining affective polarization toward the political parties,
members of the U.S. Congress, and Republican and Democratic voters (M = 36.1, SD = 30.7).
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Figure 5.4. Facebook 2019 Discussion Policy Topics: Selection Frequency (N = 491)

A noteworthy change in procedure between the 2017 and 2019 discussion studies is the
removal of a randomly assigned policy topic factor from 2017. Instead, participants in the 2019
study were asked to select one topic out of a possible eight they preferred to talk about with their
Facebook friends. Figure 5.4 shows the frequency distribution of the topics chosen by participants
who ultimately completed the study. Allowing participants to select a topic of their own is
preferable to a randomly assigned topic for two reasons. First, random assignment introduces an
experimental factor that unnecessarily divides up the statistical power of the experiment. Because
the requirements of this study are already quite demanding, it was reasonable to expect that
recruitment rates would be low. Gathering a sufficient sample size for a 4 X 2 design is, frankly,
easier than recruiting a sample with enough statistical power for a 4 X 2 X 2 design. The second
reason has a related logic: participants might be more amenable to engaging in a policy
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conversation if they are permitted a degree of agency in choosing the topic of that conversation.
Although maintaining a sample of high-quality completions of the study proved to be difficult (for
reasons that will explained in the discussion of this chapter), it is hoped that providing Turkers
with a suite of policy topics improved their ability to host prolonged political discussion
Discussion 2019 Hypotheses
Results from the 2017 pilot study revealed that participants who posted deliberative
prompts in combination with requests for the “best evidence” reported lower levels of affective
polarization toward the two major political parties and members of the U.S. Congress.
Deliberation treatment effects for the previous study were analyzed in comparison to the debate
prompt, which asked interlocutors to identify which side of the policy topic they were on before
any additional contribution to the discussion. For the 2019 study, the deliberation treatment
retains identical language requesting do the following: “Let's all try to talk like we haven't made
up our minds yet, and just figure this issue out together.” Because the discussion treatment factor
analyzed here compares deliberation to several versions other than debate, including a control
condition that contains no prompt treatment, I analyze main effects for the deliberation treatment
against the new stimuli.
H1. Deliberation prompts will decrease affective polarization toward a) the political
parties b) members of the U.S. Congress and c) voters.
Next, The Testimony prompt asks whether anyone involved in the discussion has a “personal
story” about how the chosen issue-topic affected them, based primarily on Sanders’ (1997) call
for including personal accounts in deliberative spaces.
H2. Testimony prompts will decrease affective polarization toward a) the political parties
b) members of the U.S. Congress and c) voters.
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As explained in Chapter IV, Levendusky (2018) experimentally shows that reductions in
affective polarization are possible when American subjects are asked to reflect on their shared
national identity. Given the powerful stimulus utilized in his study, it is valid to examine whether
such effects are replicable in a discussion environment on Facebook. For this study, a prompt
variation is constructed asking that interlocutors post the following sentence within their prompt:
“Let’s try to forget about Republicans and Democrats for now and just figure this issue out
together as Americans.” Given the previous decrease in affective polarization observed by
Levendusky, I test to following hypothesis in the context of a Facebook discussion experiment:
H3. Shared National Identity prompts will decrease affective polarization toward a) the
political parties b) members of the U.S. Congress and c) voters.
Finally, results from the 2017 pilot study showed that the combination of deliberation and
evidence led to decreases in affective polarization for attitudes between the two political parties
and members of congress. There proved to be no significant influence from requests for the “best
reasons” in the pilot, so that request is absent from the 2019 experiment. Given the observed
interaction between evidence and deliberation from the previous study, as well as uncertainty
around the combined effects of evidence with the testimony and shared national identity
treatments, results below investigate effects for the following research question:
RQ. Will effects observed from H1, H2, and H3 vary depending on requests to include
the “best evidence” in the discussions?
Results
There is a great deal to disentangle from the resulting analyses reported below. I will
emphasize two key conclusions from the data: first, reductions in affective polarization are
consistently observed for participants posting the deliberative, testimony, and shared national
identity prompts, although there is some variation in statistical significance across outcome.
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Differences across the four affective polarization outcomes based on the prompt treatment effects
indicate that thermometer responses toward different political groups are not uniformly reactive
to experimental treatment. Second, the presence of requests for the best evidence to be included
in the policy discussion appears to interact with the discussion treatments in much the same way
that was observed in the 2017 pilot study. In the presence of language designed to be more
invitational and depolarizing, evidence requests appear to decrease affective polarization.
However, when participants posted prompts requesting evidence that did not include any
additional from the deliberation, testimony, or shared national identity treatments, their affective
polarization increased, particularly toward fellow voters. Results tables for each of the analyses
presented below are shown in the Appendix.
The presence of requests for the best evidence actually undermines efforts for
depolarization in the absence of other language framing the intent of the discussion. This
polarizing effect is statistically significant for interaction terms using the voters thermometer
gap, although the direction of mean differences is consistent across all outcomes. When
participants posted the discussion prompts asking only for the best evidence, their affective
polarization increased toward their fellow voters. Regardless of whether evidence requests are
included, each discussion of the three discussion initiation strategies slightly reduces the
affective polarization of participants.
A first step in testing the expectations of the hypotheses and research question is to repeat
my earlier strategy of investigating changes in affective polarization by creating a dependent
variable that is the averaged feeling thermometer gap responses for each outcome. In this case,
feeling thermometer gaps for the political parties and members of the U.S. Congress remain from
the aforementioned experiments and are joined by a gap from responses to a feeling thermometer
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item asking how participants feel toward “people who vote for” the Republican and Democratic
parties. The first set of results seen below use the average of the combined thermometer gaps as a
dependent variable. The averaged thermometer gap outcome has been log-transformed.
Because the motivation for this investigation is to identify ways of depolarizing Facebook
users by having each participant engage in one specific form of political discussion, the
hypotheses above are worded as comparisons to a control condition featuring no discussion
treatment. Consequently, each discussion treatment in the four-level prompt factor (Deliberation,
Testimony, and Shared National Identity) is coded as a dummy variable and compared against
the control condition. Each of these dummies is then interacted with a two-level factor for the
presence of requests for the best evidence or not.
Two covariates are also included in the analyses. Pre-test responses for each thermometer
gap are included to better account for changes in affective polarization that result from the
experiment, a methodological improvement over the 2017 pilot study. Next, participants were
asked three pre-test survey items assessing how often they engage in political behaviors on
Facebook (M = 4.9, SD = 1.5, α = 844). Participants indicated on a 7-point scale how often they
read about politics or current events, commented on posts about politics or current events, and
posted about politics or current events (including sharing a link).
Treatment Effects
Average Affective Polarization (Political Parties, U.S. Congress, & Voters)
The first model uses a dummy variable for deliberation to test the prediction in H1 that a
deliberative discussion invitation would decrease affective polarization, represented here by the
averaged thermometer gap outcome combining responses toward the political parties, members
of Congress, and voters. An analysis of covariance was conducted using pre-test measures of

- 107 -

affective polarization and Facebook political use. Results show a statistically significant effect of
deliberation discussion initiation, F(1,240) = 4.71, p = .016 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .020.
Participants assigned to post a discussion prompt asking interlocutors to talk as though they had
not already made up their minds and figure the issue out together were slightly less affectively
polarized (M = 35.1, SE = 1.4) compared to participants assigned to the control condition (M =
39.3, SE = 1.5).
A second identical model replaces the deliberation dummy with a two-level dummy for
testimony, or the prompt strategy asking interlocutors to share a personal story about how the
issue topic affected them or someone they know. H2 predicted that requesting the exchange of
stories in this way would reduce affective polarization. Results from this second model show a
statistically significant main effect for the testimony prompt on the outcome averaging the
together the thermometer gaps toward the political parties, members of congress, and voters,
F(1,242) = 7.70, p = .003 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .032. Participants posting prompts that invited
the sharing is issue-relevant testimonies were less affectively polarized (M = 36.5, SE = 1.2)
compared to the control condition (M = 41.1, SE = 1.3).
H3 predicted that participants posting a prompt asking that interlocutors put aside
partisan differences and discuss the issue as fellow Americans would lead to reduced affective
polarization. A third model utilizing a dummy variable for the shared national identity treatment
reveals a statistically significant change in the predicted direction, F(1,243) = 8.80, p = .002
(one-tailed), partial η2 = .036. Participants assigned to post the shared national identity reported
lower post-test levels of affective polarization (M = 35.6, SE 1.5) compared to participants
posting the control condition prompt (M = 41.8, SE = 1.5).
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Results from the three analyses reported above are supportive of the predictions for
reduced affective polarization from the discussion strategies, with each version of the
depolarizing language included in the prompts demonstrating a depolarizing effect on the
averaged thermometer gap dependent variable. It is important to note that effect sizes for the
treatment influences described above are relatively small, despite their statistical significance.
Further analyses reported below that use the distinct thermometer gap outcomes for the parties,
congress, and voters shed some light on why the effects may be muddled when the gap measures
are averaged together.
The research question asked whether any main effects observed in investigation H1, H2,
and H3 would vary depending on whether or not the prompts included requests for the best
evidence. Investigating this interaction reveals a pattern observed by multiple treatment
strategies and outcomes: requests for the best evidence in the absence of additional framing from
depolarizing language actually increases affective polarization, often by as much as 15-points on
the un-logged thermometer gaps. The first example of this finding is observed from the
interaction between the deliberation prompt and requests for the best evidence. Results from the
model using the deliberation dummy find a statistically insignificant interaction effect, F(1,240)
= 3.52, p = .062, partial η2 = .015. Although the interaction term is insignificant in this case, the
direction of changes in mean affective polarization is consistent with a pattern that is observed
across multiple treatments and outcomes, further detailed below. Requests for the best evidence
in the absence of additional depolarizing language actually increases thermometer gap responses
compared to other experimental conditions.
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Figure 5.5. Facebook 2019 Average Affective Polarization: Deliberation & Evidence

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward the
Republican and Democratic parties, members of the U.S. Congress, and Republican
and Democratic Voters.
Model Summary: F(1,240) = 3.52, p = .062, partial η2 = .015
Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between requests for the best evidence and requests that
discussants withhold their views while talking about all sides of an issue. Using Holm’s
sequential Bonferroni post hoc comparisons, we see that participants assigned to the combination
of evidence and deliberation were less polarized (M = 34.7, SE = 1.9) compared to participants
only posting the request for best evidence (M = 42.5, SE = 2.1), p = .006. The observed
difference between the deliberation dummy and the control condition without the best evidence
request was not significant in the post hoc analysis (p = 847).
Next, results from the second model utilizing the testimony dummy variable show a
statistically significant interaction with requests for the best evidence, F(1,242) = 4.32, p = .039,
partial η2 = .018. As Figure 5.7 shows, a similar pattern emerges for the relationship between
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evidence and testimony that was observed for the relationship between evidence and
deliberation.
Figure 5.6. Facebook 2019 Average Affective Polarization: Testimony & Evidence

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward the
Republican and Democratic parties, members of the U.S. Congress, and Republican
and Democratic Voters.
Model Summary: F(1,242) = 4.32, p = .039, partial η2 = .018

Bonferroni post hoc comparisons indicate that participants assigned to post a prompt
inviting both personal stories and the best evidence relating to the chosen issue topic were less
affectively polarized (M = 36.3, SE = 1.6) compared to participants assigned to a prompt only
requesting the best evidence (M = 44.3, SE = 1.8), p < .001. The difference between participants
assigned to the testimony prompt vs. the discussion baseline condition did not vary in the
absence of evidence was not significant (p = .616).
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Prompts including a best evidence request and appeals to a shared national identity
resulted in a pattern similar to the observed results for testimony and deliberation. Results from
the third model utilizing the shared national identity dummy show a statistically significant
interaction effect on affective polarization in the presence of requests for the best evidence,
F(1,243) = 4.54, p = .034, partial η2 = .019. Figure 5.8 below shows that participants assigned to
post an evidence-only discussion prompt were significantly more affectively polarized (M =
34.8, SE = 2.2) compared to the participants posting the combination of evidence and appeals to
a shared national identity (M = 45.1, SE = 2.2), p = .001. Along with the deliberation and
testimony interactions with the no-evidence control condition, the presence of shared national
identity appeals was not significant in in the presence of an interaction (p = .529).
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Figure 5.7. Facebook 2019 Average Affective Polarization: Shared National Identity &
Evidence

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward the
Republican and Democratic parties, members of the U.S. Congress, and Republican
and Democratic Voters.
Model Summary: F(1,243) = 4.54, p = .034, partial η2 = .019
A consistent pattern emerges based on the interaction results reported above: although the
deliberation, testimony, and shared national identity discussion prompts do appear to have a
cooling effect on affectively polarized attitudes overall, requests for the best evidence related to
the discussion topic risk increasing affective polarization above what participants reported in the
other experimental conditions, as well as in the pre-test. In the absence of combining evidence
requests with language designed to ease political tensions, requests for evidence produce a
backfiring increase in affective polarization. A better understanding of these relationships may
be revealed by analyzing the thermometer gap outcomes separately.
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The Political Parties & Members of the U.S. Congress
To what extent do the findings described above vary depending on the political group
mentioned in the feeling thermometer questions? In keeping with the strategy utilized in earlier
analyses in this dissertation, I replicate models described for the averaged thermometer gap
outcome by replacing the averaged gap with each discrete thermometer gap measure. For the
2019 Facebook study, thermometer gaps were calculated for the difference in attitudes toward
the Republican and Democratic parties, Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress, and
people who vote for the Republican or Democratic parties. The results reported below offer
additional evidence that discussion treatment strategies influence affectively polarized responses
differently depending on the object of concern specified in the feeling thermometer question.
Just as three separate models using the deliberation, testimony, and shared national
identity dummies were employed to examine effects on the average thermometer gap outcome,
three models using the same dummy variables are employed for the thermometer gap toward the
Republican and Democratic parties, as well as Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress.
For the feeling thermometer gap between feelings toward the Republican and Democratic
parties, two statistically significant main effects are found for the testimony and shared national
identity discussion prompts. Participants assigned to post the testimony prompt asking
interlocutors to exchange personal stories about the influence of the issue topic were slightly less
affectively polarized (M = 39.8, SE = 1.6) compared to participants in the control condition (M =
43.3, SE = 1.6), F(1,242) = 2.93 p = .044 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .012. Next, a similar modest
reduction in affective polarization toward the political parties is observed for participants posting
the shared national identity prompt. Those posting a request to set partisanship aside and solve
the issue as fellow Americans were slightly less affectively polarized (M = 39.5, SE = 1.8)
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compared to participants in the control condition (M = 44.3, SE = 1.8), F(1,240) = 3.87 p = .025
(one-tailed), partial η2 = .016. The deliberation prompt treatment did not produce and statistically
significant changes in affective polarization. Interaction terms between each of the discussion
strategies and requests for the best evidence also yielded null statistical findings for the political
parties thermometer gap. These findings provide support for predictions made in H2a and H3a.
Next, the models examining treatment effects on affective polarization toward the U.S.
Congress reveal statistically significant reductions in affective polarization for all three
discussion prompt treatments. H1b predicted that participants posting a deliberative discussion
prompt would report lower levels of affective polarization. In support of this prediction, the
analysis finds that those asking interlocutors to withhold their opinion and solve the issue
cooperatively were less affectively polarized (M = 34.1, SE = 1.9) than participants not assigned
to one of the depolarizing treatments (M = 38.9, SE = 1.9), F(1,240) = 3.62 p = .029 (one-tailed),
partial η2 = .015. H2b predicted a similar reduction for those participants assigned to post the
testimony treatment prompt. Again, the model including the testimony vs. control condition
dummy variable finds statistical support for this reduction, F(1,242) = 3.57 p = .030 (one-tailed),
partial η2 = .015. The testimony treatment appears to reduce affective polarization toward
members of congress (M = 36.1, SE = 1.7) compared to the control condition (M = 40.4, SE =
1.7). The prediction in H3b, which expected reduced affective polarization for the congress
thermometer gap as a result of posting the shared national identity prompt, is also supported by
the analysis, F(1,243) = 7.45 p = .004 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .031. Individuals assigned to the
shared national identity prompt showed lower levels of affective polarization for Republicans
and Democrats in Congress (M = 33.9, SE = 1.9) compared to participants in the control
condition (M = 40.9, SE = 1.9).
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In answering the research question, each analysis finds no statistically significant
interaction effects when requests for the best evidence are included in the discussion prompts. Of
import here is to note that reductions in affective polarization in the 2017 pilot study comparing
deliberation and debate with evidence are not replicated in the 2019 study. Although a debate
prompt is not employed for the 2019 experiment, the combination of deliberation and requests
for best evidence did not produce the reduction in affective polarization we would expect based
on the preliminary findings in 2017. Although not definitive, this absence of replication suggests
that intentionally framing discussions in the terms of formal debate (“let’s make it clear what
side we’re on”) is not synonymous with a control condition that does not specify the framing of a
political discussion. Future research should more closely examine differences between
operationalization of formal disagreement and less constrained beginnings to social media
political talk.
Republican and Democratic Voters
The final set of results described in this project test the predictions made in H1c, H2c,
and H3c, which expected that the discussion prompt treatments would reduce affective
polarization toward ordinary voters for the Republican and Democratic parties. Like previous
analyses, three models analyses of covariance are conducted using dummy variables indicating
random assignment to the deliberation, testimony, or shared national identity discussion prompts.
Interaction effects with a request to include the best evidence are also reported.
The first of these models tests H1c, which predicted that deliberation prompts asking
discussants to solve the issue topic cooperatively without revealing their own positions would
reduce affective polarization toward Republican and Democratic voters. Results from the
analysis reveal a statistically significant reduction in the predicted direction, F(1,239) = 8.94 p =
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.002 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .037. Participants assigned to post deliberation prompts reported
lower thermometer gaps toward voters (M = 29.7, SE = 1.6) compared to participants receiving
control condition prompts (M = 36.2, SE = 1.6), even in the presence of the pre-test voter
thermometer gap and Facebook political use covariates. Next, participants assigned to post
testimony prompts that invited pertinent personal stories did not support the prediction in H2c
which expected a reduction affective polarization toward voters.
A second model relying on the testimony prompt requesting an exchange of personal
issue-related stories also produced a statistically significant reduction in the voters feeling gap,
F(1,240) = 6.18 p = .007 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .028. Participants assigned to the testimony
condition reported lower thermometer gap differences toward Republican and Democratic voters
(M = 30.8, SE = 1.6) compared to participants who were assigned a control condition prompt (M
= 36.4, SE = 1.7).
The third model using the voters feeling gap as a dependent variable tested my prediction
in H3c, which expects that participants assigned to prompts mentioning a shared national identity
would be less affectively polarized toward voters. Results from the analysis confirm this
prediction, yielding a statistically significant reduction in the voters feeling thermometer gap,
F(1,241) = 5.54 p = .010 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .023. Participants assigned to post the shared
national identity prompts reported smaller feeling gaps toward voters (M = 31.2, SE = 1.8)
compared to participants assigned to the control condition (M = 37.2, SE = 1.9).
To answer the research question inquiring about whether the effects observed from the
discussion prompts would vary depending on requests for the best evidence, interaction results
are reported below. First, the interaction between the deliberation prompt and requests for the
best evidence reveals a statistically significant effect, F(1,240) = 5.16, p = .024, partial η2 = .022.
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Bonferroni post hoc comparisons of these mean differences shows that participants assigned to
the combination of deliberation and best evidence prompts (M = 29.3, SE = 2.3) were less
affectively polarized than participants seeing best evidence alone (M = 40.7, SE = 2.3), p < .001.
Figure 5.8 below displays a similar pattern for the presence of the best evidence as a polarizing
influence on participant attitudes compared to the combination of evidence and deliberation.

Figure 5.8. Facebook 2019 Voters Feeling Gap: Deliberation & Evidence

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward
Republican and Democratic Voters.
Model Summary: F(1,240) = 5.16, p = .024, partial η2 = .022.
The research question next applies to the influence of best reasons requests in
combination with the testimony prompt. Similar to the result identified previously using the
averaged thermometer gaps, requests for an exchange of relevant personal stories in combination
with requests for the best evidence produces a statistically significant effect on polarized
attitudes toward voters, F(1,240) = 7.60, p = .006, partial η2 = .032. Another post hoc analysis
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using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni comparisons shows that participants assigned to post
prompts combining testimony and evidence (M = 29.3, SE = 2.2) reported significantly lower
levels of affective polarization toward voters compared to participants posting evidence-only
prompts (M = 40.9, SE = 2.4), p < .001. The differences observed are displayed below in Figure
5.9.
Figure 5.9. Facebook 2019 Voters Feeling Gap: Testimony & Evidence

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward
Republican and Democratic Voters.
Model Summary: F(1,240) = 7.60, p = .006, partial η2 = .032.
Finally, there remains a comparison to be examined between participants assigned to post
a prompt including a request for the best evidence and an appeal to a shared national identity.
Interaction results from the final analysis of covariance demonstrate a statistically significant
interaction effect that is consistent with the pattern of results observed for the averaged affective
polarization dependent variable, as well as deliberation and testimony effects on the voters
- 119 -

feeling gap, F(1,241) = 6.30, p = .013, partial η2 = .026. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons clarify
that participants assigned to post prompts featuring a combination of best evidence requests and
an appeal to a common national identity (M = 29.5, SE = 2.8) compared to participants posting a
prompt requesting only evidence (M = 41.8, SE = 2.7), p = .001. Figure 5.10 below shows these
results.
Figure 5.10. Facebook 2019 Voters Feeling Gap: Shared National Identity & Evidence

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward
Republican and Democratic Voters.
Model Summary: F(1,241) = 6.30, p = .013, partial η2 = .026.
Each of the effects observed for the voters thermometer gap is consistent in size and
direction with the statistically significant findings observed for the averaged thermometer gaps
outcomes, though not with the outcomes for the political parties and congress. I interpret this to
suggest that the changes most responsible for driving the significance of the averaged thermometer
gap variable are due in large part to changes in participant responses toward ordinary voters of
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either party. This is especially true for the interaction effects finding that requests to include the
best evidence, when isolated from the other prompt treatments, lead to an increase in polarized
responses.

- 121 -

CHAPTER VI.
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
Discussion Studies
The two Facebook discussion experiments described above tested the effects of randomly
assigned pre-written discussion prompts on affective polarization. In the 2017 pilot study, results
showed that participants who were assigned to post prompts containing a combination of
deliberative instructions and requests for the “best evidence” reported lower levels of affective
polarization toward the two political parties and members of the U.S. Congress compared to
those seeing debate instructions with evidence. The 2019 follow-up study found that
depolarizing main effects from deliberative, testimony, and shared national identity prompts on
affective polarization overall, particularly toward Republican and Democratic voters, and toward
the political parties and congress. The only exception for main effects is that participants posting
the deliberative prompt did not report significantly lower polarization toward the political
parties. Alarmingly, interaction effects revealed that requests for the best evidence in isolation or
in combination with the “debate” style prompt might increase levels of affective polarization.
These findings applied inconsistently across three affective polarization outcomes. In the
2017 study, reductions were observed for dependent variables measuring the feeling
thermometer gap between the Republican and Democratic parties and the gap between feelings
towards Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress. In 2019, these results failed to
replicate. Instead, the influence of the discussion prompts alone, and especially the testimony and
shared national identity prompts, produced reductions in affective polarization toward multiple
political objects. In 2019, interaction effects are only observed for the voters thermometer gap.
Because feeling thermometers gauging responses for voters were not included in the 2017 posttest survey, it is impossible to draw comparisons on that measure across studies.
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Despite this inconsistency, it seems that Facebook users can depolarize themselves under
the right conditions. The 2017 study suggest that the distinction between evidence and
deliberation vs. evidence and debate can either depolarize or polarize the participant posting the
prompt. In posting statuses inviting Facebook friends to discuss an issue, the 2019 participants
posting prompts that offered to discuss the topic by either withholding their own opinions and
solving the issue cooperatively (deliberation), to share personal stories about how the topic
affected them (testimony), or setting aside partisan differences to solve the issue as fellow
Americans (shared national identity), self-reported smaller gaps in their feelings toward political
elites, parties, and voters. These findings demonstrate the importance of framing political
discussions in strategically sound ways at their starting points. While further analysis may reveal
that some treatments influenced the quality of the discourse induced by the prompts, or other
non-experimental factors influencing participant attitudes, the analysis provided here
demonstrates how the act of either seeing, posting, or the combination of the two led participants
to report reduced feelings of political animus.
The Proper Use of Evidence
Findings from both the 2017 and 2019 discussion studies suggest that the way requests
for evidence are presented can be a key difference in the affective polarization of participants
posting invitations to talk about politics on Facebook. Results from both experiments
demonstrate that requests to include evidence can make participants more polarized,
exacerbating a general trend already observed in the general public. This increase appears to
occur in cases where the experimental prompts either intentionally set opinions against each
other (debate, 2017), or when the best evidence is requested without any other qualifications
(2019).
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In both cases, it is possible that participants polarized themselves by virtue of posting,
and therefore expressing, language inviting contentious talk. More investigation is required to
disentangle the underlying mechanisms governing how expressing more contentious invitations
for political talk might lead to increased affective polarization. Such an investigation would
focus on participant expectations for combative responses from their friend network. It is
important to note that neither study replicates the conditions under which increased polarization
was observed. The 2017 study does not feature an experimental control condition in which there
is no a discussion instructions treatment (the deliberation vs. debate treatment is a randomly
assigned two-level factor). Likewise, the 2019 study does not feature a debate prompt as one of
its discussion treatments. Although the motivation for the discussion studies in this dissertation is
to identify depolarizing modes of social media talk, scholars can still benefit from a better
understanding of modes of political talk that cause social media users to report increased political
animus. Results here reveal that ordinary Facebook users are capable of increasing their own
affectively polarized attitudes when posting discussion prompts that appear to invite debate or
unrestricted exchanges of evidence.
Discussion Studies Limitations
Lack of External Validity & Unclear Mechanisms
Most experiments lack strong claims for external validity and this limitation is certainly
true of the 2017 and 2019 Facebook discussion experiments. Although results from each of these
studies offer encouraging evidence that ordinary Facebook users can depolarize themselves when
beginning policy conversations, the generalizability of this kind of political discussion is
unknown, and the efficacy of these strategies outside of an experimental context is unclear. From
a descriptive standpoint, scholars have recently noted that gaps remain in our understanding of
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polarizing influences on social media (Tucker, et al. 2018). As of this writing, there is no
publicly available descriptive study addressing the prevalence of depolarizing language on social
media. Furthermore, although depolarizing effects are observed experimentally for measures of
affective polarization in this dissertation, there remain many dimensions of political polarization
in general that go unexplored here that may have greater relevance scholarly and public
understanding of social media’s polarizing influence. As noted earlier, Settle (2018)
convincingly demonstrates that the complex interactions of social cues, news content, and
expression features offered by the Facebook newsfeed lead users to report both higher levels of
perceived political extremism in the public, as well as greater confidence in their own ability to
sort members of their friend network into opposing political camps.
Furthermore, the specific psychological and social mechanisms related to the
depolarizing effects observed here are still unknown. In the literature review I speculated that at
least three concepts may be relevant: inter-group contact theory, social modeling, and expression
effects. Participants may exhibit lower levels of affective polarization because the experiment
forced them to invite members of their Facebook network who hold different political views to
engage in conversation, and therefore putting the participants into contact with members of a
competing political group. Inter-group contact theory historically deals with contact between
racial and ethnic divisions (Glaser, 2003), yet the increased sorting of political, personal, and
social identities into partisanship in the United States (Mason, 2018) lends some support to
concerns that partisan divides may be at least as powerful in shaping polarized attitudes as other
identities. Breaking through the influence of partisan identity via discussion may be one
explanation for depolarization.
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It is also possible that participants expressed attitudes they believed to be consistent with
the perceived intent of the prompts themselves, thus modeling a kind of social stance provided to
them by the researcher. Under this interpretation, reductions in affective polarization are due to
the influence of learning to express lower levels polarization based on the social cues contained
in the language of the prompts. If this explanation holds, then external validity is deeply
compromised. During an ordinary session of Facebook use, the prevalence of conciliatory
language that presents as an attempt to improve online political discussions is unknown. Rarely
will there by researchers or other moderating authorities providing templates for improved
political talk. Negative and more contentious language is likely the norm, meaning that the
power social learning biases the public toward polarizing rather than depolarizing language.
Finally, depolarizing effects may result from the influence on self-perception that results
from posting language about improving political discussion online. If an expression effects
interpretation is correct, then participants may report reduced affective polarization because the
act of publicly posing content that communicates depolarizing sentiments has influenced their
own self-perception. They may (consciously or unconsciously) experience a need to conform
their attitudes and behaviors to things they have previously articulated. In this case, that past
articulation takes the form of the experimental treatments.
General Limitations for Portals and Discussion Studies
Unknown Device Variance
The methods used in the news portal experiments and Facebook discussion studies do not
dictate that participants to use (or refrain from using) different devices, such as smart phones,
tablets, laptop or desktop computers. Recent work comparing differences in user effects between
mobile devices and conventional computers demonstrates that people are less likely to retain
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information seen on mobile compared to laptops or desktops (Dunaway, et al. 2018). The
consequences of multiple-device usage for news attention and discussion participation are only
recently emerging in political communication literature. Because participants were permitted to
use any device that could access the news portals or their Facebook profiles, both experimental
approaches may have relatively strong external validity compared to device-specific studies.
Differences Across Demographic Groups
There may be important differences in the effects of different discussion initiation
strategies and news portal effects across diverse range of demographic differences, including
gender, race/ethnicity, socio-economic status, etc. One of the clearest examples of where this
limitation is clear comes from my theoretical justifications for including discussion prompts that
invited personal testimony in the 2019 experiment. As noted previously, previous investigations
into deliberative settings often find gendered disparities in participation, efficacy, and
democratically desirable outcomes. Sanders (1998) compellingly notes that the barriers to entry
for many deliberative settings prevent disenfranchised groups from equal participation in the
often highly challenging requirements for deliberation. Education and socio-economic status in
particular may limit some members of the population from fully participating in a complex
discursive exchange of evidence and propositions about policy.
Future Research
The Discussion Text
These results should be interpreted in light of at least one major limitation that future
study can capitalize on: results here report only post-test survey responses showing changes
differences in attitudes across experimental conditions. I have not analyzed the content of the
Facebook discussions themselves. At this point, the nature of those conversations is a “black-
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box.” The degree of compliance from participants and their fellow discussants is unknown. The
analysis only concludes that that those posting certain prompts, such as deliberation and evidence
in 2017 or any discussion prompt and evidence in 2019, were less affectively polarized by the
end of the study. Future analyses of depolarization using these data would benefit tremendously
from understanding the content of these discussions that may reveal other moderating
mechanisms.
A procedural and conceptual limitation of the design could be properly identifying the
specific role played by the study participants. Analysis of the discussion text may reveal whether
participants tended to take on the role of discussion moderators, equal participants with other
interlocutors, or some other mode of participation. There is good evidence from studies relying
on the comment sections on the Facebook pages of prominent news outlets that interventions
from journalists or page administrators can reduce incivility and improve the deliberative quality
of posts (Stroud, Scacco, Muddiman, & Curry, 2014). Similar mechanisms could be occurring in
this study: participants randomly assigned to different discussion initiation prompts might
comply with the prompts by taking on different moderation roles rather than contributing to the
discussions in ways identical to their friends.
Concluding Thoughts
The fact that many of the findings presented in this dissertation differ from expectations
established in the extant literature, particularly regarding partisan news exposure in the Portal
experiments and depolarization on social media, signals the importance of innovation in
methodological strategies that investigate new media and political attitudes. Compared to many
single-shot exposure experiments occurring in highly controlled laboratory settings, the
approaches delineated here take advantage of realistic and real-world information environments
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combined with the epistemic advantages of experimental methods. If results from newer
approaches violate the expectations shaped by previous work, the onus is on scholars fielding
these novel approaches to justify the scientific legitimacy of their methods. I hope I have
adequately done so throughout this monograph.
Results from the four experiments described here offer reasons to be tentatively
optimistic about how new media technologies can be used with respect to affective polarization.
Despite the fears articulated by President Obama in the quotation at the beginning of this
dissertation, the divisive effects of a new media environment may be overstated in terms of
partisan news influence, and even vulnerable to improvement when ordinary Facebook users
begin policy discussions in a productive and conciliatory way. The findings from the Facebook
discussion experiments suggest that members of the public are capable of depolarizing
themselves by starting political discussions in positive ways, even if it is unknown whether these
effects extend to other participants in the discussion. These reductions in affective polarization
appear possible even without deeply analyzing the substance of the discussion text itself. While
the text of these discussions remains fertile ground for deeper understandings of Facebook
political discussion between online friends, the fact that consistent attitudinal changes are
observed from the discussion treatments suggests that expressing a desire for positive discussion
provides a compelling starting point for depolarization efforts.
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APPENDIX A. STUDY PROCEEDURES
Portal 2016 Design
Stories from Fox News or MSNBC (or baseline) were added to participant newsfeeds. Some
partisans assigned to conditions with supporting or opposing source (e.g. some Democrats seeing
influx of stories of Fox News, others MSNBC, others no extra dosage). In several observational
studies, pro- and counter-attitudinal political news exposure is associated with increases in
negative partisan affect (Garrett, Gvirsman, Johnson, Neo, & Dal, 2014; Wojcieszak & Garrett,
2018). Randomly assigning both Democrats and Republicans to artificially high dosages of
either friendly or opposing news allows us to investigate the polarizing effects of two distinct
forms of partisan news exposure.
18-cell Design:
3 (Fox News vs. MSNBC vs. baseline)
X 3 (Problem stories, Problems with crime, baseline)
X 2 (Local news)
N = 1371

Portal 2018 Design
The 2018 Portal robustly tests predictions that influxes of friendly partisan news shape attitudes
toward the other side by filtering out cross-cutting voices. Participants see increases of news
from sources aligned with their preferred party. e.g. Republicans saw Fox News, Breitbart, and
Townhall; Democrats saw MSNBC, Huffington Post, Mother Jones, and Slate.
64-cell Design:
2 (Partisan Congruent sources vs. none)
X 2 (Agenda-setting: Trump-Russia vs. Education/Immigration)
X 2 (Defense of Professionalism vs. none)
X 2(Sidebar Agenda Cue: Trending vs Important)
X 2 (Sidebar Agenda Setting: Guns vs. Race/Police)
X 2 (Vote button vs. none)
Final N = 1391
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Portal 2016 Screenshot
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Portal 2018 Screenshot
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Portal Survey Items
Partisan Strength
“How strongly do you identify as a member of either the Democratic Party or the
Republican Party?”
(7-point scale)
Party Preference
“Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?”
(Choice: the Republican Party or the Democratic Party)
Feeling Scales (2016)
“Rate your feelings towards the following on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being the most
positive.”
(11-point scale)
President Barack Obama
Republican Party
Democratic Party
Republicans in Congress
Democrats in Congress
Hillary Clinton
Donald Trump
Bernie Sanders
Feeling Thermometers (2018)
“Please rate how you feel about each of the following on a "feeling thermometer" where
100 degrees means the warmest / most favorable feeling, and 0 degrees means the coolest
/ least favorable feeling.”
(0 – 100 scale)
The Democratic Party
The Republican Party
Donald Trump
Fox News
MSNBC
The News Media
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
The Muller Investigation
People who disagree with you about the Mueller Investigation
People who disagree with you about the black lives matter movement
People who disagree with you about education privatization
People who disagree with you about gun control
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Facebook Discussion Study 2017 Design
The difference between deliberation and debate is operationalized in our prompts by
explicitly asking participants and their interlocutors to either 1) withhold their point of view on a
policy in order to find a “best” solution (i.e. a deliberative posture) or 2) begin the discussion by
clearly stating which side of the issue they are on so they may defend their point of view (i.e. a
debate posture). As Pingree (2007) has previously argued, the posture of messages sent by
participants in discussion settings may affect a variety of attitudinal outcomes important to
democratic decision-making of the message-sender. We expect that merely posting our
discussion prompts as Facebook statuses might trigger posturing mechanisms wherein
participants are more likely to adhere to the spirit of the prompts motivated by a defense of selfexpression.
A second three-level factor asked participants to supply either 1) the best “evidence” for
each side of the dispute, 2) the best “reasons” for each side, and finally 3) a baseline condition
omitting requests for evidence or reasons. We included this manipulation to assess the effects
evidence or reasons on a participant’s post-study “argument repertoire” (Price, Cappella, & Nir,
2002) or evaluations of “the relevant reasons that one has for one’s own opinions and the
relevant reasons that others with opposite opinions might have” (pg. 73). The inclusion of
explicit calls for evidence or reasons in the policy discussions may influence an interlocutor’s
ability to recall substantive evaluations of their own views, as well as of competing views.
Immigration and healthcare were selected as discussion policy topics for two reasons: 1)
in May/June of 2017 when the study and survey were in the field, both issues were highly salient
in news coverage and online discourse. President Trump’s “immigration ban” policies and the
Republican healthcare proposal (AHCA) had both been prominent issues in the weeks leading up
to the study. 2) We preferred issues that were substantively broad enough that large numbers of
the public might at least hold pre-existing attitudes regarding them, even if well-structured
opinions were not present. Both policy topics received highly contentious news coverage in the
weeks leading up to when the experiment occurred. We speculated that this approach was
preferable to prompting discussions around any specific piece of legislation to avoid topics so
narrow that participants would have little to say about them.
12-cell Design & Example Discussion Prompts:
2 (Deliberation vs. Debate)
X 3 (“best evidence” vs. “best reasons” vs. baseline)
X 2 (immigration vs. healthcare)
N = 578
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Table A.1. Facebook 2017 Discussion Prompts
Deliberation: I'm in a
research study on how people
talk about political issues
online. Please help me by
sharing your thoughts on
________. I'd like to hear
from all sides. Let's all try to
talk like we haven't made up
our minds yet, and just figure
this issue out together.

Evidence: I'm in a research
study on how people talk
about political issues online.
Please help me by sharing
your thoughts on ________.
I'd like to hear from all sides.
Let's all try to talk like we
haven't made up our minds
yet, and just figure this issue
out together. What is the best
evidence for each side?

Healthcare: I'm in a research
study on how people talk
about political issues online.
Please help me by sharing
your thoughts on healthcare.
I'd like to hear from all sides.
Let's all try to talk like we
haven't made up our minds
yet, and just figure this issue
out together. What is the best
evidence for each side?

Debate: I'm in a research
study on how people talk
about political issues online.
Please help me by sharing
your thoughts on ________.
I'd like to hear from all sides.
Let's all each start by making
it clear what side we're on.

Reasons: I'm in a research
study on how people talk
about political issues online.
Please help me by sharing
your thoughts on________.
I'd like to hear from all sides.
Let's all each start by making
it clear what side we're on.
What are the best reasons for
each side?

Immigration: I'm in a
research study on how people
talk about political issues
online. Please help me by
sharing your thoughts on
immigration. I'd like to hear
from all sides. Let's all each
start by making it clear what
side we're on. What are the
best reasons for each side?

Control: I'm in a research
study on how people talk
about political issues online.
Please help me by sharing
your thoughts on________.
I'd like to hear from all sides.
Let's all each start by making
it clear what side we're on.
Note: Each combination yields 12 available conditions, fitting the 2 X 3 X 2 between-subjects
experimental design.
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Facebook Discussion Study 2019
Preliminary results from the Facebook 2017 study suggest that a combination of deliberation and
evidence reduce affective feeling gaps compared to more contentions forms of discussion (e.g.
debate) or deliberation in the absence of evidence-based appeals. Affect may also be vulnerable
to other modes of communication (e.g. poetic, ironic, humorous) that make persuasive appeals as
a function of pathos rather than logos. Rather than depending on the rationalistic paradigms
inherent in much deliberation research, discussions involving appeals to identity and emotional
expression could influence affective political evaluations in democratically interesting ways.
The Hamilton study adds two new discussion prompts designed to tap non-partisan
identity and affective appeals. Since the Facebook 2017 study was designed to focus on
discourse-quality rather than polarization, the new study is designed to specifically target
affective mechanisms that could be susceptible to influence by political discussions. First,
emphasizing a shared American national identity has been shown in previous experimental
research to reduce the salience of partisan identities in making affective evaluations of political
out-partisans (Levendusky, 2018). A new prompt includes a statement asking potential
discussants to recall the importance of the discussion topic to all Americans, and does so using
inclusive group pronouns (e.g. “us” and “we”).
The stimuli also contrast deliberation with testimony as a means of reducing affective
polarization. According to Sanders (1997), deliberation “offers a form of expression and
discourse that makes it likely that the talk of an identifiable and privileged sector of the
American public will dominate public dialogue” (pg. 370). Indeed, inequities in online influence
are a common critique of the Internet’s influence on democratic outcomes (Hindman, 2010,
2018). Sanders proposes shared testimony as an alternative to deliberation because it allows
critical perspectives that are not typically offered in consensus-seeking discussions. Storysharing does not facilitate dialogue, in her view, but may activate empathetic responses to
personalized stories.
While Sanders’ goal in advocating for shared testimony is to create a mechanism for
excluded groups to be heard, I am optimistic that framing online political discussions this way
might reduce the power of negative out-group stereotypes to govern feelings toward the other
side.
8-Cell Design & Example Discussion Prompts:
4 (Deliberation vs. Testimony vs. Shared American Identity vs. Baseline)
X 2 (“Best evidence” vs. baseline).
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Table A.2. Facebook 2019 Non-Experimental Variation in Prompt Wording
Original Prompt Versions

Updated Prompt Versions

Deliberation: I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. Please help me by sharing your
thoughts on ______________. I'd like to hear
from all sides. Let's all try to talk like we
haven't made up our minds yet, and just figure
this issue out together. What is the best
evidence for each side?

Deliberation: What should be done about
_____________? I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. Let's all try to talk like we haven't
made up our minds yet, and just figure this
issue out together. What is the best evidence
for each side?

Testimony: I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. I’d like to hear from all sides. Please
help me by sharing your thoughts on ____.
Does anyone have a personal about how this
issue affected you? What is the best evidence
for each side?

Testimony: What should be done about
_____________? I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. Does anyone have a personal about
how this issue affected you? What is the best
evidence for each side?

Shared American Identity: I’m in a research
study on finding better ways of talking about
politics online. Please help me by sharing
your thoughts on _________________. I’d
like to hear from all sides. Let’s try to forget
about Republicans and Democrats for now
and just figure this issue out together as
Americans. What is the best evidence for each
side?

Shared American Identity: What should be
done about _____________? I’m in a
research study on finding better ways of
talking about politics online. Let’s try to
forget about Republicans and Democrats for
now and just figure this issue out together as
Americans. What is the best evidence for each
side?

Baseline: I’m in a research study on finding
better ways of talking about politics online.
Please help me by sharing your thoughts on
______________. I’d like to hear from all
sides. What is the best evidence for each side?

Baseline: What should be done about
_____________? I’m in a research study on
finding better ways of talking about politics
online. What is the best evidence for each
side?

Note: each prompt above includes a request for best evidence. Participants could also be
assigned to a no evidence request control condition, consistent the full 4 X 2 between-subjects
design.
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Facebook 2019 Treatment Page Screenshot
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Facebook Discussion Study Survey Items
Feeling Thermometers (2017)
“Please rate how you feel about each of the following on a "feeling thermometer" where
100 degrees means the warmest / most favorable feeling, and 0 degrees means the coolest
/ least favorable feeling.”
(0 – 100 scale)
Republicans
Democrats
Democrats in Congress
Republicans in Congress
Donald Trump

Feeling Thermometers (2019)
“Please rate how you feel about each of the following on a "feeling thermometer" where
100 degrees means the warmest / most favorable feeling, and 0 degrees means the coolest
/ least favorable feeling.”
(0 – 100 scale)
The Democratic Party
The Republican Party
Democrats in Congress
Republicans in Congress
Donald Trump
Nancy Pelosi
People who vote for Democrats
People who vote for Republicans
People who disagree with you on political issues
Facebook Political Use
When you use Facebook, how often do you:
(7-point scale)
“Read about politics or current events?”
“Comment on someone else’s post about politics or current events?”
“Post about politics or current events (including sharing a link)?”
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APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES
Figure A.1. Portal 2016 Combined Thermometer Gaps

ANES Time-series Partisan Feeling Gap
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
1980

1984

1988

1992

Democratic party

1996

2000

2004

Republican party

2008

2012

2016

Combined

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant scale ratings of The Republican and Democratic Parties,
Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress, and Donald Trump vs. Hillary
Clinton. The dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the variable
mean.
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Figure A.2. Portal 2016 Partisan Thermometer Gap

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant scale ratings of the Republican and Democratic Parties. The
dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the variable mean.
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Figure A.3. Portal 2016 Congress Thermometer Gap

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant scale ratings of Republicans and Democrats in the U.S.
Congress. The dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the
variable mean.
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Figure A.4. Portal 2016 Presidential Candidates Thermometer Gap

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant scale ratings of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. The
dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the variable mean.

- 156 -

Table A.3. Portal 2016 Factorial Between Subjects Models (ANCOVA)
F

p

partial η2

H1a
H1b
H1c

0.06
0.04
0.76

.404
.476
.190

.000
.000
.001

Congress (M1)
Parties (M2)
2016 Candidates (M3)

H2a
H2b
H2c

0.01
0.14
0.62

.456
.356
.216

.000
.000
.001

Pro Attitude
Pro Attitude
Pro Attitude

Congress (M1)
Parties (M2)
2016 Candidates (M3)

H3a
H3b
H3c

0.20
1.70
0.16

.329
.192
.344

.000
.002
.000

Counter Attitude
Counter Attitude
Counter Attitude

Congress (M1)
Parties (M2)
2016 Candidates (M3)

H4a
H4b
H4c

2.21
2.25
1.77

.061
.067
.092

.003
.002
.002

Partisan Exposure
Dummies

Dependent
Variable

Pro Attitude
Pro Attitude
Pro Attitude

Congress (Model 1)
Parties (M2)
2016 Candidates (M3)

Counter Attitude
Counter Attitude
Counter Attitude

Partisan Strength
Interaction

Note: p < .10 #, p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001***
Each model includes a covariate calculated from the pre-test affective polarization feeling gaps
for each outcome. Two experimental factors for problem stories (3-level) and local news (2level) are included in each model as controls.
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Figure A.5. Portal 2018 Partisan Thermometer Gap

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant feelings toward the Republican and Democratic parties. The
dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the variable mean.

- 158 -

Figure A.6. Portal 2018 Feelings Toward Fox News vs. MSNBC

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant feelings toward Fox News vs. MSNBC. The dotted line
shows a normally distributed curve around the variable mean.
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Figure A.7. Portal 2018 Feelings Toward Those Who Disagree About Policy

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean responses of feeling
thermometers asking participants how they feel about people who disagree with
them about the following issue topics: Education, Guns, Black Lives Matter, and
the Mueller Investigation. The dotted line shows a normally distributed curve
around the variable mean.
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Table A.4. Portal 2018 Factorial Between-Subjects Models (ANCOVA)
Partisan News
Factor

Dependent
Variable

Pro Attitude
Pro Attitude
Pro Attitude

Political Parties
Fox vs. MSNBC
Issue Disagreement

Political Parties
Fox vs. MSNBC
Issue Disagreement

F

p

partial η2

H1a
H1b
H3

3.08
0.11
1.08

.080
.746
.300

.003
.000
.001

H2a
H2b
H4

2.61
0.05
1.85

.106
.945
.174

.002
.000
.002

Interaction with
Partisan Strength
Pro Attitude
Pro Attitude
Pro Attitude

Each model includes a covariate calculated from the pre-test affective polarization feeling gaps
for each outcome. Experimental factors for fact-checking (2), defense of journalism (2), an
“up-vote” button (2), news media agenda (2), user agenda issue (2), and user agenda format
(2) are included in each model as controls.
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Figure A.8. Facebook 2017 Mean Thermometer Gap (Parties & Congress)

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant feelings toward the Republican and Democratic parties
averaged with thermometer gap responses toward members of the U.S.
Congress. The dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the
variable mean.
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Figure A.9. Facebook 2017 Political Parties Thermometer Gap

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant feelings toward the Republican and Democratic parties. The
dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the variable mean.
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Figure A.10. Facebook 2017 Congress Thermometer Gap

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant feelings toward Republicans and Democrats in the U.S.
Congress. The dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the
variable mean.
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Figure A.11. Facebook 2017 Average Affective Polarization: Evidence vs. Baseline

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward the
Republican and Democratic parties.
Model Summary: F(1,374) = 2.36, p = .125, partial η2 = .006
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Figure A.12. Facebook 2017 Political Parties Thermometer Gap: Evidence vs. Baseline

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward the
Republican and Democratic parties.
Model Summary: F(1,374) = 3.21, p = .074, partial η2 = .009
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Figure A.13. Facebook 2017 Congress Feeling Gap: Evidence vs. Baseline

Note: Figure displays treatment differences in discussion prompt types on the mean
absolute value feeling thermometer difference between participant feelings toward
Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress.
Model Summary: F(1,374) = 1.30, p = .255, partial η2 = .004
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Table A.5. Facebook 2017 Factorial Between Subjects Models (ANOVA)
F

p

partial η2

Combined
Political Parties
U.S. Congress

0.06
0.04
0.76

.404
.476
.190

.000
.000
.001

Combined
Political Parties
U.S. Congress

0.20
1.70
0.16

.329
.192
.344

.000
.002
.000

Combined
Political Parties
U.S. Congress

2.21
2.25
1.77

.061
.067
.092

.003
.002
.002

Experimental
Treatment

Dependent
Variable

Deliberation vs. Debate

Evidence vs. Reasons

Evidence vs. Baseline

Each model includes a covariate calculated from the pre-test affective polarization feeling gaps
for each outcome. Two experimental factors for problem stories (3-level) and local news (2level) are included in each model as controls.
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Figure A.14. Facebook 2019 Mean Thermometer Gap (Parties, Congress, & Voters)

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference between participant
feelings toward the Republican and Democratic parties averaged with thermometer gap
responses toward members of the U.S. Congress and toward Republican and Democratic voters.
The dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the variable mean.
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Figure A.15. Facebook 2019 Political Parties Thermometer Gap

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant feelings toward the Republican and Democratic parties. The
dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the variable mean.
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Figure A.16. Facebook 2019 Congress Thermometer Gap

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant feelings toward Republicans and Democrats in the U.S.
Congress. The dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around the
variable mean.
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Figure A.17. Facebook 2019 Voters Thermometer Gap

Note: Histogram displays the distribution of mean absolute value difference
between participant feelings toward people who vote for the Republican or
Democratic parties. The dotted line shows a normally distributed curve around
the variable mean.
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Table A.6. Facebook 2019 Discussion Prompt (Omnibus) Interaction with Requests for
Evidence
DV: Voters Thermometer Gap

Evidence Request
M
SE
Control
M
SE

Testimony

Deliberation

National ID

Control

2.53Aa
0.12

2.59b
0.12

2.53c
0.13

3.07Babc
0.13

3.01Aa
0.13

2.71
0.12

2.64a
0.11

2.70B
0.12

Interaction Summary: F(3,488) = 4.07, p = .007, partial η2 = .025
Note: Common subscripts indicate mean differences significant at p < .05 using Holm’s
sequential Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons. Uppercase differences correspond to statistical
differences across columns. Lowercase differences correspond to statistical differences across
rows. Also, thermometer feeling gap has been log transformed to be consistent with normality
assumption.
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Table A.7. Facebook 2019 Treatment Main Effects and Interactions (ANCOVAs)
df,
F
p
Prompt Treatment
residual
Deliberation (one-tailed) (H1)
1,240
4.71
.016

partial η2
.020

Testimony (one-tailed) (H2)

1,242

7.70

.003

.032

Shared American Identity (one-tailed) (H3)

1,243

8.80

.002

.036

Deliberation X Evidence (RQ)

1,240

3.52

.062

.015

Testimony X Evidence (RQ)

1,242

4.32

.039

.018

Shared American Identity X Evidence (RQ)

1,243

4.54

.034

.019

Dependent Variable: Average Thermometer Gap (Parties, Congress, & Voters)
Model includes a covariates calculated from the pre-test affective polarization feeling gaps for
feelings toward partisan voters, as well as Facebook political use. Model includes experimental
factor for prompt-type (2-level).

Table A.8. Facebook 2019 Treatment Main Effects and Interactions (ANCOVAs)
df,
F
p
Prompt Treatment
residual
Deliberation (one-tailed) (H1)
1,240
0.58
.223

partial η2
.003

Testimony (one-tailed) (H2)

1,242

2.93

.044

.012

Shared American Identity (one-tailed) (H3)

1,243

3.87

.025

.016

Deliberation X Evidence (RQ)

1,240

3.02

.083

.013

Testimony X Evidence (RQ)

1,242

1.70

.193

.007

Shared American Identity X Evidence (RQ)

1,243

1.71

.193

.007

Dependent Variable: Political Parties Thermometer Gap
Model includes a covariates calculated from the pre-test affective polarization feeling gaps for
feelings toward partisan voters, as well as Facebook political use. Model includes experimental
factor for prompt-type (2-level).
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Table A.9. Facebook 2019 Treatment Main Effects and Interactions (ANCOVAs)
df,
F
p
Prompt Treatment
residual
Deliberation (one-tailed) (H1)
1,240
3.62
.029

partial η2
.015

Testimony (one-tailed) (H2)

1,242

3.57

.030

.015

Shared American Identity (one-tailed) (H3)

1,243

7.45

.004

.031

Deliberation X Evidence (RQ)

1,240

1.50

.222

.006

Testimony X Evidence (RQ)

1,242

0.69

.407

.003

Shared American Identity X Evidence (RQ)

1,243

1.34

.247

.006

Dependent Variable: Congress Thermometer Gap
Model includes a covariates calculated from the pre-test affective polarization feeling gaps for
feelings toward partisan voters, as well as Facebook political use. Model includes experimental
factor for prompt-type (2-level).

Table A.10. Facebook 2019 Treatment Main Effects and Interactions (ANCOVAs)
df,
F
p
partial η2
Prompt Treatment
residual
Deliberation (one-tailed) (H1)
1,239
8.94
.002
.037
Testimony (one-tailed) (H2)

1,240

6.18

.007

.028

Shared American Identity (one-tailed) (H3)

1,241

5.54

.010

.023

Deliberation X Evidence (RQ)

1,239

5.16

.024

.022

Testimony X Evidence (RQ)

1,240

7.60

.006

.032

Shared American Identity X Evidence (RQ)

1,241

6.30

.013

.026

Dependent Variable: Voters Thermometer Gap
Model includes a covariates calculated from the pre-test affective polarization feeling gaps for
feelings toward partisan voters, as well as Facebook political use. Model includes experimental
factor for prompt-type (2-level).
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Complications in 2019 Design and Data Collection
Beginning at 11:00am EST on March 13th of 2019, Facebook and its other platforms
(Instagram, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger) suffered from its longest service outage ever (The
Verge, 2019). This was, by cruel fate or coincidence, only 25 minutes after I initiated the data
collection process on Mechanical Turk for the 2019 Facebook Discussion Study. Over the course
of the next 24-hours, I received dozens of emails from concerned Turkers explaining that
Facebook was either inaccessible or, if one could manage to log in, proved to be incapable of
displaying posts to the newsfeed. People could barely log in; their friends could not post replies;
cataclysm. This forced me to republish the study link for what I hoped would be the only
necessary re-start to the collection process. Originally, I had planned to publish the study and
collect responses under one “batch,” meaning that I would post the study link and instructions
only once and hope that enough responses would roll in to allow a single session of experimental
treatment. Although Facebook’s outage did force me to republish the study again the next day, I
had no idea how many other hurdles would emerge in the coming days.
Within hours of re-publishing a new batch for workers on March 14th, I began receiving
emails from Turkers accusing the study of violating Amazon’s user terms of service, particularly
regarding the collection of personally identifying information. Although the study description
and instructions explained that any identifying information collected from the discussion
transcripts or screenshots would be anonymized by the researchers, many workers were not
persuaded and filed a formal complaint with Amazon’s customer service. After receiving notice
that the study had been suspended for violating terms of service, I immediately revised the study
instructions to require that workers anonymize their submissions themselves (e.g. blacking out
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names in the screenshots). Amazon’s customer support reviewers then confirmed that the new
instructions complied with their terms of service and lifted the restriction.
Over the next several days, I published new links to the study each morning to maximize
exposure for workers using the worker portal to find tasks. Despite seeking and earning the
clearance of Amazon’s reviewers for the revised instructions, complaints from workers accusing
the study of violating the terms of service continued. I then received a second notice of
suspension for violating terms of service regarding privacy, despite having been cleared by
Amazon’s reviewers only days earlier. I contacted Amazon support again to understand why the
study had been shut down. Three days later, Amazon responded explaining that the message of
suspension was sent in error and then apologized for any inconvenience. Simultaneously,
workers continued to email me asking about the terms of service and mentioned that several
worker forums had flagged the discussion study for violating worker rights.
The final stroke occurred on April 4th. Amazon emailed me that morning notifying me
that the account associated with by study (called “PCRG Manship”) had been deactivated for
repeatedly violating terms of service. The specific accusation accused my account of
“Advertising or marketing activities, including HITs requiring registration at another website or
group, or building profiles of MTurk Workers for any purpose other than to track performance of
specific Workers completing your HITs and HITS intended to promote a site, service or opinion
which are both prohibited by our Acceptable Use Policy.” Incensed, I contacted Amazon support
for a third time requesting an explanation for why the account had been deactivated after having
been cleared of suspensions by previous Amazon reviewers, only to be deactivated several days
later for utterly different reasons that were, in the opinion of this humble author, not even
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sensical enough to be considered false. Amazon upheld the decision and provided no further
explanation.
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